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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Broad philosophical perspective
The work done in this thesis generally speaking can be situated within the episte-
mology of mathematics and formal philosophy. We employ logical and analytical
methods in order to formally characterize one of the central notions in the epis-
temology of mathematics — the notion of a proof. Proofs, roughly speaking,
are taken to be acceptable means to establish and convince people (especially
mathematicians) about the truth of a given mathematical claim.
The notion of a proof is philosophically important, for the way we under-
stand it cements our views on the philosophy of mathematics and mathematics
in general.
One of the most prominent examples of this influence is provided by ma-
thematical intuitionism. According to the proponents of this view, an essential
feature of an existence proof in mathematics is the ability to define or construct
the object. On this view, if one wants to prove that there is a certain object that
fits a given description, then the proof of this claim should involve a construction
of the object whose existence we are about to prove.
It is quite well known that not all proofs in classical mathematics are like that.
In some of them, in order to show that there is an object satisfying a certain
description, we assume that there is no such object and infer a contradiction
from this assumption. Such proofs are known as indirect proofs. They justify an
existential claim without providing or specifying a witness for it.
Intuitionists claim that indirect proofs should not be admissible in mathe-
matics. Thus, on the intuitionistic account, proving methods are limited to con-
structive ones. This results in a new explication of the notion of a mathematical
proof, different from the classical notion of a proof.
The above difference has a major impact on what is quite often called the
logic of proofs: the set of intuitively valid principles governing sentences that
involve the notion of a proof. To get the idea of what a logic of a notion is,
consider, for instance, what one can think about inferential principles governing
the notion of truth. One may want to have principles assuring that the truth
of a conjunction of two sentences is equivalent to a statement expressing that
the first and the second conjuncts are both true. Similarly, for disjunction, one
1
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would like to have a principle saying that a disjunction is true iff at least one of
its disjunctions is true. For provability, obviously, the logic would be different
than the one designed for truth. The question is: in what respects?
The logic of intuitionistic proofs has to be different from classical logic in order
to limit ways of proving mathematical claims corresponding to the limitations
put by the mathematical intuitionism. The logic appropriate for this notion of
proofs is known as intuitionistic logic. It is strictly weaker than classical logic.
For instance the double negation rule allowing to move between a formula and
its double negated form is no longer valid. It is weakened from equivalence to
the implication in one direction only (from ϕ to ¬¬ϕ ). So, it seems that even a
prima facie simple change in the notion leads to major consequences.
In the thesis, however, we do not focus on intuitionism (which was used
only as an example). Instead, we focus on the opposition between formal and
informal proofs. The former are purely syntactical derivations stated within
a fully developed axiomatic formal system, such as Zermelo-Fraenkel with the
Axiom of Choice, in short ZFC (the common mathematical axiomatization of
set theory). The relation between any two steps in a formal proof is purely
syntactical. Within a formal system we have strict syntactical rules governing
symbol manipulations that determine the ways we can generate next lines in a
proof.
On the other hand, the informal notion of a proof is inspired by mathematical
practice. An informal proof is a commonly accepted mathematical justification
of a mathematical claim. On this account, commonly accepted means of proving
things are broader than in the case of formal proofs, and incorporate insights
based on semantics or intuition. What is also essential for informal proofs is the
fact that not all the steps in a proof have to be spelled out in details. Quite
often, mathematicians using informal proofs rely heavily on the experience and
mathematical insight of the reader.
In the thesis, we study the relation between formal and informal proofs from
a very particular angle. While formal logics of formal provability have been
developed and thoroughly studied, the logics of informal provability are not yet
fully developed. The ultimate aim of the thesis is to provide a characterization
of the logic of informal provability and study philosophical implications thereof.
We argue that the logics of formal and informal proofs are different. On the
account proposed in the thesis, informal provability is a partial notion: some
mathematical claims are informally provable, some are informally refutable and
the rest is neither. Incorporating this intuition into a formal framework results
in a non-classical logic.
The logics developed in the thesis are not-deterministic. The values of com-
plex formulas are not uniquely determined by the values of their components.
This is motivated by the observation that the provability status of certain disjunc-
tions and conjunctions of some claims which are neither provable nor refutable
is not automatically settled by the status of their components.
Providing the logic of informal provability that is non-classical has a major
impact on the debate about the nature of informal mathematics. First, since the
logics of informal and formal provability are different, it seems that the former
is not easily reducible to the latter. This means that the price that we have to
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pay by increasing the mathematical rigor of proofs is not as innocent as initially
one might suspect.
Second, once we provide a consistent characteristic of the notion of informal
provability, it can be used as in an argument against the philosophers claiming
that informal mathematics is inconsistent. On this view, using self-referential
mathematical claims involving the notion of informal provability, it is possible
to argue for the inconsistency of informal mathematics. Using the approach
proposed in the thesis we formulate strong arguments against the claim.
Third, spelling out in detail what the logic of informal provability looks like
sheds some light on a very complex relation between formal and informal provabil-
ity. It shows quite clearly that both notions are not inter-reducible. Nevertheless,
provability of a given claim in an axiomatic system about which we firmly be-
lieve is true still counts as a proper informal justification of the sentence. In that
sense, formal proofs can be counted as formal approximations of informal proofs.
1.2 Methodology
We will employ the methodology quite common for this type of investigation.
On one hand, we use philosophical analysis and intuition in order to identify the
crucial properties of the notion of informal provability. Next, using conceptual
analysis together with formal methods we construct formal systems. We will
mostly use many-valued logics and non-deterministic semantics. Then, we study
the systems and use them to approach philosophical conundrums related to the
notion of provability.
1.3 Provability logics
Provability logics are, roughly speaking, modal logics meant to capture the formal
principles of various provability operators (which apply to sentences) or predi-
cates (which apply to sentence names).1
Historically, the first candidate for a provability logic was the modal logic S4.
It contains as axioms all the substitutions of classical tautologies in the language
with ,2 and all substitutions of the schemata:
(K) (ϕ→ ψ)→ (ϕ→ ψ)
(M) ϕ→ ϕ
(4) ϕ→ ϕ
It is also closed under two rules of inference: modus ponens (from ` ϕ and
` ϕ→ ψ infer ` ψ), and necessitation (Nec): if ` ϕ, then ` ϕ.3
The principles of S4 seem sensible when ϕ is read as ‘it is provable that ϕ’.
Axiom K says that if an implication and its antecedent are provable, then so is
its consequent. Axiom M assures us that whatever is provable should be true. In
1The introductory section is partially based on (Urbaniak and Pawlowski, 2018).
2Throughout this dissertation when talking about instances or substitutions we’ll mean in-
stances and substitutions in the full language of the system under consideration, unless specified
otherwise.
3‘`’ is just a symbol for ‘is a theorem’.
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the context of provability, this axiom is sometimes called the reflection schema.
The third axiom 4 allows us to iterate provability. If something is provable, we
can prove that it is by simply displaying the proof. The system was used in 1933
by Go¨del to interpret intuitionistic propositional calculus (which is closely related
to reasoning about provability). Alas, S4 turned out to be inadequate as a tool
for modeling the behavior of the formal provability predicate within axiomatic
arithmetic. This was mostly due to the fact that (M), also (in the context of
provability logics) called the reflection schema, while intuitively plausible, cannot
be provable in a consistent sufficiently strong axiomatic arithmetic for the formal
provability predicate of that arithmetic.
Section 1.4 introduces the basic technical machinery of first order arithmetic.
We are mostly interested in a sketch of a construction of the standard provabil-
ity predicate of Peano Arithmetic. Next, in section 1.5 we define a modal logic
that at the time when it was constructed was thought to capture some notion
of provability. Currently, it’s clear that the modal operator of S4 and a formal
provability predicate of sufficiently strong formal theory have different properties.
Section 1.6 presents the logic GL which is used to interpret the formal provability
predicate. We describe the logic and define the well-known translation between
the first order language of Peano Arithmetic and a propositional modal language
of GL. In section 1.7 we present some attempts made to explicate the notion
of informal provability directly within the arithmetical setting. We start with
Epistemic Arithmetic where we extend the arithmetical language with an S4
operator. The resulting theory is interesting albeit quite weak. Horsten (1994)
proposed a more elaborate setting where informal provability is represented as
a composition of two operators. The resulting theory is called Modal Epistemic
Arithmetic and is also described in the section. A completely different way of
representing informal provability over arithmetic is sketched in section 1.9. The
system was developed by Horsten (2002). The idea behind it is straightforward.
Informal provability is a predicate not an operator and we axiomatize it by weak-
ening some of the rules to a certain subsystem of the theory. In section 1.10 we
state the main aim of the thesis and we briefly elaborate on its content.
1.4 Provability predicate and Peano Arithmetic
Considerations of the formal provability predicate (or predicates) are usually
developed in the context of an axiomatic arithmetic. This is the case for various
reasons: via Go¨del coding, instead of expressions, we can talk about numbers,
standard arithmetical theories are usually strong enough to include a sufficiently
rich theory of syntax (modulo coding), and arithmetic in general is a field where
many results are already known and can be borrowed and applied to syntax.
For the sake of simplicity, we’ll focus on one fairly standard axiomatic arith-
metic: Peano Arithmetic (PA), although many results apply to other arithmeti-
cal theories, including some weaker ones (see for example Ha´jek and Pudlak,
1993, for details). The language of PA, LPA, is a first order language with
identity and a few specific symbols: 0, S,× and + (in the standard model of
arithmetic N interpreted as referring to the number zero, the successor function,
multiplication, and addition, respectively). For any number m, the standard nu-
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meral for m has the form S . . . S︸ ︷︷ ︸
m
0 and is abbreviated by m. The specific axioms
of PA consist of:
∀x (0 6= Sx) (PA 1)
∀x, y (Sx = Sy → x = y) (PA 2)
∀x (x+ 0 = x) (PA 3)
∀x, y (x+ Sy = S(x+ y)) (PA 4)
∀x (x× 0 = 0) (PA 5)
∀x, y (x× Sy = (x× y) + x) (PA 6)
and all the instances of the induction schema:
ϕ(0) ∧ ∀x (ϕ(x)→ ϕ(S(x)))→ ∀xϕ(x) (PA Ind)
Formulas of LPA can be classified according to their logical complexity. If
t is a term not containing x, ∀x ≤ t ϕ(x) and ∃x ≤ t ϕ(x) abbreviate ∀x (x ≤
t → ϕ(x)) and ∃x (x ≤ t ∧ ϕ(x)) respectively. Such occurrences of quanti-
fiers are called bounded, and formulas all of whose all quantifiers are bounded
are called ∆0-formulas. The hierarchy proceeds in two “layers”, that of Πn
and that of Σn formulas. Π0 = Σ0 = ∆0. Σn+1-formulas are of the form
∃x1, . . . , xk ϕ(x1, . . . , xk), where ϕ(x1, . . . , xk) is Πn. Πn+1-formulas are of the
form ∀x1, . . . , xk ϕ(x1, . . . , xk), where ϕ(x1, . . . , xk) is Σn. Every formula of LPA
is logically equivalent to a Σn formula and to a Πm formula, for some n and m
(and there always exist the least such n and m).
The class of Σ1 formulas is of particular interest, because it turns out that
a function is recursively enumerable (see Smith, 2007, for a nice introduction to
the topic) just in case it is Σ1-definable. This result, for instance, makes sure
that an axiomatic system which is strong enough to handle Σ1-sentences (in a
sense to be specified) is strong enough to properly handle computable functions,
including those related to syntactic manipulations, and so is strong enough to
prove things about syntax of a formal language within it.
We say that an arithmetical theory T is Σ1-sound just in case for any Σ1-
formula ϕ, if T ` ϕ, then N |=ϕ (that is, ϕ is true in the standard model of
arithmetic). The dual notion is that of Σ1-completeness. T is Σ1-complete just
in case for any sentence ϕ ∈ Σ1, if N |=ϕ, then T ` ϕ. Interestingly, we have:
Fact 1. PA is Σ1-complete.
There are various ways of coding syntax, effectively mapping syntactic ob-
jects, such as expressions, formulas, sentences and sequences thereof to natural
numbers, so that each syntactic object τ of LPA is represented by its Go¨del code
pτq. The details are unimportant here, so let’s just focus on one coding and work
with it (again, see Smith, 2007, for an accessible introduction).
Consider now any theory T in LPA extending PA. It is said to be elementary
presented just in case there is an arithmetical ∆0-formula AxT(x) true of a natural
number just in case it is a code of an axiom of T. Such a formula can be further
used in a fairly standard way to construct a ∆0 arithmetical formula PrfT(y, x)
6 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
which is the standard binary proof predicate of T such that it is true of natural
numbers m and n just in case m is the code of a sequence of formulas which
is a proof of the formula whose code is n (the details of the construction are
inessential here). Moreover:
(Binumeration) If N |= PrfT(m,n), then PA ` PrfT(m,n).
If N |= ¬PrfT(m,n), then PA ` ¬PrfT(m,n).
PrfT(y, x) can be further used to define the so-called standard provability predi-
cate (since we won’t be talking about non-standard provability predicates, we’ll
simply talk about provability predicates, assuming they’re standard) and the
consistency statement :
ProvT(x) := ∃y PrfT(y, x)
Con(T) := ¬ProvT(p⊥q)
ProvT(y) is obtained from a ∆0 formula by preceding it with an existential
quantifier, and so, it is a Σ1-formula. Therefore, by Σ1-completeness, the first
half of (Binumeration) holds for it (and the second one fails, for somewhat more
complicated reasons):
If in the standard model ProvT(n) is true, then PA ` ProvT(n).
Note however, that even though the second half of (Binumeration) fails,
ProvT(x) succeeds at defining provability, in the sense that ProvT(pϕq) is true
in the standard model of arithmetic just in case in fact T ` ϕ (by the way, from
now on we’ll skip using the bar above numbers coding of formulas, assuming it
is normally there, that is, that in the formulas we’ll mention, numerals of codes
of formulas are standard).
Still assuming T is elementary presented, ProvT(x) satisfies the following so-
called Hilbert-Bernays conditions (Hilbert and Bernays, 1939; Lo¨b, 1955) for any
arithmetical formulas ϕ,ψ:
T ` ϕ iff PA ` ProvT(pϕq) (HB1)
PA ` ProvT(pϕ→ ψq)→ (ProvT(pϕq)→ ProvT(pψq)) (HB2)
PA ` ProvT(pϕq)→ ProvT(pProvT(pϕq)q) (HB3)
In particular, the provability predicate of T can be taken to be that of PA itself.
Also, keep in mind that most of the results apply to certain theories weaker
than PA and to elementary presented theories extending PA, either of which we
usually choose to ignore for the sake of simplicity.
Another important piece of the puzzle will be Go¨del’s incompleteness theo-
rems, which we include here in a somewhat modernized version:
Theorem 2. If an elementary presented theory T extends PA and is consistent,
then there is a sentence G ∈ LPA such that T 6` G and T 6` ¬G. Moreover,
T 6` Con(T).
Incompleteness follows from a more general result:
1.5. MODAL LOGIC S4 7
Lemma 1 (Diagonal Lemma). For any formula ϕ(x) ∈ LA there is a sentence
λ ∈ LA such that
PA ` λ ≡ ϕ(pλq).
The Diagonal Lemma, when we take ϕ(x) to be ¬ProvPA(x), entails the
existence of a sentence that can be used in the incompleteness proof, which
provably satisfies the condition:
PA ` G ≡ ¬ProvPA(pGq)
Such a G is independent of PA. The result generalizes: if a theory satisfies
certain requirements and is consistent, its Go¨del sentence is independent of it.
Henkin (1952) asked a related question: what happens, however, with sen-
tences such as:
H ≡ ProvT(pHq)? (Henkin)
The question was soon answered by Lo¨b (1955):
Theorem 3 (Lo¨b). If the Diagonal Lemma applies to T, and the provability
predicate of a theory T satisfies (his formulation of) the Hilbert Bernays condi-
tions (HB1-3), T ` ProvT(pϕq)→ ϕ if and only if T ` ϕ.
1.5 Modal logic S4
Formulas of the language LM of a propositional modal logic are built from propo-
sitional variables p1, p2, . . . , two propositional constants ⊥ (contradiction) and
> (logical truth), classical connectives ¬,∧,∨,→,≡, brackets, and unary modal
connectives  and ♦, in the standard manner. Sometimes, without loss of gener-
ality, we’ll treat LM as containing only a single classical connective and a single
modal operator — this will shorten some definitions, and is enough to make
all the other connectives definable. Given a formal language (not necessarily
LM , the context will make the range of meta-variables clear on each occasion),
we’ll use lower case Greek letters ϕ,ψ, χ, . . . as meta-variables for formulas of
that language (sometimes, we’ll also use σ as a metavariable for an arithmetical
sentence).
A normal modal logic contains as axioms all the substitutions of formulas of
LM for propositional variables in classical tautologies, all substitutions (in LM )
of the schema:
(ϕ→ ψ)→ (ϕ→ ψ) (K)
and is closed under two rules of inference: modus ponens (from ` ϕ and ` ϕ→ ψ
infer ` ψ) and necessitation (Nec): if ` ϕ, then ` ϕ (` ϕ is just a shorthand for
‘ϕ is a theorem’). The weakest normal modal logic is called K, all other normal
logics are its extensions.
The standard semantics of LM involves relational models (also called Kripke
models). A frame is a tuple F = 〈W,R〉, whereW is a non-empty set of possible
worlds (or simply nodes, if you’re not too much into bloated terminology) andR is
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a binary relation onW (‘is a possible world from the perspective of’), often called
an accessibility relation. A model over F = 〈W,R〉 is a triple M = 〈W,R,〉,
where  is a forcing (or satisfaction) relation between W and the formulas of
LM (think about it as ‘being true in’), satisfying the following conditions for any
w ∈ W and any ϕ,ψ ∈ LM :
w 6 ⊥ w  >
w  (ϕ→ ψ) iff w 6 ϕ or w  ψ
w  ϕ iff for all w′ ∈ W, if wRw′, then w′  ϕ
It turns out that the class of formulas forced in every node in every frame is
exactly the class of theorems of K. Sound and complete semantics for various
other normal modal logics is obtained by putting further conditions on R.
One modal logic that will be of particular interest for us is S4, which (in one
of the formulations) is obtained from K by adding as axioms all the instances of
the following schemata:
ϕ→ ϕ (M)
ϕ→ ϕ (4)
(M) is sometimes called (T), but in what follows we’ll often use T as a variable
for an axiomatic theory, so to avoid confusion, we’ll stick to (M). S4 is sound
and complete with respect to frames in which the accessibility relation is reflexive
(∀w ∈ W wRw) and transitive (∀w1, w2, w3 ∈ W(w1Rw2 ∧w2Rw3 → w1Rw3)).
Modal connectives of various modal systems admit various interpretations. 
can be interpreted as logical necessity, metaphysical necessity, physical necessity,
moral obligation, knowledge, etc.. Different modal systems are taken to capture
principles essential for these various notions. In what follows, we’ll be concerned
with the reading on which ϕ means ‘it is provable that ϕ’ (this reading will need
further specifications, as it will turn out). Now the question is: which modal logic
captures adequately the formal principles that hold for this reading?
Prima facie, S4 seems like a decent candidate. (K) holds, because the con-
sequent of a provable implication whose antecedent is provable is also provable.
(M) holds, because whatever is provable is true. (4) holds, because if ϕ is prov-
able, then by producing a proof of ϕ, by the same token, you are proving that
it is provable (necessitation is reliable for pretty much the same reason). But
are these considerations satisfactory? Not completely. First of all, we still don’t
know if there aren’t any principles that hold for provability but are not provable
in S4, because the argument so far was about the soundness of S4 with respect to
our intuitions about provability, not about completeness. Secondly, the argument
is somewhat handwavy — it would be good to have a more precise explication
of the notion of provability involved. Thirdly, even with such an explication in
hand, we have to double-check if all principles of S4 hold with respect to this
explication. Things will turn out to be more complicated than one might initially
expect.
Coming back to the question of whether  of S4 can be sensibly interpreted
as the formal provability predicate: what happens when we take ϕ to mean
ProvT(pϕq)? As it turns out, things fall apart quite quickly. For the sake
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of simplicity we’ll take the case where T = PA, but the point generalizes to
consistent recursively axiomatizable extensions of PA.
Since S4 ` ϕ → ϕ for any ϕ, the interpretation would require that for all
ϕ ∈ LPA, PA ` ProvPA(pϕq)→ ϕ. But this, jointly with Lo¨b’s theorem, would
entail that for any ϕ ∈ LPA,PA ` ϕ. So, if PA is consistent, S4 is not the logic
of the formal provability predicate of PA.
There is a somewhat different way to notice the inadequacy of S4 in this
context, already brought up by Feferman et al. (1986). The formula expressing
Con(PA) is ¬ProvPA(p⊥q), which is logically equivalent to ProvPA(p⊥q) → ⊥.
At the modal level, this is just an axiom of S4, since ⊥ → ⊥ falls under
schema (M). Thus, if S4 was adequate, we would have PA ` Con(PA), which
would contradict Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem. Moreover, necessita-
tion would yield (⊥ → ⊥), and so in S4 we would be able to derive the claim
that the consistency claim is derivable, which again, contradicts Go¨del’s second
incompleteness theorem.
1.6 Modal logic GL
Let’s fix our attention on the standard first order axiomatic arithmetic called
Peano Arithmetic (PA). With this system in the background, instead of talking
about an arithmetical formula ϕ, we can use a coding to represent it by some
natural number, denoted by pϕq. Once we’ve done this, there is (a standard
way to construct) an arithmetical formula ProvPA(x) true in the standard model
exactly about the codes of those formulas, which are provable in PA. This is the
formal provability predicate of PA.
One crucial property of this predicate is stated by Lo¨b’s Theorem, according to
which for any arithmetical ϕ, if PA ` ProvPA(pϕq)→ ϕ, then already PA ` ϕ.
It turns out that the modal logic of provability principles of formal arithmetical
provability is Go¨del-Lo¨b logic GL. Its axioms are all the substitutions of classical
tautologies, all the substitutions of (K), all the substitutions of:
(Lo¨b) (ϕ→ ϕ)→ ϕ
and the rules are modus ponens and necessitation. Various modal logics similar to
GL have been developed for various notions of provability related to the standard
formal provability. In the language of GL we can express claims such as ‘p is
provable’, but we cannot express things such as ‘t is a proof of p’.4
Note that while (Nec) is a rule of GL, we cannot have ϕ→ ϕ as an axiom
schema. While (Nec) is well-motivated (it says, in the intended interpretation,
that any theorem is provably provable), the implication would say that anything
true is provable, and that is far from obvious. In the arithmetical setting, we
already have the formalized version of the second incompleteness theorem:
PA ` Con(PA)→ ¬ProvPA(pCon(PA)q)
4That is, we cannot express explicit provability statements. The latter task can be achieved
in the so-called Logic of Proofs (LP). For a very interesting survey on this topic see (Artemov,
1994, 1998).
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so if we also had:
PA ` Con(PA)→ ProvPA(pCon(PA)q)
it would follow that PA ` ¬Con(PA).
Now, is GL at least sound with respect to the formal provability interpreta-
tion? Well, the necessitation rule is the modal version of (HB1) and (K) is the
modal version of (HB2). We can also prove in GL the modal version of (HB3),
that is, GL ` (4), and so it can also be dropped when moving from S4 to GL.
Fact 4. GL ` (4), that is GL ` ϕ→ ϕ.
We know that (4) is derivable in GL. But since (M) was the source of the
problems, we also need to make sure it is not a derivable theorem schema for
GL. Simply dropping it from the axiom schemata is not enough.
Fact 5. It is not the case that for any ϕ, GL ` ϕ→ ϕ.
Proof. The general structure of the argument is this. We show that all theorems
of GL have a certain property, which p → p doesn’t have, and so p → p is
not a theorem of GL. The property is: being a classical propositional tautology
under the following translation. So now we need to define a translation t from
LM into the classical propositional language, which translates all theorems of
GL into classical tautologies, but at the same time translates p → p into a
formula whose negation is classically satisfiable. Let’s start with the translation:
t(⊥) = ⊥
t(p) = p (for all propositional variables)
t(ϕ→ ψ) = (ϕ)? → (ψ)?
t(ϕ) = >
1. If ϕ is a substitution of a classical tautology, t(ϕ) is a tautology. This is
because the translation effectively is a substitution, and it gives a formula in
the classical propositional language, in which all substitutions of tautologies
are classical tautologies.
2. Let’s translate the first modal axiom of GL. t(K) is > → (> → >), which
is a classical tautology.
3. Let’s translate (Lo¨b). t(Lo¨b) is > → >, which also is a tautology.
So we handled the axioms of GL, making sure their translations are classical
tautologies. Now we need to take care of the inference rules.
4. Consider modus ponens (arguments for any classical propositional rule are
pretty much the same). One can still apply modus ponens to t(ϕ) and
t(ϕ → ψ) = (t(ϕ) → t(ψ)). So if GL ` ϕ,GL ` ϕ → ψ, we know that
GL ` ψ, and that the following are tautologies: t(ϕ), t(ϕ) → t(ψ), and
t(ψ).
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5. What about necessitation? Say GL ` ϕ so that also GL ` ϕ. Quite
trivially t(ϕ) = >, which is a tautology.
Together, points 1-5 show that all theorems of GL translate into classical tau-
tologies. Finally, we have to show that the translations of the formulas that we’re
interested in aren’t tautologies.
6. t(p→ p) = > → p, which is not a tautology.
Point 6 means that this formula is not a theorem of GL, which completes the
proof.
We know S4 turned out inadequate with respect to the formal provability
predicate. It turns out that GL does a much better job. To elaborate, we first
need to explain the relation between LM and LPA that will underlie what follows.
A mapping from propositional variables of LM to the set of sentences of LPA
is called an arithmetical realization. In a sense, an arithmetical realization tells us
which variables are to be interpreted as which sentences of arithmetic. Given an
elementary presented theory T, any arithmetical realization r can be extended
to a T-interpretation rT(ϕ) of a modal formula, by the following conditions:
rT(⊥) = ⊥ rT(>) = >
rT(p) = r(p) for any variable p
rT(ϕ→ ψ) = rT(ϕ)→ rT(ψ)
rT(ϕ) = ProvT(prT(ϕ)q)
(If you worry that LPA doesn’t really contain ⊥ and >, feel free to replace them
with any LPA-formulas that are, respectively, refutable and provable by pure
logic.) Let’s call the set of all possible T-interpretations of ϕ ∈ LM (under all
possible realizations) ϕT.
Given the correlation between the axioms and rules of GL and the Hilbert-
Bernay’s conditions and Lo¨b’s theorem, the adequacy of GL at least in one
direction is clear:
Fact 6. GL is sound with respect to the arithmetical interpretation, that is:
If GL ` ϕ, then PA ` ϕT.
(where by PA ` ϕT we mean that PA proves all the members of ϕT).
In fact, implication in the opposite direction also holds, provided that T is
Σ1-sound, so that the claim can be strengthened to equivalence (Solovay, 1976):
Theorem 7 (Solovay Completeness). If T is Σ1-sound, then for any ϕ ∈ LM :
GL ` ϕ if and only if T ` ϕT.
This shows that given a sensible arithmetical theory, those principles of its
formal provability predicate that are provable in arithmetic are adequately ax-
iomatized by GL. The proof lies beyond the scope of this introduction.
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1.6.0.1 Relational semantics for GL
We have drawn a connection between GL and the formal provability predicate.
What about relational semantics for GL, though? As proved by Segerberg (1971),
there is a natural class of relational models with respect to which GL is sound
and complete.
Theorem 8. GL is sound and complete with respect to the class of finite frames
in which R is transitive and irreflexive.
There is also a somewhat different class of frames with respect to which GL
is sound and complete. We say that the accessibility relation R is reversely well-
founded in W just in case every non-empty subset X of W has an R-maximal
element (that is, a w ∈ X such that ¬∃w′ ∈W wRw′).
Theorem 9. GL is sound and complete with respect to transitive and reversely
well-founded frames.
Notice that there is a connection between these two. Any reversely well-
founded R is irreflexive, and a transitive R on a finite set is reversely well-founded
just in case it is irreflexive. The result can be strengthened:
Theorem 10. GL is sound and complete with respect to finite transitive and
reversely well-founded frames.
Since the proof employs a construction that given a formula to be checked
gives an upper limit on the finite size of models to be checked, the proof by the
same token proves the decidability of GL.
The full proof of weak completeness (that is, the one that applies to theo-
remhood, read on for details) is beyond the scope of this thesis. To give you a
taste, however, we’ll run the following interesting part of the argument to the
effect that validity of (Lo¨b) in a frame, implies that the accessibility relation is
reversely well-founded. We’ll argue by contraposition, by showing that if a frame
isn’t reversely well-founded, there is a possible world in it and a forcing relation
over it, such that (Lo¨b) fails there.
So assume R is not reversely well-founded. This means there is a set X ⊆W
such that the elements of X constitute an infinite chain w1Rw2Rw3 . . . . Take 
such that w  p for all w ∈W \X and w′  ¬p for all w′ ∈ X. Pick an arbitrary
w ∈ X. Now we want to show that the antecedent of (Lo¨b), (p → p), holds
in w. This requires showing that p → p holds in any world accessible from w.
So assume wRv. We’ll want to show v  p→ p.
Either v ∈ X or v 6∈ X. If the former, then v can access at least one world
in the infinite chain. So for some u ∈ X, vRu. Since p is false in all elements of
X we have u 6 p and so v  ♦¬p, that is v  ¬p. But this classically entails
v  p→ p. If the latter, v  p, and classically v  p→ p.
Either way, if wRv, v  p→ p. Since our choice of v was arbitrary, and the
only assumption was that wRv, this means that w  (p → p). This is the
antecedent of (an instance) of (Lo¨b). On the other hand, w is in a chain in X,
and so it can access a world where p fails, and so w  ¬p, which is the negation
of (our instance of) (Lo¨b).
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1.7 Epistemic Arithmetic and its variants
The picture so far is that it’s possible to study properties of formal provability
directly in PA or indirectly via translation from the modal language. For in-
formal provability the situation is a bit different. Even if we agree that S4 is
an interesting modal logic of informal provability we still do not have means of
directly expressing informal provability in an arithmetical setting. In this section
we will fill this hole in by introducing a couple of systems that enable one to
study informal provability in arithmetic.
Historically, the first theory of informal provability is Shapiro’s Epistemic
Arithmetic (EA) presented in (Goodman, 1984; Shapiro, 1985) and further de-
veloped by Flagg and Friedman (1986). The idea here is to extend the standard
arithmetical language LPA to LK by adding a unary operator K that applies to
formulas. The underlying arithmetical theory is PA, and the behavior of K is
characterized by the following rules:
KI If Γ ` ϕ and every element of Γ is epistemic, then Γ ` K(ϕ)
KE K(ϕ) ` ϕ
where a formula ϕ is ontic iff it does not contain any occurrences of the operator
K and is epistemic iff it has the form K(ψ) for some formula ψ. So EA has all
axioms of PA and the above two rules for K. Note that the above rules imply
S4 principles for K.
Unfortunately, the internal logic of EA (that is, what in EA is provably
provable) is quite a weak theory — in a sense, it is an elementary extension of
intuitionistic Heyting Arithmetic (HA). Define a translation V from LHA, the
language of HA, into LK . We use ϕ¯ to indicate that ϕ belongs to LHA as follows:
1. For atomic formulas: V (ϕ¯) = K(ϕ¯),
2. V (ϕ ∧ ψ) = K(V (ϕ)) ∧K(V (ψ)),
3. V (ϕ ∨ ψ) = K(V (ϕ)) ∨K(V (ψ)),
4. V (ϕ→ ψ) = K(K(V (ϕ))→ K(V (ψ))),
5. V (ϕ ≡ ψ) = K(K(V (ϕ)) ≡ K(V (ψ))),
6. V (¬ϕ) = K(¬K(V (ϕ))),
7. V (∀xϕ(x)) = K(∀xV (ϕ(x))),
8. V (∃xϕ(x)) = ∃xKV (ϕ(x)).
Just for the sake of simplicity we will write ϕ instead of ϕ¯ whenever it does not
lead to confusion. The above translation is sound and complete in the following
sense:
Theorem 11. For every ϕ ∈ LHA, if HA ` ϕ, then EA ` V (ϕ).
Theorem 12 (Goodman 1984). For every ϕ ∈ LHA, if EA ` V (ϕ),then
HA ` ϕ.
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EA, however, does have some interesting properties — we’ll mention only
two of them. The numerical existence property is that for any formula ϕ, if
EA ` ∃xKϕ(x) then for some natural number n, EA ` Kϕ(n). The disjunction
property is that if EA ` K(ϕ ∨ ψ) then either EA ` K(ϕ) or EA ` K(ψ).
In Shapiro’s EA, K is a primitive operator which cannot be further ana-
lyzed. Horsten (1994) suggests that the provability operator is not primitive but
complex. He distinguishes between two components of informal provability: the
modal and the epistemic.
The modal component is associated with possibility. The epistemic compo-
nent is explained in terms of a mathematical proof. Instead of just one operator
K we have two unary operators applying to formulas: ♦ and P , where ♦ is in-
terpreted as possibility and P intuitively stands for “some mathematician has a
proof that...”. In LPA extended with these two operators, LMEA, and following
these intuitions we present the so-called Modal Epistemic Arithmetic (MEA)
(Horsten, 1994). The axioms of MEA are as follows:
1. all the axioms of PA with induction for the extended language,
2. ♦ϕ→ ϕ where ϕ is ontic i.e. ϕ ∈ LPA,
3. P (ϕ)→ ϕ,
4. P (ϕ)→ P (P (ϕ)),
5. (♦P (ϕ) ∧ ♦P (ϕ→ ψ))→ ♦P (ψ),
6. all axioms of the modal system S5 for ♦,
and a rule of inference: if ϕ is a theorem, then so is ♦P (ϕ).
Axioms 1 and 2 are some variants of the reflection principle which is provable
for P for ontic sentences, and for ♦ for all sentences. It does not follow that
reflection is provable for ♦P . Axioms 3 and 4 are standard axioms for prov-
ability ((HB3) and (HB1)). Note that (HB3) works for the provability operator
and (HB1) for ♦P . By a ♦P -formula we will mean any formula ϕ where all
subformulas of ϕ of the form Pχ are immediately preceded with ♦.
Observation 1.1. Let ϕ ∈ LMEA be a ♦P -formula. Then the following claims
hold:
MEA ` ♦Pϕ→ ϕ
MEA ` ♦Pϕ→ ♦P♦Pϕ
The above observation shows that we have a certain version of reflection schema
and certain version of (HB3), at least for a restricted class of formulas.
1.8 Problems with informal provability understood as an
operator
The main aim of treating provability as an operator is to circumvent the impos-
sibility that arises for the formal provability predicate — that of having all HB
conditions and all the instances of the reflection schema at the same time.
1.9. SPLITTING SOLUTION 15
Theorem 13 (Montague’s theorem). Peano Arithmetic, if consistent, cannot
contain (or be consistently extended to contain) a (possibly complex) predicate for
which all Hilbert-Bernays conditions and all instances of the reflection schema
hold.
Proof. Suppose that there is such a predicate, call it P . We will use a natural
deduction system. Argue inside the theory:
1. λ ≡ P (p¬λq) Diagonal lemma
1.1 λ Hypothesis
1.2 P (p¬λq) equivalence elimination: 1,1.1
1.3 ¬λ modus ponens and reflection schema: 1.2
2. ¬λ reductio ad absurdum: 1.1→ 1.3
3. P (p¬λq) (HB1)
4. ¬P (p¬λq) CL, 1, 2
5. contradiction CL, 3, 4
In order to prove Montague’s theorem one applies the diagonal lemma to a
certain formula involving the provability predicate. But if provability is treated
as an operator, we cannot use the Diagonal Lemma to generate this paradoxical
formula.
MEA is capable of proving variants of the reflection schema. It is an inter-
esting result, for the name of the game here is to gather as many instances of the
reflection schema as possible without inconsistency. Unfortunately, the theory
has some other philosophical problems:
1. The choice which rules are postulated for P and which are postulated for ♦
seems somewhat arbitrary. It is possible to consider different combination
of those rules. For instance, to add axiom (K) directly for P .
2. The reflection schema is available only for ♦P . It is not clear why other
types of reflection shouldn’t be introduced. For instance, reflection re-
stricted to Σ1 formulas doesn’t look completely insane.
3. Usually provability is treated as a predicate and not as an operator. There
seems to be no motivation for using an operator, independent of blocking
t Montague’s theorem.
4. Both EA and MEA seem to be a bit too weak — there are translations to
HA which preserve theorems.
1.9 Informal provability as a predicate — splitting
solution
Another strategy is to treat informal provability as a predicate and weaken some
of the Hilbert-Bernays conditions for this predicate. Again, expand LPA with an
additional predicate P for informal provability, thus obtaining a new language
LP . The idea here is straightforward: we divide the set of problematic principles
(HB conditions and the reflection schema) for the additional predicate P between
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two theories: PEA and its basis BPEA. Then we add to PEA all the instances
of the axiom saying that if something is derivable in the basis, it is informally
provable.
We will start with the basis of PEA (BPEA) (Horsten, 1997), which is
defined by:
Basis Axiom 1 PA in extended language with induction extended to LP
Basis Axiom 2 P (pϕq)→ (P (pϕ→ ψq)→ P (pψq)) for all ϕ,ψ ∈ LP
Basis Axiom 3 P (pϕq)→ P (pP (pϕq)q) for all ϕ ∈ LP
So, we have (K) and (4) for P . By ProvB we mean the standard provability
predicate of BPEA. PEA is given by the following axioms:
Axiom 1 PA in the extended language with induction extended to
LP
Axiom 2 P (pϕq)→ ϕ for all ϕ ∈ LP
Axiom 3 ProvB(pϕq)→ P (pϕq) for all ϕ ∈ LP
We have the reflection schema for P . Notice that we do not have (Nec) for
P , but we have the implication ProvB(pϕq)→ P (pϕq), which together with the
reflection schema gives us ProvB(pϕq)→ ϕ which is a certain version of (Nec).
These theories are still under investigation. One of the nice things about
PEA, apart from the reflection schema holding in it, is the fact that PEA has
nice models.
Fact 14. PEA has a model based on the standard model of arithmetic.
However, it seems that the philosophical motivations underlying the system
are somewhat lacking. While informal provability seems unified, this system
clearly has two separate layers. The restrictions on the claims for which reflection
can be used is still there — it’s just that they’re somewhat less visible, because
they arise at the point in which a restriction is put on what can be provably
provable (Axiom 3). Yes, Axiom 2 guarantees that reflection is provable for
any φ, but given that the internal logic of P is built starting from the formal
provability predicate of BPEA, it holds universally at the price of being idle on
many occasions.
1.10 The aim of the thesis
As one can already tell from the title, the main character of the thesis is the
notion of informal provability. The notion itself is rather elusive and obscure.
Generally, it’s quite hard to provide a positive characterization of it. There are
two things that we can do to partially explicate the notion and provide certain
intuitions. First, we can contrast this notion with the notion of formal provability.
Second, we can try to capture the intuitively valid inference patterns involving the
notion. We are interested in both. Keep in mind though that the main aim is to
characterize intuitively valid inference patterns involving a certain explication of
informal provability. In order to do so, we pose the following research questions:
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1. Is there a difference between formal and informal provability?
2. Can we provide an interesting reading of informal provability as a partial
notion and provide a decent formal framework for it?
3. What are the paradoxes related to the notion of informal provability? Is it
possible to avoid them in the resulting theory?
For the first question, we argue that indeed there is a difference between
these two notions. The crucial difference, as far as this thesis is concerned, is the
validity of the reflection schema for informal provability.
For the second question, the notion of informal provability is treated as a
partial one. Thus, on this account, some mathematical claims are informally
provable, some others are refutable and some are neither informally provable
nor informally refutable. To describe this approach in a more technical manner,
we develop a non-deterministic logic BAT and its extension CABAT. In these
logics, the explication of informal provability via non-deterministic semantics is
not crazy at all. Au contraire! This explication seems to be very close to the very
common, in mathematical practice, idea that either a sentence can be proved, or
disproved, or neither.
It’s possible to provide a philosophically coherent and somewhat convincing
story on how the indeterminism may be used. Roughly speaking, mathematical
sentences can be informally proved, informally refuted or informally undecided.
Yet, some complex sentences built from two informally undecided formulas are
informally provable, and some other informally refutable. For instance, the dis-
junctions of two undecided sentences can be informally provable (The Contin-
uum Hypothesis and its negation) or still be informally undecided (for instance
a disjunction of the Continuum hypothesis with itself). This motivates the non-
deterministic approach.
On this non-deterministic reading it is possible to avoid persistent paradoxes
of informal provability without paying a huge bill. Most of the crucial infer-
ence patterns for informal provability are still valid in the framework. BAT and
CABAT are not very easy beasts to tame, though. Some of their properties
are unusual.We construct proof-systems for both logics, then take a detour into
semantical aspects of the logics. Notably, the lack of neighborhood semantics
for CABAT is proven. The situation is even worse — neither the theorems of
CABAT nor the consequence relation of BAT can have a finitely many-valued
deterministic semantics.
Proceeding with the inquiry, we take a closer look at the paradoxes of informal
provability. It turns out that some of them are avoided by switching from classical
logic to CABAT in the background. A version of the dialetheist argument for
the inconsistency of mathematics is presented and discussed. We argue that the
argument fails and that if we switch to CABAT in the background we need not
to worry about it.
Lastly, the BAT framework is developed into a full first order theory. The
main idea is to use three-valued structures. On this account, an interpretation of
a predicate ascribes to it a triple whose elements are called the extension, the anti-
extension and the fringe. Intuitively the first set corresponds to all the elements
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for which the predicate holds, anti-extension is the set of all elements for which
the predicate does not hold and the fringe is a set of all the elements for which
the predicate is not applicable. These sets can be used to define a triple which
serves as a partial satisfaction relation restricted only to atomic formulas. Thus
all atomic sentences have exactly one of the values: 1,n or 0. Next, we extend
this partial satisfaction relation to the full language by means of evaluations.
Evaluations are total functions from the set of sentences of a given language into
the set of values such that they agree with values of atomic formulas determined
relative to a structure. According to this, one structure can have many different
underlying evaluations. We limit our attention to the so-called BAT-evaluations.
These are based on the definition of a BAT evaluation for propositional language
and similarly as in the propositional case they are not unique. As for quantifiers,
they are treated as “infinitary” disjunction and conjunction.
1.11 The structure of the thesis
The dissertation is paper-based. Each chapter is either an accepted paper or a
draft of a paper. Chapter 2 is an accepted and forthcoming paper in the Review
of Symbolic Logic. In the paper we briefly discuss the relation between formal and
informal provability, concluding that these two notions are different. Next, we
propose a non-deterministic interpretation of informal provability and develop
the many-valued non-deterministic logic BAT and its extension CABAT. We
study some of their technical properties, focusing on certain inferential patterns
involving informal provability. The moral from the paper is that it’s possible to
retain quite a large set of intuitive principles of informal provability. Chapter
3 is an accepted and forthcoming paper in the Logic Journal of the IGPL. It’s
devoted solely to proof-theoretic investigations of BAT and CABAT. Inspired
by Carnielli (1987) and Priest (2001) we construct tree-like proof systems for
BAT and CABAT and prove strong completeness. Chapter 4 is a submitted
draft. It generalizes the proof-theoretic framework of BAT and CABAT. Using
the framework it’s possible to generate proof-systems for any finitely-many val-
ued deterministic and non-deterministic consequence relation. Chapter 5 is also
a submitted draft. There, we are concerned with purely semantical investigations
of BAT and CABAT. We prove that both logics can’t be pinned down by a vast
class of well-known semantics. The main result in the paper is the proof that
there is no finitely many-valued deterministic semantics for CABAT. Chapter 6
is also a submitted draft. It’s more philosophical — we present well-known para-
doxes involving various notions of provability and how they correspond to certain
limitation theorems. Dialetheist arguments to the effect that informal mathemat-
ics is inconsistent is thoroughly discussed. We dissect some of its premises and
argue that the argument does not work. Next, we discuss the paradoxes and
corresponding theorems with CABAT in the background. It turns out that most
of the paradoxes are blocked and at the same time the set of admissible principles
of informal provability in CABAT is quite large and intuitive.
Chapter 7 contains conclusions and sketches the future perspective of logics
of informal provability. We start with a generalization of BAT to a first order
version. To do so, we use the notion of a three-valued structure. Based on
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that, we define the interpreting function which uniquely determine the values
of atomic formulas. Similarly to the propositional case, the values of all atomic
formulas are uniquely determined by the interpretation. To ascribe logical values
to complex formulas, we introduce the notion of an evaluation. On this account,
an evaluation determines logical values for all complex formulas and has to agree
on the values of atomic formulas determined by the structure together with its
interpretation. In particular we are interested in a certain type of evaluations
which we call BAT evaluations. These evaluations are generated by applying
the meaning of BAT connectives and quantifiers are treated as “infinitary” BAT
conjunction and disjunction. In the last subsection we state the conclusions of
the thesis.

Chapter 2
Many-valued logic of informal
provability: a non-deterministic
strategy1
Abstract
Mathematicians prove theorems in a semi-formal setting, provid-
ing what we’ll call informal proofs. There are various philosophical
reasons not to reduce informal provability to formal provability within
some appropriate axiomatic theory (Leitgeb, 2009; Antonutti Marfori,
2010; Tanswell, 2015), but the main worry is that we seem committed
to all instances of the so-called reflection schema: B(ϕ) → ϕ (where
B stands for the informal provability predicate). Yet, adding all its
instances to any theory for which Lo¨b’s theorem for B holds leads to
inconsistency.
Currently existing approaches (Shapiro, 1985; Horsten, 1996, 1998)
to formalizing the properties of informal provability avoid contradic-
tion at a rather high price. They either drop one of the Hilbert-
Bernays conditions for the provability predicate, or use a provability
operator that cannot consistently be treated as a predicate.
Inspired by (Kripke, 1975), we investigate the strategy which
changes the underlying logic and treats informal provability as a par-
tial notion. We use non-deterministic matrices to develop a three-
valued logic of informal provability, which avoids some of the above
mentioned problems.
Keywords. Informal provability, many-valued logic, non-deterministic
semantics, Lo¨b’s theorem, paradoxes of provability
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2.1 Formal vs Informal provability
In common mathematical practice mathematical claims are justified or proven in
an informal way. Informal proofs are not stated in a proper formal language, but
rather in a mixture of a native language expanded with mathematical notation.
They abide by a different canon of rigour than formal proofs. From the perspec-
tive of fully formalized proofs, in informal proofs some inference steps seem to
be missing. It is not even clear what counts as an axiom and some simple facts
are said to be justified merely on the basis of mathematical insight (or intuition).
Yet, the existence of an informal proof of a mathematical statement is a very
good reason to take the claim to be true (or established). Provability in the
above sense will be called informal provability.
On the other hand, there exist formal proofs, given in a fully formalized
axiomatic theory by means of a fully specified formal proof system. Formal
provability in this sense is always relative to some axiomatic theory.
The relation between formal and informal provability is often explained by
the so-called standard view. The proponents of this view argue that any infor-
mal proof is at least in principle reducible to a proper proof in an appropriate
axiomatic system (usually, ZFC). On this view, informal proofs are just sloppy,
incomplete versions of formal proofs.
Yet, there are reasons to think that there is at least a conceptual differ-
ence between these notions. Some philosophers (Horsten, 2002; Leitgeb, 2009;
Antonutti Marfori, 2010) argue against the standard view. According to them,
the standard view does not fully explain why informal proofs are quite good at
convincing mathematicians, whereas formal ones are not. They also point out
that the role of axioms and definitions is quite different in both kinds of proofs
and that there is no clear procedure for converting an informal proof into a formal
one or for associating informal proofs with their formal counterparts (Tanswell,
2015).
For us, the most important argument for the difference between formal and in-
formal provability lies in general principles valid for informal provability. There is
an agreement that principles of formal provability are satisfied for informal prov-
ability. Yet, those principles are not enough, they do not express the reliability
of informal proofs. The additional principle, which is thought to be sound for
informal provability is the reflection schema. It roughly says that any informally
provable sentence is also true.
Unfortunately, the language of any arithmetical theory T containing Peano
arithmetic, cannot contain a formula for which the combination described above
holds. We will elaborate on this in section 2.7.
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Current theories of informal provability (Horsten, 2002) have to face the cost
of adding all the instances of the reflection schema for a new informal provability
predicate. It is quite high: some other principles which intuitively hold for infor-
mal provability (such as some of Hilbert-Bernays derivability conditions) have to
go.
Another strategy of constructing a theory of informal provability is to pay a
different price for adding all the instances of the reflection schema for informal
provability. In such systems, provability can only be treated as an operator, but,
under the threat of inconsistency, not as a predicate (Shapiro, 1985).
By the end of the paper the reader will notice that in the system we present
all the instances of reflection for informal provability can be added, while (some
variants of) other intuitive principles are preserved. Our current goal is only to
discuss the propositional level of the inferential machinery, so showing that our
strategy can be consistently extrapolated to the informal provability predicate lies
beyond the scope of this paper. However, it will become clear that the reasons
which blocked the move to the predicate level for other systems are not going to
constitute a similar obstacle in the case at hand.
We would like to suggest an unexplored strategy out of these difficulties, which
stems from the intuitions that some of the solutions proposed in Kripke’s theory
of truth can be used to approach provability.
Instead of dropping or restricting Hilbert-Bernays conditions we will change
the underlying logic. Most notably, our goal is to explore the option of treating
mathematical provability as a partial notion — after all, there is an intuitive
division of mathematical claims into provable, refutable and undecidable.
In the standard Kripke construction we rely on the Strong Kleene logic to
deal with the partial truth predicate. But Kleene logic is not appropriate for
modelling informal provability. It seems that informal provability doesn’t have a
truth-functional nature. Generally it is not always the case that disjunctions of
two independent sentences of a given theory are independent of that theory.
We’ll limit our attention to the arithmetical setting since it is at the same
time quite simple to handle and expressive enough. The logic developed in this
paper is propositional and it still needs to be further developed to the full first
order version. Yet, some properties of informal provability can be studied in the
propositional setting, and doing so seems like a good place to start, especially
as it will turn out on page 2.7 that the propositional level is where most of the
action is.
2.2 The non-deterministic strategy
Let L be a propositional language (understood as the set of all well-formed for-
mulas) constructed from propositional variables W = {p1, p2, . . . } and Boolean
connectives (¬,∧,∨,→,≡) in the standard manner. We will use Greek letters
ϕ,ψ, ... as meta-variables for formulas. The language that results from extending
the set of Boolean connectives with one unary operator B will be denoted LB.
We will use B to express provability within the object language.
By an assignment we mean any function v : W 7→ V al, where V al is a set of
values. By an evaluation ev built over an assignment v we will mean a function
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assigning values to all well-formed formulas (ev : L 7→ V al) agreeing with v on W
(propositional variables), and satisfying some additional constraints determined
by a given logic.
In the case of standard classical propositional logic, evaluations are unam-
biguously determined by assignments. For each assignment there is exactly one
evaluation extending it.
It is possible to construct sensible logics for which this uniqueness fails.
One nice example is the propositional variant of paraconsistent logic CLuN
(Batens and De Clercq, 2004).2 The standard semantics of CLuN is similar to
the semantics of classical propositional logic with one difference: the truth con-
ditions for negation are different.
Both for classical logic and for CLuN we have V al = {0, 1}. In classical
propositional logic ev(¬ϕ) = 1 iff ev(ϕ) = 0. In CLuN this equivalence is weak-
ened to an implication: if ev(ϕ) = 0, then ev(¬ϕ) = 1. (Clauses for the rest
of connectives are the same as in classical propositional logic.) In other words,
CLuN allows for gluts for negation: both ϕ and ¬ϕ can be true in one and the
same evaluation.
The standard semantics of CLuN has another interesting feature. It is non-
deterministic: assignments of values to propositional variables do not uniquely
determine evaluations of all formulas. One and the same assignment might be
extended in different ways to different evaluations, as long as they obey classical
clauses for connectives other than negation and the implication above for nega-
tion. For instance, if v(p) = 1, there is one evaluation e1v such that e
1
v(¬p) = 0
and there is another one e2v such that e
2
v(¬p) = 1.
2.3 Non-deterministic matrices for provability
We apply a similar trick to develop a non-deterministic semantics for a logic
which would help us model the notion of informal provability.
The logic will be three-valued: we take the set of values V al = {0, n, 1}.
The intended interpretation of the values is as follows. 1 stands for (informally)
provable, 0 represents (informal) refutability and n stands for being neither (in-
formally) provable, nor (informally) refutable. This is the synchronic interpre-
tation, on which whether something is informally provable or refutable doesn’t
depend on the stage of the development of mathematics or on anyone’s state of
knowledge.
We will develop a logic with provability values. One might think that this
approach is strictly speaking anti-realist (because the values aren’t interpreted
in terms of what happens in the “external world” but rather in terms of the
properties of the system), but we are not deeply committed to this way of thinking
about it. One can be a truth-value realist or an ontological realist while using
our logic to reason about provability and at the same time being aware that
provability and truth are quite different.
2A general framework for non-deterministic logics can be found in (Avron and Zamanski,
2011). Particular systems discussed there have, however, quite different motivation from ours,
and quite different matrices.
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Perhaps, one can think of these values diachronically by assuming that what
is informally provable changes through time as new proofs are developed. In this
sense, 1 would stand rather for being informally proven, 0 for being informally
refuted and i for being neither. While we conjecture that this interpretation
should abide by the same intuitively valid inferential principles, due to the limited
scope of this paper we have to postpone a proper discussion of this reading aside.
Recall that LB is the propositional language with provability operator B. We
now move to specifying the semantics for connectives of LB by means of non-
deterministic matrices. Let’s start with negation:
• ev(ϕ) = 1 iff ev(¬ϕ) = 0.
• ev(ϕ) = 0 iff ev(¬ϕ) = 1.
• ev(ϕ) = n iff ev(¬ϕ) = n.
A given formula is informally provable iff its negation is informally refutable.
A given formula is informally refutable iff its negation is informally provable. A
formula is undetermined iff its negation is.
For disjunction we introduce non-deterministic clauses. The equivalence
ev(ϕ ∨ ψ) = 1 iff ev(ϕ) = 1 or ev(ψ) = 1
is weakened to one direction only:
If ev(ϕ) = 1 or ev(ψ) = 1 then ev(ϕ ∨ ψ) = 1.
The full set of clauses for disjunction is:
• If ev(ϕ) = 1 or ev(ψ) = 1, then ev(ϕ ∨ ψ) = 1.
• ev(ϕ ∨ ψ) = 0 iff ev(ϕ) = ev(ψ) = 0.
• If ev(ϕ) = 0, ev(ψ) = n, then ev(ϕ ∨ ψ) = n.
• If ev(ϕ) = n, ev(ψ) = 0, then ev(ϕ ∨ ψ) = n.
• If ev(ϕ) = n, ev(ψ) = n, then ev(ϕ ∨ ψ) = n or ev(ϕ ∨ ψ) = 1.
The intention behind the introduction of non-determinism is this. We want
to allow for the possibility of there being informally (absolutely) undecidable
mathematical sentences (without saying that there are any). Yet, even for such
sentences (if there are any), some disjunctions built from them might be infor-
mally undecidable, while some others will be informally provable. Say ϕ and ψ
are informally undecidable (and therefore, so is ¬ϕ). Then, while we might think
that ϕ ∨ ψ is informally undecidable, we might be inclined to think that ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ
is informally provable despite ϕ not being decidable.
For instance, you might be inclined to think that the Continuum Hypothesis
(CH) is informally undecidable, while CH ∨ ¬CH is still informally provable,
being a logical truth. This however, clearly doesn’t mean that CH ∨ CH is
provable, and so not every disjunction of undecidable sentences is decided.
Conjunction ϕ ∧ ψ is taken to have the same matrix as ¬(¬ϕ ∨ ¬ψ), and so:
• If ev(ϕ) = 0 or ev(ψ) = 0 then ev(ϕ ∧ ψ) = 0.
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• ev(ϕ ∧ ψ) = 1 iff ev(ϕ) = ev(ψ) = 1.
• If ev(ϕ) = 1, ev(ψ) = n then ev(ϕ ∧ ψ) = n.
• If ev(ϕ) = n, ev(ψ) = 1 then ev(ϕ ∧ ψ) = n.
• If ev(ϕ) = n, ev(ψ) = n then ev(ϕ ∧ ψ) = n or ev(ϕ ∧ ψ) = 0.
The idea for the non-deterministic case for conjunction is as follows. For
some informally undecidable sentences we may be able to prove that they are
mutually contradictory, which makes their conjunction informally refutable. For
some others it may be impossible, and so their conjunction remains informally
undecidable.3
Implication is taken to have the same matrix as (¬ϕ ∨ ψ), and so:4
• If ev(ϕ) = 0 then ev(ϕ→ ψ) = 1.
• ev(ϕ→ ψ) = 0 iff ev(ϕ) = 1 and ev(ψ) = 0.
• If ev(ϕ) = n, ev(ψ) = n then ev(ϕ→ ψ) = n or ev(ϕ→ ψ) = 1.
• If ev(ϕ) = n, ev(ψ) = 1 then ev(ϕ→ ψ) = 1.
• If ev(ϕ) = n, ev(ψ) = 0 then ev(ϕ→ ψ) = n.
• If ev(ϕ) = 1, ev(ψ) = n then ev(ϕ→ ψ) = n.
• If ev(ϕ) = 1, ev(ψ) = 1 then ev(ϕ→ ψ) = 1.
Equivalence has the same matrix as ((ϕ→ ψ) ∧ (ψ → ϕ)), and therefore:
• ev(ϕ ≡ ψ) = 1 if ev(ϕ) = ev(ψ) = 1 or ev(ϕ) = ev(ψ) = 0.
• ev(ϕ ≡ ψ) = 0 if (ev(ϕ) = 1 and ev(ψ) = 0) or (ev(ϕ) = 0 and ev(ψ) = 1).
• ev(ϕ ≡ ψ) = n if exactly one of ψ, ϕ has value n.
While this doesn’t need to be stated and follows from the above, notice that
if ev(ϕ) = ev(ψ) = n then ev(ϕ ≡ ψ) is either 0, n, 1.
The intended reading of Bϕ is ‘ϕ is informally provable.’ The matrix for B is
non-deterministic:
• ev(Bϕ) = 1 iff ev(ϕ) = 1.
• If ev(Bϕ) = 0, then ev(ϕ) = 0 or ev(ϕ) = n.
• If ev(Bϕ) = n, then ev(ϕ) = n.
3Notice that just because ϕ ∧ ψ has the same truth table as ¬(¬ϕ ∨ ¬ψ), it doesn’t follow
that the substitution of expressions of this form preserves the value under an interpretation.
This will fail due to indeterminacy. (The substitutability will be regained once we move from
BAT to CABAT.)
4There are other ways to introduce implication in many-valued contexts, but given how,
as it will turn out, the behavior of implication deserves additional attention, we postpone the
discussion of various ways it can or cannot be introduced to another paper.
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The intuition behind these conditions is the following.
If a formula is informally provable (ev(ϕ) = 1), then giving its own proof
is also a proof of its provability (ev(Bϕ) = 1), and the other way around. If a
formula is informally refutable ev(ϕ) = 0, then giving its own refutation is also a
refutation of its provability (ev(Bϕ) = 0). If a formula is informally undecidable
(ev(ϕ) = n), then one of two things may happen. First, it may be the case
that the undecidability of that formula is informally provable, and so its informal
provability is refutable (ev(Bϕ) = 0). Second, it may be the case that its absolute
informal undecidability is not informally provable, and so its absolute informal
provability is informally undecidable (ev(Bϕ) = n).
All these conditions are captured by the following tables:
¬ ϕ
0 1
n n
1 0
∨ 0 n 1
0 0 n 1
n n n/1 1
1 1 1 1
∧ 0 n 1
0 0 0 0
n 0 0/n n
1 0 n 1
→ 0 n 1
0 1 1 1
n n n/1 1
1 0 n 1
≡ 0 n 1
0 1 n 0
n n 0/n/1 n
1 0 n 1
B ϕ
1 1
n/0 n
0 0
Because we interpret value 1 as Being an Absolute Theorem (BAT), we call
the logic thus obtained BAT and we’ll use the bat symbol ý to denote its
consequence relation, which we define as follows.
A BAT-assignment v is a function from propositional variables W to {0, n, 1}.
A BAT-evaluation over an assignment v is a function which assigns values to all
formulas of LB, agrees with v on W and obeys the constraints we gave for the
connectives. Notice that due to non-deterministic clauses, one and the same
assignment might underlie multiple evaluation functions.
By Γýϕ, where Γ is a set of formulas, we will mean that any BAT-evaluation
which assigns 1 to all formulas in Γ assigns 1 to formula ϕ. We say that ϕ is a
BAT-tautology iff ∅ýϕ. We say that ϕ is a countertautology of BAT iff ∅ý¬ϕ.
2.4 Properties of BAT
First, note:
Theorem 15. BAT has neither tautologies nor countertautologies.
Proof. Because n is contagious, it is easy to see by induction on formula com-
plexity that for the assignment v which assigns n to all propositional variables
and for any formula ϕ there will be a way of extending v to ev such that ev(ϕ)
will be n.
Theorem 16. Let Γ ⊆ L and ϕ ∈ L, then for any set of formulas Γ and any
formula ϕ if Γýϕ then Γ |= ϕ, where |= is the classical consequence relation
(we’ll use |= in this sense throughout the paper).
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Proof. By contraposition suppose that Γ 6|= ϕ. Then there is an evaluation over
an assignment v such that ev(ψ) = 1 for all ψ ∈ Γ and ev(ϕ) = 0. It is easy to
see that ev is also a BAT-evaluation. For the assignment v is classical (it is into
{0, 1}) and BAT-evaluations behave in the same manner as classical evaluations
over classical assignments. Hence, there is at least one BAT-assignment which
makes all formulas of Γ true and ϕ false, which means that it is not the case that
Γýϕ (that is, Γ
Z
Zý| ϕ).
Quite expectedly, classical consequence is strictly stronger than BAT-consequence:
Theorem 17. There are some Γ ⊆ L and ϕ ∈ L such that Γ |= ϕ but ΓZZý| ϕ.
Proof. For instance, ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ)ZZý| ¬ϕ ∨ ¬ψ. Take any evaluation for which
ev(ϕ) = n = ev(ψ), ev(ϕ ∧ ψ) = 0, ev(¬ϕ ∨ ¬ψ) = n.
The following table illustrates the assessment of some standard classically
valid inference patterns in BAT.
Premises Conclusion ý ?
ϕ ¬¬ϕ Yes
¬¬ϕ ϕ Yes
¬(ϕ ∧ ψ) ¬ϕ ∨ ¬ψ No
¬ϕ ∨ ¬ψ ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ) No
¬(ϕ ∨ ψ) ¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ Yes
¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ ¬(ϕ ∨ ψ) Yes
ϕ ∧ ψ ψ ∧ ϕ Yes
ϕ ∨ ψ ψ ∨ ϕ No
ϕ→ ψ ¬ψ → ¬ϕ No
ϕ ∧ ψ ϕ ∨ ψ Yes
ϕ ψ → ϕ Yes
ϕ ∧ (ψ ∨ χ) (ϕ ∨ ψ) ∧ (ϕ ∨ χ) No
ϕ ∨ (ψ ∧ χ) (ϕ ∧ ψ) ∨ (ϕ ∧ χ) No
(ϕ ∨ ψ) ∧ (ϕ ∨ χ) ϕ ∧ (ψ ∨ χ) No
(ϕ ∧ ψ) ∨ (ϕ ∧ χ) ϕ ∨ (ψ ∧ χ) No
ϕ→ ψ,ψ → χ ϕ→ χ No
¬ψ ¬(ϕ ∧ (ϕ→ ψ)) No
ϕ ¬[(ϕ→ ψ) ∧ ¬ψ] No
ϕ ∨ ψ,¬ϕ ψ Yes
ϕ→ ψ,¬ψ ¬ϕ Yes
¬ψ ∧ (ϕ→ ψ) ¬ϕ Yes
ϕ ∧ (ϕ→ ψ) ψ Yes
ϕ, (ϕ→ ψ) ψ Yes
ϕ→ ψ (ϕ ∧ λ)→ ψ No
ϕ→ ψ ϕ→ (ψ ∨ λ) No
ϕ ∧ (ψ ∧ χ) (ϕ ∧ ψ) ∧ χ Yes
ϕ ∨ (ψ ∨ χ) (ϕ ∨ ψ) ∨ χ No
(ϕ ∧ ψ) ∧ χ ϕ ∧ (ψ ∧ χ) Yes
(ϕ ∨ ψ) ∨ χ ϕ ∨ (ψ ∨ χ) No
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Notice that Modus Ponens works in both formulations, while its contraposed
form fails. Similarly, Modus Tollens works in both forms, while its contraposed
form fails. This entails:
Theorem 18. It is not generally the case that if ϕýψ then ¬ψý¬ϕ.
Observe that disjunction is neither commutative nor associative. Take the
assignment v where all propositional variables have value n and consider two
formulas: ϕ = p ∨ q and ψ = q ∨ p. As far as ϕ and ψ are concerned, there are
four possible ways to extend this assignment:
e1v(ϕ) = n = e
1
v(ψ)
e2v(ϕ) = 1, e
2
v(ψ) = n
e3v(ϕ) = n, e
3
v(ψ) = 1
e4v(ϕ) = 1 = e
4
v(ψ).
BAT is too weak to eliminate extensions (e1v, e
2
v, e
3
v), in which ϕ and ψ obtain
different values, and which show that neither ϕýψ, nor ψýϕ. Thus, it needs
to be strengthened.
2.5 Strengthening BAT
Usually, to obtain a stronger logic from a logic with a non-deterministic semantics
we have to limit the range of available possible extensions of given assignments.5
We would like to propose our own solution to this problem in terms of either
enriching one logic by another one or by an additional closure condition.
Definition 19. Let L be a logic. We say that a BAT-evaluation e belongs to
the L-filtered set of BAT-evaluations just in case the following conditions hold:
1. For any two formulas ϕ,ψ, if |=L ϕ ≡ ψ then e(ϕ) = e(ψ),
2. For any L-tautology ϕ, e(ϕ) = 1,
3. For any L-countertautology ϕ, e(ϕ) = 0.
We will focus on the case where L is classical logic (L=CL) in the extended
language with B,6 and we simply use |= to denote the classical consequence rela-
tion. By ΓýCL ϕ we will mean that for any evaluation e in the CL-filtered set
5The most common way to strengthen a non-deterministic logic is to use the level-evaluation
method (Coniglio et al., 2015) Due to simplicity, we prefer our method.
6 Technically speaking, propositional logic is not defined for the language containing oper-
ator B. Yet, it is rather straightforward what we mean. We mean a logic which treats every
formula whose main operator is B as a propositional variable. Semantically, one can interpret
B by an n-matrix:
B ϕ
{1,0} 1
{1,0} 0
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of BAT-evaluations if e(ψ) = 1 for all ψ ∈ Γ then e(ϕ) = 1. The resulting logic
is called CLBAT.
We may also be inclined to strengthen BAT in a different manner. A quite
intuitive way to go is to close BAT under classical consequence. It can be done
by the following condition:
Definition 20 (Closure condition). An extension of BAT (in LB) satisfies the
closure condition just in case for all LB-formulas ϕ1, ϕ2, · · · , ϕk, ψ such that
ϕ1, ϕ2, · · · , ϕk |= ψ,
where |= is the classical consequence relation for LB, for any BAT-evaluation ev,
if ev(Bϕi) = 1 for any 0 < i ≤ k, then ev(Bψ) = 1.
The result of closing BAT-logic under the closure condition will be called
CABAT and its consequence relation will be denoted byýC .
It turned out that the above conditions are equivalent, and so are the resulting
logics:
Theorem 21. ΓýC ϕ iff ΓýCL ϕ.
Proof. We will show that the set of CL-filtered BAT-evaluations respects the
closure condition and that the set of evaluations for which the closure condition
holds is exactly the set of CL-filtered BAT-evaluations.
⇒: Let Γ = {ϕ1 . . . ϕn} and ϕ be such that Γ |= ϕ. We have to show that for
any CLBAT-evaluation e, if e(Bϕ1) = e(Bϕ2) = . . . = e(Bϕn) = 1 then e(Bϕ) = 1.
Assume the antecedent. By the deduction theorem for classical propositional
logic we know that |= ∧i=ni=1 ϕi → ϕ. By the assumption and the definition of
CLBAT-evaluation, e(
∧i=n
i=1 ϕi → ϕ) = 1. Since any CLBAT-evaluation which
assigns 1 to all conjuncts has to assign 1 to the whole conjunction, we have
e(
∧i=n
i=1 ϕi) = 1. By the matrix for implication it follows that e(ϕ) = 1. By the
matrix of B, we have e(Bϕ) = 1.
⇐: To show that any CABAT-evaluation e is also a CLBAT-evaluation, since
both sets are subsets of BAT-evaluation, we only need to check that CABAT-
evaluations respect the filtration conditions.
We will start with the third condition. Let ϕ be a formula in LB. First,
suppose that for any classical evaluation e, e(ϕ) = 0. It follows that for any
classical evaluation e(¬ϕ) = 0, so |= ¬ϕ. We have to show that ϕ has value 0 in
any CABAT-evaluation. By the closure conditionýC B¬ϕ. By the matrix for B,
ýC ¬ϕ. So any CABAT-evaluation assigns 0 to formula ϕ.
Next, consider the second condition. Let ϕ be a formula in LB. First, suppose
that for any classical evaluation e, e(ϕ) = 1. We have to show that ϕ has value 1
in any CABAT-evaluation. By the closure conditionýC Bϕ. By the matrix for
B,ýC ϕ. So any CABAT-evaluation assigns 1 to formula ϕ.
Finally, consider the first condition. Suppose now that for any classical eval-
uation e(ϕ) = e(ψ). In other words, |= ϕ ≡ ψ. By the deduction theorem,
ϕ |= ψ, ψ |= ϕ, ¬ψ |= ¬ϕ and ¬ϕ |= ¬ψ. We want to show that for any CABAT-
evaluation ec, ec(ϕ) = ec(ψ). By the closure condition, BϕýC Bψ, BψýC Bϕ,
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B¬ψýC B¬ϕ and B¬ϕýC B¬ψ. Thus, by the matrix for B we have ϕýC ψ,
ψýC ϕ, ¬ϕýC ¬ψ and ¬ψýC ¬ϕ.
We will consider three cases: ec(ϕ) = 1, ec(ϕ) = 0 and ec(ϕ) = n. We will
start with the first case. It follows from ϕýC ψ that ec(ψ) = 1, thus by the
matrix for B, ec(Bψ) = 1.
For the second case if ec(ϕ) = 0, then ec(¬ϕ) = 1, thus ec(¬ψ) = 1, so
ec(ψ) = 0, which implies by the matrix for B that ec(Bψ) = 1.
In the third case note that if ec(ϕ) = n then ec(ψ) = n because otherwise by
an analogous argument to the ones above from ec(ψ) 6= n we would have that
ec(ϕ) is either 1 or 0, which contradicts the assumption.
Given that both CABAT and its internal logic are closed under classical
consequence, all the worries about syntactic sensitivity that applied to BAT
disappear.
2.6 Properties of CABAT
Quite trivially, CABAT is strictly stronger than BAT. The first interesting thing
to see is that the deduction theorem is not generally valid in CABAT:
Theorem 22. If ýC ϕ → ψ then ϕýC ψ but it is not always the case that
ϕýC ψ impliesýC ϕ→ ψ.
In CABAT implications are stronger than the corresponding consequence re-
lation, simply because the consequence relation informs us only about those eval-
uations in which all the premises have value 1. For instance, the consequence
relation ϕýC ψ does not determine the value of the implication ϕ → ψ when
both ψ and ϕ have value n. On the other hand,ýC ϕ→ ψ uniquely determines
the value of the implication under the previous assignment.
Lack of the deduction theorem makes the difference when we look at inference
patterns with provability operator. Usually, principles for provability are valid in
CABAT as consequence relations whereas their implicational formulations may
be invalid. We are not terribly worried about that, since given our reading ϕýC ψ
means that if ϕ is informally provable then ψ is and this is the phrase we intended
to formalize. On the other hand, ýC ϕ → ψ says if ϕ is informally provable,
then so is ψ and if the antecedent is undecidable then the consequent is either
provable or independent, which is a stronger claim than ϕýC ψ.
Now we will take a look at some schemas involving the provability predicate.
Intuitively, informal provability commutes with conjunction but not with dis-
junction. The fact that either ϕ or ψ is informally provable does not imply that
we can prove either the first or the second disjunct. Of course, the consequence
relation in the opposite direction (Bϕ ∨ BψýC B(ϕ ∨ ψ)) should hold.
Provided our reading of the consequence relation, BϕýC ϕ may be seen as a
certain version of the reflection schema, which is definitely a sound principle for
informal provability.
The fact that a certain statement is informally provable is itself an evidence
for the informal provability of the provability of that statement. Thus, iterative
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principles allowing to either add or subtract the B operator from the beginning
of a formula are also natural.
The table below summarizes which inference patterns are valid in CABAT
and whether the principle, according to us, is intuitive or not:
Principle Valid? Intuitive?
(Bϕ ∧ Bψ)ýC B(ϕ ∧ ψ) Yes Yes
B(ϕ ∧ ψ)ýC (Bϕ ∧ Bψ) Yes Yes
B(ϕ ∨ ψ)ýC (Bϕ ∨ Bψ) No No
(Bϕ ∨ Bψ)ýC B(ϕ ∨ ψ) No ?
ϕýC Bϕ Yes Yes
BϕýC ϕ Yes Yes
BϕýC ¬B¬ϕ Yes Yes
BϕýC BBϕ Yes Yes
BBϕýC Bϕ Yes Yes
B(ϕ→ ψ)ýC (Bϕ→ Bψ) No ?
B(ϕ→ ψ), BϕýC Bψ Yes Yes
B(ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ)ýC B(ψ) Yes Yes
Bϕ ∨ B¬ϕ No No
Bϕ ∨ ¬Bϕ Yes Yes
¬BϕýC B(¬ϕ) No No
B(¬Bϕ)ýC B(¬ϕ) No No
B(¬B¬ϕ)ýC ¬B(¬Bϕ) No No
One thing that might seem worrying is that
(Bϕ ∨ Bψ)ZZý| C B(ϕ ∨ ψ)
After all, if ϕ is informally provable, shouldn’t ϕ∨ψ also be informally provable?
This worry, however, stems from the fact that the provability of a disjunction
in CABAT says something weaker than that one of its disjuncts is provable —
after all, ϕ∨¬ϕ is going to be informally provable without either ϕ or ¬ϕ being
informally provable. So, we submit, the intuition should be rather captured by
requiring that the following should hold:
BϕýC B(ϕ ∨ ψ)
BψýC B(ϕ ∨ ψ)
and indeed, they do.
Another worry might be that the following asymmetry between at least prima
facie close cousins can be observed:
B(ϕ→ ψ)ZZý| C (Bϕ→ Bψ) (Fake K)
B(ϕ→ ψ), BϕýC Bψ (Real K)
The answer is, however, that putting Bϕ → Bψ on the right-hand side of
ýC doesn’t adequately capture the intuition that if ϕ is informally provable,
then so is ψ. For Bϕ → Bψ actually contains more information than that. If
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ϕ is informally provable, then so is ψ tells us only what happens when ϕ (and
so, Bϕ) is informally provable, while the provability of Bϕ → Bψ puts further
constraints on what happens if ϕ is not informally provable (for instance, that if
it is undecidable, ψ cannot be refutable). It’s (Real K) and not (Fake K) that
properly captures the underlying intuition.
2.7 CABAT and provability
Now, let’s see the difference between using ýC and its provability operator on
the one hand, and using Peano Arithmetic and its standard provability predicate
(or the modal logic of provability GL and its provability operator, for that matter)
on the other.
Quite crucially, we may want to see which principles that hold for standard
formal provability predicates hold for operator B as well.
First, recall Hilbert-Bernays conditions for PA:
PA ` ϕ⇒ PA ` Bew(pϕq) (HB1)
PA ` Bew(pϕ→ ψq)→ (Bew(pϕq)→ Bew(pψq)) (HB2)
PA ` Bew(pϕq)→ Bew(pBew(pϕq)q) (HB3)
In the arithmetical setting standard Hilbert-Bernays conditions allow one to
prove Lo¨b’s theorem:
Theorem 23. If PA ` Bew(pϕq)→ ϕ then PA ` ϕ.
Since we’ll want to make a point about how the standard proofs of the theo-
rems that we’ll discuss proceed, we’ll go over them quickly.
Proof. Suppose PA ` Bew(pϕq)→ ϕ. By the diagonal lemma there is a formula
such that PA ` λ ≡ (Bew(pλq) → ϕ). Now, arguing inside Peano Arithmetic
we get:
λ→ (Bew(pλq)→ ϕ) (2.1)
Bew(pλ→ (Bew(pλq)→ ϕ)q) (2.2)
Bew(pλq)→ (Bew(pBew(pλq)q)→ Bew(pϕq)) (2.3)
Bew(pλq)→ Bew(pBew(pλq)q) (2.4)
Bew(pλq)→ Bew(pϕq) (2.5)
Bew(pλq)→ ϕ (2.6)
λ (2.7)
Bew(pλq) (2.8)
ϕ (2.9)
(2.2) is obtained by neccesitation. Next, we use the second Hilbert-Bernay’s
condition to distribute provability over implication twice to obtain (2.3). Line
(2.4) is the third Hilbert-Bernays condition thanks to which we obtain (2.5) from
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(2.3). By the assumption that PA ` Bew(pϕq) → ϕ we obtain (2.6). Applying
detachment to the sentence generated by the diagonal lemma we get (2.7). Then,
by necessitation and modus ponens, we obtain the last two lines.
Lo¨b’s theorem is not an intuitively sound principle for informal provability.
There is no reason to suppose that only those instances of the reflection schema
hold for which ϕ is already a theorem. The intuitions are rather clear that all
instances of reflection are plausible.
In the arithmetical setting we get Lo¨b’s theorem as a side-effect of the diagonal
lemma. It is not something that we would like to postulate as an interesting
and independently motivated principle. Rather, it is an unwanted surprising
consequence. It is also one of the reasons why we cannot consistently put all the
instances of the reflection schema together with HB conditions in the classical
setting.
In CABAT we have certain versions of HB conditions:
ϕýC Bϕ (HB1′)
B(ϕ→ ψ), BϕýC Bψ (HB2′)
BϕýC BBϕ (HB3′)
The first condition in CABAT is a bit stronger, since it is not restricted
only to theorems. The condition starts to be intuitive as soon as you recall the
interpretation of ϕýC ψ, which says that if ϕ is informally provable then so is ψ.
Some may be worried that the above formulation of HB1, in some sense, allows
to go from premises which are true (and may not be theorems) to premises which
are theorems. But as we explained, according to our reading formulas on the left
hand side of ýC are not true but informally provable. So the principle allows
only to go from informally provable premises to informally provable premises
having informal provability expressed in the object language.
One interesting question is whether the above conditions are enough to prove
Lo¨b’s theorem. The key observation, in the standard proof, is that once the
premises, including the one produced by an application of the diagonal lemma,
are listed, the theorem follows by classical propositional logic. So it seems that
the issue can be handled at the propositional level.
The natural way to go about the translation is this. We translate both Bew
and ` as B. It is a standard practice to translate them using a single symbol (see
Boolos, 1993).
Slightly more challenging is the question how to translate implications from
the language of PA. The straightforward approach is to translate them as ma-
terial implications in LB.
But we think it will not do justice to the original theorem. The deduction
theorem does not hold for CABAT. Implications are stronger claims than conse-
quence claims and are much harder to prove. Thus, whenever possible, we will
translate ϕ → ψ in the conclusions as ϕýC ψ. We leave implications in the
premises, especially within the scope of B. But this is not a cheap way for us to
avoid an undesired consequence: by leaving material implications in the premises
we make them as strong as we can.
As for sentences produced by the application of Diagonal Lemma we will build
them to the assumptions.
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Fact 24 (Lo¨b’s theorem failure).
B(Bϕ→ ϕ), B(λ→ (Bλ→ ϕ)), B((Bλ→ ϕ)→ λ)ZZý| C Bϕ.
Proof. Just take an assignment v(ϕ) = v(λ) = n and extend it to an evaluation
where for each implication if it is possible to choose n, it should be chosen. It
is easily verifiable that all the premises have value 1, and yet the conclusion has
value n, while all the constraints on valuations remain satisfied.
Why doesn’t the standard argument work? Suppose ev gives value 1 to all the
premises. From ev(B(λ → (Bλ → ϕ))) = 1, we have ev(Bλ → (BBλ → Bϕ)) = 1.
Now, in the standard proof we use the fact that ev(Bϕ→ BBϕ) = 1, but we cannot
do that here, since in general the previous formula is not a CABAT-tautology.
In other words, it is not the case that only those instances of the reflection
schema are provable for which ϕ is already a theorem. The lack of Lo¨b’s theorem
is rather promising since it leaves open the possibility for adding all the instances
of the reflection schema consistently.
We will take a quick look at two other theorems related to provability and
the reflection schema.
As we already stated, there is a problem with the reflection schema in the
standard setting. It is impossible to add all instances of the schema and at the
same time have all Hilbert-Bernays conditions. This is shown by the Montague’s
paradox:
Theorem 25. Peano Arithmetic, if consistent, cannot contain (or be consistently
extended to contain) a (possibly complex) predicate for which all Hilbert-Bernays
conditions and all instances of the reflection schema hold.
Proof. Suppose that there is such a predicate, call it P . We use a natural deduc-
tion system. Argue inside the theory:
1. λ ≡ P (p¬λq) Diagonal lemma
1.1 λ Hypothesis
1.2 P (p¬λq) equivalence elimination: 1,1.1
1.3 ¬λ modus ponens and reflection schema: 1.2
2. ¬λ reductio ad absurdum: 1.1→ 1.3
3. P (p¬λq) HB 1
4. ¬P (p¬λq) 1, 2
5. contradiction 3, 4
To rephrase the above theorem, it is impossible, given Hilbert-Bernays condi-
tions, to extend the theory with the inverse of the implication corresponding to
the necessitation rule. The same goes for the implication directly corresponding
to the necessitation rule:
Theorem 26. Peano Arithmetic, if consistent, cannot contain (or be consistently
extended to contain) a (possibly complex) predicate for which all Hilbert-Bernays
conditions and all instances of ϕ → P (pϕq) (Provabilitation) hold and is closed
under the co-necessitation rule: if P (pϕq) then ϕ.
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Proof. Suppose that there is such a predicate, call it P . We use a natural deduc-
tion system. Argue inside the theory:
1. ¬P (pκq) ≡ κ the diagonal lemma
1.1 κ conditional assumption
1.2 ¬P (pκq) equiv elimination: 1, 1.1
1.3 κ→ P (pκq) instance of provabilitation for κ
1.4 ¬κ MTT: 1.3, 1.2
2. ¬κ conditional assumption discharge: 1.1← 1.4
3. P (pκq) equiv elimination: 1,2
4 κ co-necessitation: 3
5. contradiction 2,4
The moral is that the price for all Hilbert-Bernays conditions together with
all instances of the reflection schema on the one hand, or all the instances of prov-
abilitation one the other (assuming co-necessitation) is too high in the standard
setting.
Fact 27 (Montague). B(Bλ→ λ), B(B¬λ→ ¬λ), B(B¬λ ≡ λ)ýC λ ∧ ¬λ.
Proof. We can omit all occurrences of B, in all formulas of the form Bϕ. Thus,
we can omit the outmost left B in all the premises. Let ev be an evaluation under
all the premises have value 1. Then, since ev(B¬λ→ ¬λ) = 1 = ev(B¬λ→ λ), it
follows that ev(¬B¬λ) = 1. From B¬λ ≡ λ and ev(¬B¬λ) = 1 by classical logic
we have ev(¬λ) = 1 and ev(B¬λ) = 0. Which is already a contradiction, since
ev(¬λ) = 1 implies that ev(B¬λ) = 1.
Fact 28 (Dual Montague). The following consequence still holds:
B(λ→ ¬Bλ), B(¬B(λ)→ λ), B(λ→ Bλ), B(¬λ→ B¬λ)ýC λ ∧ ¬λ.
Proof. Similarly we can omit all occurrences of B, in all formulas of the form
Bϕ. Let ev be an evaluation under which all the premises have value 1. Then,
since ev(λ → Bλ) = 1 = ev(λ → ¬Bλ), it follows that ev(¬λ) = 1. Observe
that ev(¬Bλ → λ) implies, by modus tollens, ev(¬¬Bλ) = 1 finally resulting in
ev(Bλ) = 1 = ev(λ). Contradiction.
The moral of the above is that, even in CABAT there is no possibility of
having full reflection schema. Yet, we have more reflection than usually:
Fact 29. Suppose eitherýC ϕ orýC ¬ϕ. It follows thatýC Bϕ→ ϕ.
Proof. Take any evaluation ev, it is clear that since ev(ϕ) = 1 or ev(ϕ) = 0, we
have ev(¬Bϕ ∨ ϕ) = 1, which shows that ev(Bϕ→ ϕ) = 1.
This is also a signal that our initial intuition behind CABAT is not com-
pletely insane: with CABAT in the background it is possible to have more of
the reflection schema, but not all the instances of provabilitation (which is less
intuitive for informal provability).
Even if we add reflection for both λ and ¬λ, where λ states the provability
of its own negation, CABAT proves that λ is informally undecidable.
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Fact 30 (Reflection and provability). The following consequence holds:
B(Bλ→ λ), B(B¬λ→ ¬λ), B(B(¬λ)→ λ), B(λ→ B(¬λ))ýC ¬B¬λ ∧ ¬Bλ.
Proof. As usual we omit the left-hand side B. Take any evaluation for which
ev(ϕ) = 1 for all ϕ which are premises. The instance of the reflection schema
ev(B¬λ → ¬λ) combined with B¬λ → λ gives ev(¬B¬λ) = 1. This implies
ev(¬λ) = 1, thus ev(¬Bλ) = 1. In other words every evaluation ev which gives 1
to all the premises also gives 1 to ¬B¬λ ∧ ¬Bλ.
That’s for a sentence which says that its own negation is informally provable.
Another interesting pet worth playing with is what we’ll call informal Go¨del sen-
tence: a sentence which says of itself that it is not informally provable. The first
thing to observe is that its formalization in CABAT doesn’t lead to contradiction:
Fact 31 (Informal Go¨del sentence). γ → ¬Bγ,¬Bγ → γZZý| C γ ∧ ¬γ
Proof. Because of the closure condition,ýC B(¬(γ∧¬γ)), and soýC ¬(γ∧¬γ)
and ev(γ ∧ ¬γ) has to be 0, independently of what ev(γ) is, in particular it is
possible that ev(γ) = n. So now the only thing that we need to check is whether
it’s possible that all the premises have value 1. Indeed, if ev(γ) = n, there is no
problem with assuming that ev assigns 1 to both premises. After all, they are
just implications whose at least one argument has value n, and such implications
can be assigned value 1 (see the matrix for →).
However, as soon as we add either provabilitation or reflection contradiction
follows:
Fact 32 (Informal Go¨del with provabilitation). The following holds:
γ → Bγ, γ → ¬Bγ,¬Bγ → γýC γ ∧ ¬γ.
Proof. Again, the proof proceeds by showing that no evaluation can assing 1 to
all the premises. For contradiction, suppose ev is an evaluation which assigns 1
to all the premises. By the fact that ev(γ → Bγ) = ev(γ → ¬Bγ) = 1, we have
ev(γ) = 0. Then, ev(¬γ) = 1. Apply modus tollens to the third premise, we have
ev(¬Bγ) = 0 and ev(Bγ) = ev(γ) = 1, which is a contradiction.
The above fact isn’t too worrying, because provabilitation doesn’t seem too
plausible for informal provability to start with. Here’s a more interesting case.
Fact 33 (Informal Go¨del with reflection). The following holds in CABAT:
Bγ → γ, B¬γ → ¬γ, Bγ → ¬γ,¬γ → BγýC γ ∧ ¬γ.
Proof. By the argument used in the previous proof, γ∧¬γ will always have value
0. So the only way of showing that the consequence holds is to prove that the
premises cannot all have value one. For contradiction, assume ev is an evaluation
which assigns 1 to all the premises. Then, by the transitivity of implication in
CABAT (guaranteed by the closure condition) we have ev(¬γ → γ) = 1 By the
closure condition, ev(¬γ → γ) = ev(¬¬γ ∨ γ) = ev(γ ∨ γ) = ev(γ) = 1. Thus
ev(Bγ) = 1 and by modus ponens applied to the third premise ev(¬γ) = 1, which
is a contradiction.
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One might be worried that the last fact gives rise to a paradox in the vein of
(Priest, 2006; Beall, 1999), where the argument is put forward to the effect that
informal mathematics is inconsistent, because one can take the sentence:
(γ) γ is not informally provable.
and both the assumption that γ is informally provable, and that it isn’t informally
provable lead to contradiction.
Paradoxical arguments in natural language aside, notice that given that CA-
BAT consequence relation is defined in terms of informal provability preservation,
Fact 33 is to be read: if the formulae on the left-hand side ofýC are informally
provable, then so is the formula on the right-hand side. So, assuming reflection
is informally provable, for the paradox to arise we actually have to assume not
only that the following is true:
γ ≡ ¬Bγ, (γ′)
but also that it is provable in informal mathematics. This, however, is a stronger
assumption that standard paradoxical arguments failed to establish: whether
writing down (γ) constitutes an informal mathematical proof of (γ′) is far from
obvious and deserves a separate discussion. These and related fascinating issues,
however, lie beyond the scope of this paper.
2.8 Conclusions
Once we intuitively divide mathematical claims into provable, refutable and in-
dependent, the question arises as to how these three classes interact with Boolean
connectives. This interaction is not straightforward, because facts about whether
certain claims are provable, refutable, or independent do not unambiguously de-
termine the status of their Boolean combinations.
This obstacle, however, is not fatal. Once we move to non-deterministic
semantics, the basic constraints on how provability, refutability and independence
behave with respect to Boolean connectives can be explicated by a formal system:
BAT. The constraints captured by BAT matrices are a bit too basic, though.
They don’t give justice to the fact that informal mathematical provability is
closed under classical consequence. Adding this requirement to BAT results in a
stronger system, CABAT, which is studied in the remainder of the paper.
CABAT, in contrast with BAT, doesn’t fall prey to syntactic sensitivity. CA-
BAT also validates many intuitively plausible and invalidates many intuitively
implausible inference patterns for informal provability. Among the invalidated
ones, we have Lo¨b’s theorem, which when applied to informal provability seems
to be making the unintuitive claim that reflection holds only for those statements
which are already informally provable. The failure of Lo¨b’s theorem makes all
the instances of the reflection schema consistent with CABAT.
Chapter 3
Proof systems for BAT
consequence relations1
Abstract
An ongoing debate about the differences between formal provability
in an axiomatic system and informal provability of mathematical claims
in mathematics as a whole resulted in the construction of various logics
whose main purpose is to capture the inferential behavior of the notion
of informal provability, just as multiple logics of formal provability cap-
ture the behavior of the concept of formal provability. Known logics of
informal provability, based on classical logic, are unable to incorporate all
intuitive principles of informal provability (most notably, reflection, which
says that whatever is provable is true). One solution to this problem is to
treat informal provability as an operator (Shapiro, 1985; Reinhardt, 1986;
Koellner, 2016). Another solution is to weaken some of the intuitively ad-
equate principles (Horsten, 2002). Recently, in a yet another approach to
the issue, two three-valued non-deterministic logics of informal provability
have been developed (Pawlowski and Urbaniak, 2017) to overcome this dif-
ficulty. Alas, the logics have been characterized semantically and no proof
systems for them are available. The purpose of this paper is to define tree-
like proof systems for those logics and to prove the corresponding soundness
and completeness theorems.
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3.1 Motivations
The main aim of this paper is to provide sound and complete proof systems for
two modal logics of provability BAT and CABAT developed and discussed in
(Pawlowski and Urbaniak, 2017). We will develop tree-like proof systems in the
spirit of (Beth, 1955; Carnielli, 1987; Priest, 2006), and prove soundness and
strong completeness.
These logics were developed to model an informal notion of provability in
classical mathematics. Roughly speaking, a mathematical claim is informally
provable if and only if it can be proved using widely accepted mathematical
techniques.2 It may be the case that commonly accepted methods may change
through time, but at each point in time there seems to be a certain core set of
widely accepted mathematical techniques which give rise to informal provability.
On the other hand, we have formal proofs given by means of a proof system
of a fully formalized theory. Proofs in this sense are always relative to a given
proof system and a given theory. According to the proponents of the standard
view3 (see (Antonutti Marfori, 2010) and (Rav, 1999) for an elaborate discussion
on this), the relation between formal and informal concepts of provability is
straightforward. Informal proofs are incomplete sketches of formal proofs. In
principle, they claim, any informal proof can be converted into a proper proof
in a relevant axiomatic system — if one thinks there is one system in which all
formal proofs can be obtained, say ZFC, one should say the relevant axiomatic
system; but this hinges on the particularities of the variant of the view.
Some philosophers argue that the above picture is too simplistic and that
the relation between formal and informal proofs is different. Antonutti Marfori
(2010) claims that there is no clear algorithm for converting a given informal
proof into a proper proof in a relevant axiomatic system. Tanswell (2015) claims
that it is not obvious how we can identify different informal proofs with their
translations. Rav (1999, 2007) discusses the epistemological and explanatory
superiority of informal proofs over formal ones, arguing that it is not convincingly
explained by the proponents of the standard view.
Leitgeb (2009) observed that these concepts of proofs are different. While in
formal proofs the language is precisely defined and divided according to logical
order, informal proofs are stated in a natural language expanded with additional
mathematical vocabulary. Moreover, the connection between steps in an informal
2 I do not claim that mathematics is a unified discipline. In some branches of mathematics
some additional mathematical techniques are available whereas these additional techniques may
lead to incorrect results in the other branches. Nonetheless, it seems that there is a common
core of mathematical ways of proving things which is accepted thorough all its sub-disciplines.
3This view is usually shared by mathematicians, for instance Enderton (1977, 10-11)
It is sometimes said that “mathematics can be embedded in set theory.” This
means that mathematical objects (such as numbers and differentiable functions)
can be defined to be certain sets. And the theorems of mathematics (such as the
fundamental theorem of calculus) then can be viewed as statements about sets.
Furthermore, these theorems will be provable from our axioms. Hence our axioms
provide a sufficient collection of assumptions for the development of the whole
of mathematics — a remarkable fact. (In Chapter 5 we will consider further the
procedure for embedding mathematics in set theory.)
Also, for a bit more sophisticated version of the standard view, see (Sjo¨gren, 2010).
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proof has a different nature than in the formal one. The former often employs
steps that are supposed to be intuitively seen as truth-preserving, without explic-
itly following syntactically formulated rules of inference and the latter is based
purely on syntactical proof forming rules.
For this paper the most important difference between formal and informal
provability lies in the set of general principles sound for both kinds of provability.
An important inference pattern for informal provability is the reflection schema.4
It roughly says that whatever is provable, is true. It is a well-known fact that
there is no consistent formal theory extending Peano arithmetic in which all
instances of the reflection schema for its own formal provability predicate are
provable (see notably (Myhill, 1960; Montague, 1963)). So, it seems that the
informal notion of provability cannot be formally represented in the standard
setting.
A couple of interesting approaches to this problem have been developed.
Shapiro (1985) constructed a theory called Epistemic Arithmetic (EA) where
informal provability is formalized as an operator not as a predicate. On this
approach informal provability is governed by a modal logic S4.5 Shapiro defined
a theorem-preserving translation V from the language of arithmetic based on
intuitionistic logic (Heyting arithmetic) to the language of EA by the following:
1. For atomic formulas: V (ϕ¯) = ϕ
2. V (ϕ ∧ ψ) = (V (ϕ)) ∧(V (ψ))
3. V (ϕ ∨ ψ) = (V (ϕ)) ∨(V (ψ))
4. V (ϕ→ ψ) = ((V (ϕ))→ (V (ψ)))
5. V (ϕ ≡ ψ) = ((V (ϕ)) ≡ (V (ψ)))
6. V (¬ϕ) = (¬(V (ϕ)))
7. V (∀xϕ(x)) = (∀xV (ϕ(x)))
8. V (∃xϕ(x)) = (∃xV (ϕ(x)))
where ϕ means that ϕ is an intuitionistic formula.6
Goodman (1984) proved that the translation V is faithful. His proof was
notably simplified by Flagg and Friedman (1986). This theory was further de-
veloped in three directions: by considering additional principles such as the
4This schema was thoroughly studied in (Beklemishev, 1997, 2003; Arai, 1998).
5Recall S4 is axiomatized by:
1. ` ϕ→ ϕ
2. ` ϕ→ ϕ
3. ` ϕ ≡ ϕ
4. If ` ϕ then ` ϕ
5. ` (ϕ→ ψ)→ (ϕ→ ψ).
6The overline is important because the meaning of functors in intuitionistic logic is different
than in classical.
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Epistemic Church thesis (see (Flagg and Friedman, 1986; Halbach and Horsten,
2000)), by extending the language with a truth predicate Stern (2015); Koellner
(2016), and by a deeper analysis of the informal provability operator (Horsten,
1994, 1997; Heylen, 2013; Rin and Walsh, 2016).
The collateral damage of this approach is a serious limitation in expressive
power. It is no longer possible to quantify over formulas by means of coding.
Moreover, the internal logic of the operator in this theories is quite weak because
of the existence of this translation.
A somewhat different approach to informal provability was proposed by Horsten
(1997). The idea is simple: informal provability remains as a predicate but the
set of its intuitive principles is weakened. We split the set of intuitive principles
into two, we add some of them to the first arithmetical theory called the basis.
Next, we add the rest of the principles to the main theory and we also add all
the instances of the bridging schema saying that if something is provable in the
basis, it is informally provable in the main theory.
This approach seems to be more promising but it has its own problems. First,
there is no principled and independently motivated story explaining where the
set of intuitive principles should be split. Morover, Stern (2015) proved that a
lot of similar systems are inconsistent. Thus, the approach seems not to be as
promising as initially suspected.
Recently, Pawlowski and Urbaniak (2017) proposed an alternative way to
build a theory of informal provability.7 The authors developed non-deterministic
three-valued logics which can be used for building a formal theory of informal
provability. On this approach the move to predicate level seems viable.8 The
translations of paradoxical theorems blocking the move to predicate level for
theories having classical logic in the background do not hold. The systems de-
veloped in (Pawlowski and Urbaniak, 2017) have been presented without proof
theory, and the goal of this paper is to provide proof systems for these logics.
3.2 BAT and CABAT consequence relations
Let L be a modal propositional language with ¬,∧,∨,→ as Boolean connectives
and a unary modal operator B whose intended interpretation is informally prov-
able. We will use lower case Latin letters p, q, r, s, . . . as propositional variables.
The definitions of atoms and well-formed formulas are standard. Lower case
Greek letters ϕ,ψ, χ, . . . are meta-variables for (possibly complex) formulas. We
will use Γ (possibly with indices) as a variable for finite sets of propositional
WFFs. We will treat ¬,∨, B, as primitive connectives, since the rest of them can
be defined9 in a standard way.
BAT has three values: 0, n, 1. The intended interpretation of 0 is informally
refutable, 1 stands for informally provable and n stands for neither.
7This paper is included in this thesis as Chapter 2.
8Note that in these logics informal provability is treated as an operator not as a predicate.
It’s possible to develop a first order versions of these logics where informal provability is a
predicate. This lies beyond the scope of this paper.
9In the sense of having the same matrices.
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A BAT-assignment is a function which assigns values to all propositional
variables. To obtain the possible values of a complex formula we use the following
matrices:
¬ ϕ
0 1
n n
1 0
∨ 0 n 1
0 0 n 1
n n n/1 1
1 1 1 1
B ϕ
1 1
n/0 n
0 0
By x/y we mean that the value of a complex formula is not determined by
an assignment and it can be either x or y. BAT-assignments do not uniquely
determine values for all complex formulas. A BAT-evaluation is a function which
extends an assignment, assigns values to all formulas of L, according to the tables
given above. By Γýϕ, we mean that any BAT-evaluation which assigns 1 to all
formulas in Γ assigns 1 to formula ϕ.
The rest of the standard Boolean connectives have the following matrices:
→ 0 n 1
0 1 1 1
n n n/1 1
1 0 n 1
≡ 0 n 1
0 1 n 0
n n 0/n/1 n
1 0 n 1
∧ 0 n 1
0 0 0 0
n 0 0/n n
1 0 n 1
The semantics is motivated by a natural division of mathematical claims into
provable, refutable and undecidable. Consider a disjunction of two formulas p, q.
If at least one of them is informally provable, then intuitively so is the whole
disjunction. We can refute the disjunction only if we can refute both p and
q. But from the undecidability of p and q we cannot determinately infer the
status of their disjunction. For instance, in mathematical practice the status
of the Continuum Hypothesis and its negation is regarded as undecided.10 But
there is an agreement about the status of their disjunction — it is provable,
simply because it is a substitution of excluded middle. For some other undecided
sentences it is the case that their disjunction is also undecided.11 For instance,
consider the disjunction of the consistency statement of ZFC and the Continuum
hypothesis. Similar arguments can be developed for other connectives. Hence,
indeterminism is both needed and independently motivated.
I do not want to decide whether there are sentences which are absolutely
undecidable — merely to allow for such a possibility. It seems that mathemati-
cians behave as if some mathematical claim are undecidable or independent in a
certain sense. For instance, some claims can seem independent because they are
10Philosophically speaking the question whether the Continuum Hypothesis is really unde-
cidable is a bit more complex. Simply stating that CH and its negation are undecided does not
do justice to the range of contemporary opinions on the topic. Arguments have been proposed
in favor of the truth of both of these statements. However, the independence of CH and its
negation from both the axioms of ZFC set theory, and its extensions with large cardinal axioms
makes them reasonable candidates for undecidable statements.
11Note that saying that the disjunction of CH and its negation is informally provable in
virtue of being a substitution of excluded middle is something different that claiming that
every sentence is either informally provable or refutable. We agree with the former not with
the latter.
44 CHAPTER 3. BAT PROOF SYSTEMS
not provable from the commonly accepted mathematical axioms (the Continuum
Hypothesis) or that currently proofs of them are not known. Thus, this informal
division of mathematical claims seems to be justified in mathematical practice.
BAT is too weak to be used as a logic of informal provability. For instance,
it does not prove that disjunction is symmetric. A rather natural strengthening
of BAT is obtained by closing its inner logic under classical logic:
Closure condition:
For every L-formulas ϕ1, ϕ2, · · · , ϕk, ψ such that
ϕ1, ϕ2, · · · , ϕk |= ψ,
where |= is the classical consequence relation in the language with
a modal operator, for any BAT evaluation e, if e(Bϕi) = 1 for all
0 < i ≤ k, then e(Bψ) = 1.
This closure condition does justice to the notion of informal provability, since
doing real proofs we do not question classically correct inferences.
By a CABAT evaluation we will mean any BAT evaluation which respects
the above closure condition. We will use ΓýC ϕ to denote CABAT consequence
relation.
3.3 Informal provability and Lo¨b’s theorem
One of the technical features that distinguish formal and informal provability is
the validity of the reflection schema. Roughly speaking, it says that if something
is provable, then it is true.
In mathematical practice it seems that this principle is presupposed. Usually,
the existence of an informal proof (where the connection between two steps may
be truth-preservation) is sufficient for taking the claim to be true.
Things get interesting when we look at formal provability in a sufficiently
strong arithmetical theory. Let T be a recursively-axiomatizable theory extending
Robinson arithmetic. Let BewT denote its standard provability predicate. It is
well known that we have the following Hilbert-Bernays derivability conditions for
it:
T ` ϕ⇒ T ` BewT (pϕq) (HB1)
T ` BewT (pϕ→ ψq)→ (BewT (pϕq)→ BewT (pψq)) (HB2)
T ` BewT (pϕq)→ BewT (pBewT (pϕq)q) (HB3)
The above conditions are sufficient for proving Lo¨b’s theorem. Suppose that
there is an arithmetical formula θ which behaves as if it were a provability pred-
icate (it satisfied the above HB conditions), then we can prove the following:
Theorem 34. If T ` θ(pϕq)→ ϕ then T ` ϕ.
The obvious consequence of the above is the fact that it is impossible to have
all HB conditions together with the reflection schema. Lo¨b’s theorem informs us
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how much reflection is allowed for formal provability: we can only have reflection
for theorems.
There is little to no discussion about the philosophical significance of Lo¨b’s
theorem. It seems that it is commonly accepted in virtue of provability obeying
HB conditions. Yet, its independent philosophical motivation seems fishy. It
seems that there is no reason to accept only those instances of the reflection
schema for which the code of a formula used in the schema is a code of a theorem.
This restriction is completely artificial and stems from the fact that a particular
arithmetical theory is capable of proving Lo¨b’s theorem.
One way to go about this problem is to drop Lo¨b’s theorem and weaken some
of the HB conditions and add more reflection. This is exactly the direction that
was taken during the formulation of CABAT. Consider the following properties
of CABAT:
Fact 35. The following hold for CABAT:
1. B(Bφ→ φ), B(λ ≡ (Bλ→ φ))ZZý| C Bφ.
2. B(Bλ→ λ), B(B¬λ→ ¬λ), B(B(¬λ) ≡ λ)ýC λ ∧ ¬λ.
3. B(λ ≡ ¬Bλ), B(λ→ Bλ), B(¬λ→ B¬λ)ýC λ ∧ ¬λ.
4. IfýC ϕ orýC ¬φ thenýC Bϕ→ ϕ,
5. ϕýC Bϕ and BϕýC ϕ
1 shows that a translation of Lo¨b’s theorem does not hold in CABAT.12 The
first premise is a translation of the antecedent of Lo¨b’s theorem (T ` PrT(pϕq)→
ϕ) and the remaining premise is a translation of the application of the diagonal
lemma to a formula PrT(x)→ ϕ. 2 says that it is not possible to extend CABAT
with a translation of the reflection schema. The first two premises are transla-
tions of the reflection schema and the last one is a translation of the application
of the diagonal lemma. Similarly, the third thing on the list states that one
cannot consistently add all the instances of the provabilitation schema (if some-
thing is true, it is provable). Again, the first two premises are translations of the
provabilitation schema for λ,¬λ and the last one a translation of the application
of the diagonal lemma. Item 4 shows that the amount of reflection by default
available in CABAT is greater than for the standard provability predicate. The
reflection schema is not only restricted for theorems. The last item on the list
shows that CABAT consequence relation preserves provability both ways (mean-
ing a stronger version of NEC and CONEC are valid).13 This is a good sign.
Initially what we wanted for informal provability is the reflection schema which
we have in a certain form.
12To be fair if we add to the premise set a formula B¬λ → ¬λ then the consequence does
hold. But we are not interested here in an arbitraty instance of the reflection schema but in
the translation of the standard proof of Lo¨b’s theorem. Thus, in general the reflection schema
is not assumed.
13See (Pawlowski and Urbaniak, 2017) for a more elaborate discussion of motivations and
properties of BAT and CABAT.
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3.4 BAT-trees
We will construct sound and complete tree-like proof system for BAT. The whole
idea behind the proof system is to track the values of formulas which appear on
branches by labeling devices called signatures. Some formulas appearing on a
tree will be labeled with a letter n. Intuitively, the letter indicates that under
the corresponding evaluation the formula has the value n.
We will say that a formula ϕ occurs on a tree with a signature iff it occurs
on the tree in the form ϕ, n. Whenever we write formula ϕ occurs on a tree we
mean it occurs without a signature and not as a subformula of another formula
¬ϕ.
Definition 36 (Root appropriate for Γ, ψ). Let Γ = {ϕ1, ϕ2 . . . ϕn}, n ∈ N be a
set of formulas and ψ a single formula. By the root appropriate for Γ, ψ we will
mean the following construction:
ϕ1
ϕ2
...
ϕn
¬ψ ψ, n
We will use syntactic rules to decompose complex formulas, extending the
root appropriate for Γ, ψ:
Negation 1: ¬¬ϕ
ϕ
Negation 2: ¬ϕ, n
ϕ, n
Disjunction 1: ϕ ∨ ψ
ϕ ψ ϕ, n
ψ, n
Disjunction 2: ϕ ∨ ψ, n
ϕ, n
¬ψ
ψ, n
¬ϕ
ϕ, n
ψ, n
Disjunction 3: ¬(ϕ ∨ ψ)
¬ϕ
¬ψ
Provability 1: Bϕ
ϕ
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Provability 2: ¬Bϕ
¬ϕ ϕ, n
Provability 3: Bϕ, n
ϕ, n
Since→,∧,≡ are defined (in the sense of having the same matrices) as usual,
we won’t give their specific rules.
Definition 37 (Tree appropriate for Γ, ϕ). By a BAT-tree appropriate for Γ, ϕ
we will mean any construction that starts with the root appropriate for Γ, ϕ and
is generated by the set of rules defined above.
Definition 38 (Full BAT-tree). We say that a BAT-tree is full if it is not possible
to apply any rule to extend the tree further.
Definition 39 (Closed branch). Any path from the root is a branch of a BAT-
tree. A branch b is closed iff for some formula ϕ, ϕ and ¬ϕ occur on it, or for
some formula ϕ it occurs on it both with and without a signature.
By the left/right root extension we will mean any path which goes down using
the left/right path from the root.
Definition 40 (Closed tree). A BAT-tree is closed iff all of its branches are
closed. If at least one branch of a tree is open, the tree is open.
Note that for Γ, ϕ there are many different trees, depending what was the
order of the rules that we applied. In this case, trees are finite, so they are
order-invariant: either all of them are closed or all of them are open.
Fact 41 (Order invariance). If one tree t appropriate for Γ, ϕ is closed (open)
so are all of them.
Proof. Indirect. Suppose that the theorem does not hold, let t0, t1 be two trees
appropriate for Γ, ϕ where t0 is open and t1 is closed. Let b be an open branch
on t0. This branch is constructed by a series of rules. Note, that some subset
of these rules must have been applied to a certain branch b1 on t1. Either it
was a proper subset then b is an extension of b1 and b1 is closed, so we have a
contradiction, or both branches are generated by the same set of rules. If this is
the case then again, since b1 is closed, b so must be.
Definition 42 (BAT consequence relation). Γ `B ϕ iff a full BAT-tree appro-
priate for Γ and ϕ is closed. By Γ 0B ϕ we mean that BAT-tree appropriate for
Γ and ϕ is open.
Now, we will prove that the above proof system is sound and complete with
respect to BAT. We will start with some definitions and notational conventions.
Definition 43 (Faithfulness). We say that an evaluation e is faithful to a branch
b iff for all formulas ϕ occurring on the branch, if ϕ occurs without a signature
then e(ϕ) = 1 and if ϕ occurs with a signature e(ϕ) = n.
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Suppose that we have a branch b of some BAT-tree and we apply some rule to
b. If the rule generates one extension with a formula ϕ or ϕ, n, we will abbreviate
it as bc, ϕ or bc, ϕ, n. If the rule generates two or three extensions we will use bl
(or br) to refer to the left extension (or to the right one). In case where we have
three extensions we will use bl, bc, br.
Lemma 2. Let e be a BAT-evaluation and b a branch in a BAT-tree. If e is
faithful to b, then for any rule that can be applied to b, there is an extension b′
of b such that e is faithful to b′.
Proof. The proof is by cases. Suppose that e is a faithful evaluation to a branch
b up to the point where a formula ϕ occurs.
It is sufficient to check that after the application of each rule to b, the rule
generates at least one extension of b which preserves faithfulness.
We will start with rules for negation:
Negation 1,2:
If ϕ = ¬¬ψ, we have just one extension: bc, ψ. The assumption implies that
e(¬¬ψ) = 1. By the matrix of negation, e(ψ) = 1 as desired.
If ϕ = ¬ψ, n we have just one extension: bc, ψ, n. By the assumption e(¬ψ) =
n and by the matrix for negation, e(ψ) = n.
Now consider the clauses for disjunction.
Disjunction 1:
Let ϕ = ψ ∨ χ. If an evaluation e is faithful to b, then either e(ψ) = e(χ) = n,
or e(ϕ) = 1, or e(χ) = 1. If the evaluation e fulfills the first condition then the
evaluation is faithful to br, if the second one is faithful to bl, and in the third
case to bc.
Disjunction 2:
Suppose e(ψ ∨ χ) = n and e is faithful to b. Then, either e(ψ) = e(χ) = n, or
e(ψ) = n and e(χ) = 0, or e(ψ) = 0 and e(χ) = n. In the first case e is faithful
to br, in the second e is faithful to bl, and in the third case to bc.
Disjunction 3:
Suppose that e(¬(ψ ∨ χ)) = 1 and e is faithful to b. Then, by the matrix for
negation and disjunction, e(ψ) = 0 and e(χ) = 0 which implies that e(¬ψ) = 1 =
e(¬χ) = 1, which shows that e is faithful to bc.
The last set of rules is the set of rules for provability.
Provability 1:
Let ϕ = Bψ. By the assumption we only have one extension of b with ψ. By the
assumption and the matrix for B we know that e(ψ) = 1 as desired.
Provability 2:
Let ϕ = ¬Bψ. By the assumption e(¬Bψ) = 1. Thus, by the matrix of negation
and B, e(ψ) = 0 or e(ψ) = 1. In the first case bl is faithful to e, and in the second
case br preserves faithfulness.
Provability 3:
Let ϕ = Bψ, n. By the assumption we only have one extension of b with ψ, n. By
the assumption and the matrix for B we know that e(ψ) = n as desired.
Theorem 44 (Soundness). If Γ `B ϕ then Γýϕ.
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Proof. Assume for contradiction that Γ `B ϕ and ΓZZý| ϕ.
Consider a full tree appropriate for Γ and ϕ. Since Γ
Z
Zý| ϕ, there is an eval-
uation e such that e(ψ) = 1 for all ψ ∈ Γ and e(ϕ) 6= 1. Suppose ϕ ∈ Γ. Then
we have a contradiction since e(ϕ) = 1 and e(ϕ) 6= 1. Let ϕ 6∈ Γ. Since e(ϕ) = 0
or e(ϕ) = n, e is faithful to either the left or the right extension of the root. By
induction applications of Lemma 2, there is a branch b extending the root such
that e is faithful to it. Since Γ `B ϕ, we know that the branch b is closed. Thus,
for some formula ψ, either ψ and ¬ψ occur on it or for some formula ψ, ψ occurs
with and without a signature. In the first case e(ψ) = 1 = e(¬ψ) and in the
second case e(ψ) = n which leads to inconsistency.
Now we will proceed to the strong completeness of the above proof system
(for finite sets14 of formulas).
Definition 45 (Evaluation induced by b). Let b be an open branch. We will say
that an evaluation e is induced by b iff
• For all propositional variables p occurring without signature e(p) = 1,
• if ¬p occurs on b then e(p) = 0,
• if p or ¬p occurs on the branch b with signature, e(¬p) = e(p) = n.
Now we will prove the completeness theorem. We will start with the following
lemma:
Lemma 3. Let a branch b be open and complete. Let E be the set of evaluations
induced by b. Then there is a BAT-evaluation in e ∈ E such that:
• if ϕ occurs on b without a signature then e(ϕ) = 1,
• if ¬ϕ occurs without a signature then e(ϕ) = 0,
• if ϕ or ¬ϕ occurs with a signature then e(ϕ) = n.
Proof. Take e ∈ E and proceed by induction on the complexity of ϕ. If ϕ is a
propositional variable then we are done by definition of e being induced by b. If
ϕ is a complex formula it has one of the forms: ¬ψ,ψ ∨ χ, Bψ, with or without
signature for some formulas ψ, χ for which the lemma already holds. We will
divide this proof in two cases depending on whether ϕ occurs with a signature
or without.
Case 1: without signature
1. Negation: suppose that ϕ = ¬ψ. By the induction hypothesis e(ψ) = 0, so
by the matrix for negation e(¬ψ) = 1.
If ϕ = ¬¬ψ, then the rule for double negation elimination must have been
applied to obtain ψ on b. By the induction hypothesis e(ψ) = 1, hence
e(¬ψ) = 0.
14Since BAT and CABAT are compact, we will be interested only in finite sets of premises.
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2. Disjunction: ϕ = ψ ∨ χ, by the completeness of the branch, one amongst
ψ, χ or both ψ, n and χ, n is on the branch. In the first two cases, by the
induction hypothesis e(ψ) = 1 or e(χ) = 1, both implying that e(ψ∨χ) = 1.
In the third case, by the matrix for disjunction there is an evaluation e ∈ E
such that e(ψ ∨ χ) = 1.
If ϕ = ¬(ψ∨χ), by the induction hypothesis and completeness of b, e(ψ) =
ev(χ) = 0. Thus, e(ϕ) = 0.
3. Provability: If ϕ = Bψ, then by the completeness of the branch we know
that ψ is on the branch. By the induction hypothesis e(ψ) = 1 so by the
matrix for B, we have e(Bψ) = 1.
If ϕ = ¬Bψ, then by the completeness of the branch we know that either
¬ψ or ψ, n is on the branch. By the induction hypothesis either e(¬ψ)=1
thus e(ψ) = 0, so e(¬Bψ) = 1 or e(ϕ) = n and by the matrix for B, we know
that e(¬Bϕ) = 1.
Case 2: with signature
1. Negation: ϕ = ¬ψ, n. By the induction hypothesis and the matrix for
negation, e(ψ) = n, which implies that e(¬ψ) = n, as required.
If ϕ = ¬¬ψ, n. Then at some point, since the tree is complete, a rule
for double negation must have been applied, so we have both: ψ and ¬ψ
with a signature on the branch. By the induction hypothesis e(¬ψ) = n as
required.
2. Disjunction: ϕ = ψ ∨ χ, n and since b is complete, either ψ, n and ¬χ or
χ, n and ¬ψ or both ψ and χ occur on the branch with a signature. By
the induction hypothesis either e(ψ) = n and e(¬χ) = 1, or e(χ) = n and
e(¬ψ) = 1, or e(ψ) = n = e(χ). In the first two cases e(ψ ∨ χ) = n as
required. In the third, by the matrix for disjunction there is at least one
evaluation in E such that e(ψ ∨ χ) = n.
If ϕ = ¬(ψ ∨ χ), n, by the completeness of the branch, ψ ∨ χ, n occurs on
the branch. By the induction hypothesis and the matrix for disjunction,
e(ψ ∨ χ) = n, which implies that e(¬(ψ ∨ χ)) = n.
3. Provability: If ϕ = Bψ, n, then by the completeness of the branch ψ, n is
on the branch. By the induction hypothesis e(ψ) = n, so we can find an
evaluation for which e(Bψ) = n.
Theorem 46 (Completeness). Let Γ be a set of propositional formulas, and ψ a
formula. If Γýψ then Γ `B ψ.
Proof. By contraposition. Suppose Γ 0B ψ. By definition, there is a complete
open tree appropriate for Γ and ψ. Let b be the open branch in the tree. By
Lemma 3 there is an evaluation e induced by b such that e(ϕ) = 1 for all ϕ ∈ Γ
and either e(ψ) = n, or e(¬ψ) = 1 and hence e(ψ) = 0, depending on whether b
starts with the right or the left root. In both cases we have a partial evaluation
which shows that Γ
Z
Zý| ψ.
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3.5 Filtered trees
Suppose that we have a complete BAT-tree appropriate for some Γ, ϕ. We will
devise a procedure for eliminating some of the branches in the tree in order to
construct a proof system for CABAT.
Definition 47 (Filtered branch). Let b be a complete open branch in a BAT-
tree. We will say that b is filtered iff for all formulas ϕ,ψ on b the following
hold:
1. If ϕ is a classical tautology, then it doesn’t appear with a signature or in a
negated form on b.
2. If ϕ is a classical countertautology, it doesn’t appear with a signature or in
an unnegated form on b
3. If ϕ,ψ are classically equivalent then they appear in the same form: either
both with signatures, or both negated, or both in the standard form: ϕ,ψ.
Definition 48 (CABAT-tree). By a CABAT-tree we mean any BAT-tree whose
open not filtered branches are deleted.
By definition, any closed branch in a BAT-tree is not filtered.
Definition 49 (Open CABAT-tree). We say that a CABAT-tree is open iff it
contains an open branch b. Otherwise the tree is closed.
We use the symbol Γ `c ϕ to denote the fact that any full CABAT-tree
appropriate for Γ, ϕ is closed.
In order to prove completeness and soundness of the CABAT-consequence
relation with respect to CABAT-trees we will use an alternative, equivalent for-
mulation of CABAT by means of filtration of a set of evaluations:15
Definition 50 (CL-filtered evaluations). Let CL be classical propositional logic.
We say that a BAT-evaluation e is CL-filtered just in case the following conditions
hold:
1. For any two formulas ϕ,ψ, if |= ϕ ≡ ψ then e(ϕ) = e(ψ),
2. For any CL-tautology ϕ, e(ϕ) = 1,
3. For any CL-countertautology ϕ, e(ϕ) = 0.
We use the symbol |=fcl to denote a consequence relation defined by preser-
vation of 1 in the CL-filtered set of BAT-evaluations.
Fact 51. ΓýC ϕ iff Γ |=fcl ϕ and any CABAT-evaluation is a CL-filtered eval-
uation.
Proof. The proof can be found in (Pawlowski and Urbaniak, 2017).
15See: (Pawlowski and Urbaniak, 2017).
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Theorem 52. For any finite set of formulas Γ and a formula ϕ, Γ `c ϕ iff
ΓýC ϕ.
Proof. ⇒: We will argue by contraposition. Suppose that ΓZZý| C ϕ. We have to
show that Γ 0c ϕ. By the definition of ZZý| C we know that there is a CABAT-
evaluation e which assign 1 to all formulas in Γ and either 0 or n to ϕ. Note that
any CABAT-evaluation is also a BAT-evaluation. By the completeness of the
proof system Γ 0B ϕ. So there is an open branch in a BAT-tree that corresponds
to e. We will argue that e is filtered, at the same time showing that it is not the
case that Γ 0c ϕ.
We know that e is a CABAT-evaluation, so by fact 51 it is a filtered BAT-
evaluation. It is easy to see that the conditions of a filtered branch correspond
to conditions of filtered evaluation and since the branch is generated by filtered
evaluation it has to be filtered as well. In other words there is at least one open
filtered branch, thus Γ 0c ϕ.
⇐: We will argue again by contraposition. Suppose that Γ 0c ϕ, we will show
that Γ
Z
Zý| C ϕ. By the assumption we know that there is an open filtered branch
b on a tree. Take an evaluation e induced by an open filtered branch b. We will
argue that this BAT-evaluation is also a CABAT-evaluation. Suppose that e is
not in the set of filtered BAT-evaluation. Then it has to invalidate one of the
filtration conditions. We can assume that e is a partial evaluation restricted only
to the formulas on the tree, since it is a trivial matter to extend from there the
partial evaluation into a full one.
Suppose that for some classical tautology ϕ, e(ϕ) 6= 1. Then either ϕ is on
the branch with a signature or in a negated form. In both cases it is impossible,
since b is filtered.
Suppose that for some classical countertautology ϕ, e(ϕ) = 1. Then ϕ appears
on the branch in unnegated form, but this is impossible since, b is filtered.
Suppose that for some two classically equivalent formulas ϕ,ψ, e(ϕ) 6= e(ψ).
Since b is filtered and e is induced by b, we know that the form ϕ,ψ appear on
the branch is the same: either both are negated, both are without signature or
both are with signature. In all the cases evaluation e assigns to these formulas
the same values.
Chapter 4
Tree-like proof systems for
finitely-many valued deterministic
and non-deterministic
consequence relations1
Abstract
The main goal of this paper is to provide an abstract framework for con-
structing proof systems for various many-valued logics. Using the frame-
work it is possible to generate strongly complete proof systems with respect
to any finitely valued deterministic and non-deterministic logic. I provide
a couple of examples of proof systems for well-known many-valued logics
and prove the completeness of proof systems generated by the framework.
4.1 Motivations
In this paper I will present an abstract framework for constructing tree-like
(tableaux) proof systems for finitely-many valued deterministic and non-deter-
ministic consequence relations.2 Non-deterministic logics were constructed3 by
Avron and Lev (2005) as a generalization of many-valued deterministic logics.
Non-deterministic logics are characterized by means of non-deterministic matri-
ces. Roughly speaking, in such matrices an interpretation may ascribe sets of
values instead of a single value. This means that these logics are not truth-
functional. In their paper, Avron and Lev constructed an abstract framework
for sequent-based proof systems.
I will provide a recipe for constructing tree-like (or tableaux) proof systems for
non-deterministic semantics.4 One advantage of this systems over sequent-based
1I am the single author of the paper and the paper is submitted.
2These proof systems are in the spirit of (Carnielli, 1987). For a very nice introduction to
this method see (Priest, 2001).
3To be fair, Quine (1974) suggested something similar to a non-deterministic matrix.
4Roughly speaking, by non-deterministic semantics I mean a semantics in which the value
of a complex formula is not uniquely determined by the values of its subformulas.
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systems is that there is a nice mechanical procedure for finding a counter-model
for any invalid inference. In this setting it is possible to keep track of values of
formulas that appear on a tree. This allows to find valuations under which the
premises have the designated value and the conclusion doesn’t. Tree-like proof
systems are also easy to handle for both humans and computers and they have
a nice visual representation.
Moreover, it seems that some logics that use intensional operators such as
modal logics or some paraconsistent logics despite not having finitely-many valued
deterministic semantics, may have finite non-deterministic semantics.5
There is a very nice and general algebraic proof framework for non-determinis-
tic consequence relations called The method of Polynomial Ring Calculus.6 The
method is mainly used in automated theorem proving. Since in that context the
user-friendliness of the method is not important, unsurprisingly, the proof-system
is not easy to work with. On the other hand, the tableaux method is known to be
very user-friendly and pedagogically interesting, and as such deserves attention.
In the first section, I will set the notation and some necessary definitions.
The second section is a presentation of the framework. In the third section I will
show a couple of examples of proof systems generated using the framework for
various well-known logics. The last section is a sketch of a strong completeness
proof.
4.2 Technical preliminaries
Let L be a propositional language understood as a set of propositional variables
W = {p, q, . . .} closed under functors from the set
F = {◦11, ◦12, . . . , ◦21, ◦22, . . . , ◦nm}
where the upper script is the arity of a given functor. I will use Greek letters
ϕ,ψ, ... as meta-variables for formulas. I will use capital Greek letters to denote
sets of formulas.
Definition 53 (n-matrix). An n-matrix for a propositional language L is a triple
M = 〈T,D,O〉, where:
• T is a non-empty set of truth values.
• ∅ 6= D ⊆ T is a set of designated values.
• O is a set of functions, which for any n-ary functor ◦n of the language
contains a corresponding n-ary function ◦n, ◦n : Tn 7→ 2T \ {∅}.
It is quite easy to see that the above notion is a generalization of determin-
istic matrices. Set O consists of functions which assign sets of possible values
to complex formulas, given assignments of values to their components. In the
case of deterministic matrices, these sets are singletons. In a proper n-matrix
5 Some logicians are interested in finding non-deterministic semantics for such logics
(Coniglio and Peron, 2014; Coniglio et al., 2015; Omori and Skurt, 2016).
6See: (Carnielli and Matulovic, 2015).
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functions from O can assign non-empty sets of values, including those which are
not singletons. In such a case every valuation picks exactly one value of a formula
from the sets of possible values ascribed to it by an appropriate function from O.
Definition 54 (Valuation). A valuation v : L 7→ T in an n-matrix M is a func-
tion such that for any functor ◦n and any sequence of formulas ϕ1, ϕ2 . . . , ϕn,
v(◦n(ϕ1, ϕ2, . . . , ϕn)) ∈ ◦n(v(ϕ1), v(ϕ2), . . . , v(ϕn)). A valuation v satisfies ϕ in
M (v |=M ϕ ) iff v(ϕ) ∈ D. We say that ϕ follows from Γ [Γ |=M ϕ] iff every
valuation that satisfies all elements of Γ satisfies ϕ. An n-matrix M is k-valued if
|T | = k.
Definition 55 (Consequence relation). A consequence relation |= is character-
ized by an n-matrix M, iff for any Γ, ϕ it is the case that Γ |= ϕ iff Γ |=M ϕ. We will
say that a consequence relation is n-valued iff it is characterized by an n-valued
n-matrix.
4.3 Trees
Suppose we have an n-valued non-deterministic logic |=n whose semantics is given
by an n-matrix M, where T = {0, 1, . . . , n− 2, d} and d is its designated value.7
Definition 56. (Root appropriate Γ, ψ) Let Γ = {ϕ1, ϕ2, . . . , ϕi}, be a set of
formulas and ψ a single formula. By the root appropriate for Γ, ψ we mean the
following construction:
ϕ1, d
ϕ2, d
...
ϕi, d
ψ, 0 ψ, 1 . . . ψ, n− 2
The idea here is to list all the premises and ascribe to them index d. Roughly
speaking, it means that under all the valuations corresponding to this root all
premises have the designated value. Next, we split the construction into n − 2
branches. On each branch we list the conclusion with different indices. These
indices represent all non-designated values. Intuitively, each branch corresponds
to any valuation under which all the premises and the conclusion values are its
own indices determined by the branch.
The root is further extended into a tree by means of syntactical rules appro-
priate for a given logic. Before defining what a syntactical rule is we need to
introduce some additional notions.
7We stick to the case where there is only one designated value. In order to deal with
a logic whose matrix has more designated values, the validity of an inferences is checked by
constructing a tree for each combination of values under which all the premises have labels
corresponding to different designated values and the conclusion’s label corresponds to different
non-designated values. So for a reasoning with m premises in a logic with d designated values
one has to construct md different trees. If all of them are closed, then the inference is valid. If
at least one is open, it is not.
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Definition 57 (i-th combination). Let ϕ be a formula. The set of all possible
valuations under which ϕ has value i ∈ T is called the i-th combination of ϕ
and is abbreviated as COi(ϕ). Let ◦j(ϕ1, . . . , ϕj) be a formula built from ◦j
and ϕ1 . . . , ϕj , and suppose that v ∈ COi(◦j(ϕ1, . . . , ϕj)). By f(v,m), where
0 < m < j + 1, we mean the value ascribed to ϕm by the valuation
8 v.
Definition 58 (Syntactical rule for ◦j , k). Let M be an n-matrix and
COk(◦j(ϕ1, ϕ2, . . . , ϕj)) = {v1, v2, . . . , vl}.
By a syntactical rule for ◦j(ϕ1, ϕ2, . . . , ϕj), k appropriate for an n-matrix M we
mean the following construction:
◦j(ϕ1, ϕ2 . . . ϕj), k
ϕ1, f(v1, 1)
...
ϕi, f(v1, j)
ϕ1, f(v2, 1)
...
ϕi, f(v2, j)
. . .
...
ϕ1, f(vl, 1)
...
ϕi, f(vl, j)
Definition 59 (Functor described by a set). Let M = 〈T,D,O〉 be an n-matrix
and ◦ be a functor from the language of the matrix. We say that a set A◦ of
syntactical rules describes ◦ iff for any t ∈ T , A◦ contains a syntactical rule ◦, t
appropriate for M and nothing else is in A◦.
Definition 60 (Matrix described by a set). Let an n-matrix M be given in the
language L, where ◦1, . . . , ◦j are all functors available in the language. We say
that such a matrix is described by a set of syntactical rules A iffA =
⋃
(0<i<j+1)Ai
where Ai describes the i-th functor in the language of n-matrix M.
Suppose that a consequence relation is given by an n-matrix M. In order to
check any given inference in our framework we start with a root appropriate for
it and then extend it into a tree by a set of syntactical rules describing M. Next,
in order to see if an inference is indeed valid in a consequence relation described
by M, we need to introduce some additional definitions.
Definition 61 (Tree appropriate for Γ, ψ). A tree is appropriate for Γ, ψ if it
starts with a root appropriate for Γ, ψ.
Definition 62 (Complete tree). We say that a tree is complete iff it is impossible
to extend the tree further using syntactical rules appropriate for a given logic.
Definition 63 (Closed branch). We say that a branch on a tree is closed iff for
some formula ϕ occurring on the branch it occurs with two different numbers
(values).
Definition 64 (Closed tree). A tree is closed iff all of its branches are closed.
8Note that we restrict our attention to partial valuations. We are only interested in the
values of all subformulas. That is why, i-th combination is finite.
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Definition 65 (Valid inference). We say that an inference from Γ to ϕ is valid
on a tree iff the tree starts with a root appropriate for Γ, ϕ and is complete and
all of its branches are closed. We will denote this by Γ ` ϕ. Moreover if a tree
was constructed only by using rules from a set A, we will denote this by `A.
4.4 A handful of examples
In this section we will show how the framework works.9 We will give four exam-
ples of proof systems generated by our framework. Let’s start with Weak Kleene
Logic.10
4.4.1 Deterministic examples
In our case we will be interested in a propositional language with three functors
¬,∨,∧. In Weak Kleene Logic11 these are characterized by the following truth-
tables:
¬ ϕ
0 1
n n
1 0
∧ 0 n 1
0 0 n 0
n n n n
1 0 n 1
∨ 0 n 1
0 0 n 1
n n n n
1 1 n 1
By |=Kl ϕ we mean that any valuation respecting the above truth-tables ascribes
value 1 to ϕ. By Γ |=Kl ϕ we mean that any valuation v such that for all ψ ∈ Γ
v(ψ) = 1 ascribes value 1 to ϕ.
The above characterization of Weak Kleene Logic can be easily rephrased in
terms of an n-matrix.12 Let AKl be a set of rules describing Kleene logics. It
means that AKl consists of:
Negation 1: ¬ϕ, 0
ϕ, 1
Negation 2: ¬ϕ, 1
ϕ, 0
Negation 3: ¬ϕ, n
ϕ, n
9Note that the results presented for deterministic consequence relations are not origi-
nal. They are here for pedagogical reasons. For an extensive study of tableaux methods
see (Baaz et al., 1996; Fitting, 2003).
10This logic sometimes goes by the name of Bochvar Logic (Bochvar, 1939). One of the main
application of this logic is in truth theories (Horsten, 2011; Halbach, 2011).
11Known also by the name Bochvar Internal Logic. See (Bergmann, 2008) for an extensive
overview of many-valued logics.
12Observe that truth-tables define interpretations of functors, the designated value is 1 and
T = {0, n, 1}.
58 CHAPTER 4. PROOF SYSTEMS
Disjunction 1: ϕ ∨ ψ, 1
ϕ, 1
ψ, 0
ϕ, 1
ψ, n
ϕ, 0
ψ, 1
ϕ, n
ψ, 1
ϕ, 1
ψ, 1
Disjunction 2: ϕ ∨ ψ, n
ϕ, n
ψ, n
ϕ, n
ψ, 0
ϕ, 0
ψ, n
ϕ, 1
ψ, n
ϕ, n
ψ, 1
Disjunction 3: ϕ ∨ ψ, 0
ϕ, 0
ψ, 0
Conjunction 1: ϕ ∧ ψ, 1
ϕ, 1
ψ, 1
Conjunction 2: ϕ ∧ ψ, n
ϕ, n
ψ, n
ϕ, n
ψ, 0
ϕ, 0
ψ, n
ϕ, 1
ψ, n
ϕ, n
ψ, 1
Conjunction 3: ϕ ∧ ψ, 0
ϕ, 0
ψ, 0
ϕ, 0
ψ, 1
ϕ, 1
ψ, 0
ϕ, 0
ψ, n
ϕ, n
ψ, 0
It is rather easy to see that the following system is sound (since all the abstract
rules are based on truth-tables). A completeness proof is in the last section.
We will proceed to another example  Lukasiewicz logic ( L3) ( Lukasiewicz,
1970, 1988). This case is quite similar to the previous one with one difference,13
some functors have different truth-tables:
¬ ϕ
0 1
n n
1 0
∧ 0 n 1
0 0 0 0
n 0 n n
1 0 n 1
∨ 0 n 1
0 0 n 1
n n n 1
1 1 1 1
Similarly we will use |=Lk ϕ to state that ϕ is  Lukasiewicz-tautology and Γ |=Lk ϕ
to denote its consequence relation (defined as a preservation of value 1). Thus,
ALk contains the following rules:
Negation 1: ¬ϕ, 1
ϕ, 0
Negation 2: ¬ϕ, n
ϕ, n
13This logic has exactly the same truth-values for negation, conjunction and disjunction as
strong Kleene logic. The only difference between these two lies in matrix for implication.
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Negation 3: ¬ϕ, 0
ϕ, 1
Disjunction 1: ϕ ∨ ψ, 1
ϕ, 1
ψ, 1
ϕ, 1
ψ, n
ϕ, 1
ψ, 0
ϕ, n
ψ, 1
ϕ, 0
ψ, 1
Disjunction 2: ϕ ∨ ψ, n
ϕ, n
ψ, n
ϕ, n
ψ, 0
ϕ, 0
ψ, n
Disjunction 3: ϕ ∨ ψ, 0
ϕ, 0
ψ, 0
Conjunction 1: ϕ ∧ ψ, 1
ϕ, 1
ψ, 1
Conjunction 2: ϕ ∧ ψ, n
ϕ, n
ψ, n
ϕ, 1
ψ, n
ϕ, n
ψ, 1
Conjunction 3:
ϕ ∧ ψ, 0
ϕ, 0
ψ, 0
ϕ, 0
ψ, n
ϕ, n
ψ, 0
ϕ, 1
ψ, 0
ϕ, 0
ψ, 1
4.4.2 Non-deterministic examples
The first candidate is the paraconsistent14 logic CLuN. This logic has both a non-
deterministic and a deterministic characterization (see: Batens (1999, 2000)). We
will focus on the non-deterministic one. CLuN is a two-valued logic characterized
by the truth-tables of classical logic for all the functors except negation. The
negation is characterized by:
¬ ϕ
{0,1} 1
1 0
where 0, 1 means that the negated formula can have either of the two values, so
negation is strictly non-deterministic. In other words, there are valuations under
which both a formula and its negation can be true. Again, it is rather straight-
forward what the n-matrix for CLuN looks like. The set of rules appropriate for
CluN is defined as:
14See: (Batens, 1998, 1999; Batens and De Clercq, 2004).
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Negation 1: ¬ϕ, 1
ϕ, 0 ϕ, 1
Negation 2: ¬ϕ, 0
ϕ, 1
Disjunction 1: ϕ ∨ ψ, 1
ϕ, 1
ψ, 1
ϕ, 1
ψ, 0
ϕ, 0
ψ, 1
Disjunction 2: ϕ ∨ ψ, 0
ϕ, 0
ψ, 0
Conjunction 1: ϕ ∧ ψ, 1
ϕ, 1
ψ, 1
Conjunction 2: ϕ ∧ ψ, 0
ϕ, 0
ψ, 0
ϕ, 1
ψ, 0
ϕ, 0
ψ, 1
The last example of a proof system that we will formulate is more intere-
sting, since it contains a modal operator B. The logic BAT was presented in
(Pawlowski and Urbaniak, 2017) as a logic of informal provability. In this logic,
informal provability is treated similarly to the notion of truth in (Kripke, 1975).
It is partial in the sense that some sentences are informally provable, other are
informally refutable but this division is not exhaustive. There are sentences which
are neither informally provable nor informally refutable. To indicate this, BAT
has three values: 0, n, 1. The intended interpretation of 0 is informally refutable,
1 stands for informally provable and n stands for neither. BAT functors are
characterized by the following truth-tables:
¬ ϕ
0 1
n n
1 0
∨ 0 n 1
0 0 n 1
n n {n,1} 1
1 1 1 1
∧ 0 n 1
0 0 0 0
n 0 {0, n} n
1 0 n 1
the provability operator is characterized by the following table:
B ϕ
1 1
{0,n} n
0 0
Since in this case we have multiple non-deterministic functors, we will split
the presentation of syntactical rules for BAT into subsets. The negation in BAT
is described by the following:
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Negation 1: ¬ϕ, 1
ϕ, 0
Negation 2: ¬ϕ, n
ϕ, n
Negation 3: ¬ϕ, 0
ϕ, 1
As one can imagine, rules for disjunction and conjuction are somehow com-
plicated (both functors are non-deterministic15). For readability we will provide
a minor simplification. Suppose that we have a formula ϕ1 ◦ ϕ2. If it is clear
from the truth-table that for v(ϕ1 ◦ ϕ2) = i it is sufficient that either v(ϕ1) = i
or v(ϕ2) = i instead of listing all the options we will only list two options: either
ϕ1, i or ϕ2, i. Thus, the non-deterministic functors of BAT are described by the
following rules.
Disjunction 1: ϕ ∨ ψ, 1
ϕ, 1 ψ, 1 ϕ, n
ψ, n
Disjunction 2: ϕ ∨ ψ, n
ϕ, n
ψ, 0
ψ, n
ϕ, 0
ϕ, n
ψ, n
Disjunction 3: (ϕ ∨ ψ), 0
ϕ, 0
ψ, 0
Conjunction 1: ϕ ∧ ψ, 1
ϕ, 1
ψ, 1
Conjunction 2: (ϕ ∧ ψ), n
ϕ, n
ψ, n
ϕ, n
ψ, 1
ϕ, 1
ψ, n
Conjunction 3: (ϕ ∧ ψ), 1
ϕ, 0 ψ, 0 ϕ, n
ψ, n
Provability 1: Bϕ, 1
ϕ, 1
15Some disjunctions of two undecided claims can be informally provable whereas some
other remains undecided. Similar considerations apply to conjuctions. For more details see
(Pawlowski and Urbaniak, 2017).
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Provability 2: Bϕ, 0
ϕ, 0 ϕ, n
Provability 3: Bϕ, n
ϕ, n
4.5 Soundness and completeness
We only provided a general framework for constructing proof systems. Thus, the
proofs of both soundness and completeness rely heavily on a particular charac-
terization of a given consequence relation. That is why we will only sketch a
general method of proving these results.
Suppose that we have a consequence relation L defined in terms of an n-
matrix M. Let A be a set of rules describing M. In order to prove that `A is sound
and strongly complete with respect to L we need some further definitions.
Definition 66. We say that a valuation v is faithful to a branch b iff for all
formulas ϕ occurring on the branch, if ϕ occurs with a label k, then v(ϕ) = k.
Fact 67. Let v be an L-valuation and b a branch in a tree. If v is faithful to b,
then for any rule of A that can be applied to b, there is an extension b′ of b such
that v is faithful to b′.
Proof. We argue by cases. Let ϕ = ◦i(ϕ1, ϕ2, . . . , ϕi) and suppose ϕ, k appears
on b. Let COk(ϕ) = {v1, . . . , vl} for some l. Thus, the application of a rule appro-
priate for ◦, i generates l many extensions of b. By construction, each extension
is correlated with a valuation from COk(ϕ) and these valuations constitute all
the possible ways of having v(ϕ) = k. By the definition, since v is faithful to b,
v(ϕ) = k, so v ∈ COk(ϕ) which means that v is faithful to at least one extension
of b.
Fact 68. If Γ `A ϕ then Γ |=L ϕ.
Proof. By contraposition, suppose Γ 6|=L ϕ. Then there is an L-valuation v, such
that for any ψ ∈ Γ, v(ψ) ∈ D and v(ϕ) /∈ D. This valuation is faithful to at least
one extension of a root of a tree for Γ, ϕ. By a multiple application of Lemma
67 we can find a valuation faithful to some branch b. It means that this branch
must be open, so Γ 6`A ϕ.
Definition 69 (Evaluation induced by b). Let b be an open branch. An L-
valuation v is induced by b iff for all propositional variables p, if they occur in
the form p, k, then v(p) = k.
We proceed with a lemma which will enable us to sketch a proof of the com-
pleteness theorem.
Fact 70. Let a branch b be open and complete. Let E be the set of L-valuations
induced by b. Then there is an L-valuation v ∈ E such that if ϕ occurs on b with
a label k, then v(ϕ) = k.
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Proof. The proof is by induction on the complexity of ϕ. If ϕ is a proposi-
tional parameter, we are done by the definition of v being induced. Suppose
that the theorem works for ϕ1, ϕ2, . . . ϕm. We will show that it also works for
◦m(ϕ1, ϕ2 . . . ϕm). Assume that ◦m(ϕ1, ϕ2 . . . ϕm), j occurs on the branch. Since,
b is complete a rule for ◦m, j must have been applied to it. Let
o = |COj(◦m(ϕ1, ϕ2 . . . ϕm))|.
We have o many extensions of b where indexes of ϕ1 . . . ϕm on each exten-
sion correspond uniquely to some valuation v ∈ COj(◦m(ϕ1, ϕ2 . . . ϕm)). By
the induction hypothesis if for some formula ϕi, i < m + 1, it occurs with
a number h, there is a valuation vh such that vh(ϕi) = h. It is clear that
vh ∈ COj(◦m(ϕ1, ϕ2 . . . ϕm)), so vh(ϕ) = j.
Fact 71. If Γ |=L ϕ then Γ `A ϕ.
Proof. By contraposition, suppose Γ 0A ϕ. Then there is a complete open tree
for Γ, ϕ. Let b be an open branch on that tree. Take valuation v ∈ E which is
induced by b. Under this valuation all elements of Γ have the designated value
and ϕ does not, meaning Γ 6|=L ϕ.
4.6 Conclusions
We presented a simple framework for constructing proof systems for finitely-
valued deterministic and non-deterministic logics. Using the framework we can
construct, for any finite n-matrix, a strongly complete proof system.

Chapter 5
Non-deterministic logic of
informal provability has no finite
characterization1
Abstract
Recently, in an ongoing debate about informal provability, non-deter-
ministic logics of informal provability BAT and CABAT were developed
to model the notion. I will take a closer look at some properties of these
logics, proving a couple of negative results about the existence of various
semantics for their consequence relations. The key results are that these
logics lack finitely many-valued deterministic characterization and that a
majority of commonly used modal semantics cannot characterize CABAT.
5.1 Motivations
In common mathematical practice mathematical claims are justified or proven
in an informal way. Derivations are not stated in a proper formal language but
rather in a mixture of a natural language expanded with mathematical notation.
The existence of an informal proof of a mathematical statement is a good reason
to take the claim to be known. This kind of provability connected to mathemat-
ical practice will be called informal provability. On the other hand, we have the
notion of formal provability, relative to a given axiomatic theory.
The whole discussion about the notion of informal provability started with
Myhill (1960) and Go¨del (1986). Quite recently the discussion has been revived
by philosophers (Leitgeb, 2009; Antonutti Marfori, 2010). They argue that there
are differences between formal and informal provability. Amongst many the main
differences are: the role of axioms and definitions in proofs of these two kinds is
different, there is no clear algorithm for converting informal proofs into formal
ones, informal proofs are better at convincing mathematicians and the justifica-
tion between steps in both kinds of proofs is different.
1I am the single author of the paper and the paper is submitted (revisions).
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Some systems for informal provability were proposed. Shapiro (1985) treats
informal provability not as a predicate but as an operator. Provability is axiom-
atized by a modal logic S4. The resulting system is called Epistemic Arithmetic
[EA]. EA and similar theories were further developed by Reinhardt (1986) and
Horsten (1996, 1997, 1998).
Goodman (1984) showed that the internal logic2 of EA is the same as a
version of intuitionistic arithmetic called Heyting Arithmetic. This implies that
informal provability as described by the system behaves similarly to the intu-
itionistic notion of provability. Given that informal mathematics is rather un-
controversially classical, it seems that EA does not do justice to the notion of
informal provability.
A key difference between formal and informal provability lies in the principles
of inference that these concepts validate. For both informal provability and
formal provability the principle called reflection schema, which roughly says that
if a given sentence is (informally) provable then it is true, is sound. Yet, not
all instances of the above principle are provable for formal provability for the
full language of arithmetic. The principle is crucial for informal provability.
Unfortunately, even the straightforward strategy of adding all the instances of
the above schema (retaining at the same time other natural conditions on informal
provability) to an arithmetical theory fails — the resulting theory is inconsistent.3
One way to solve this problem is to resign from classical logic in the background
in favor of a newly developed non-classical logic aiming at modeling the notion
of informal provability.
Recently, new logics BAT and CABAT for informal provability were developed
(Pawlowski and Urbaniak, 2017).4 I will present these logics and discuss some of
their properties, showing that there is no finite deterministic semantics for BAT,
which consequently means that BAT is a strictly non-deterministic logic. I also
prove that the set of theorems of CABAT cannot be characterized by a finite
deterministic matrix. Finally, I give an argument that CABAT understood as a
consequence relation cannot be captured by commonly used modal semantics.
Before we proceed to the technicalities, let’s take a brief look at the features of
CABAT that make it an interesting candidate for the logic of informal provability.
CABAT is a propositional modal logic, where B is a modal operator. The intended
interpretation of B is informally provable. I will useýC to denote its consequence
relation.
Consider popular proofs of paradoxical sounding theorems involving the no-
tion of provability, such as Montague’s theorems and Lo¨b’s theorem. A vast
majority of them can be translated to propositional modal language and the key
2By the internal logic in this context, we mean all formulas ϕ such that EA ` ϕ, where 
stands for informal provability operator of Epistemic arithmetic. See (Shapiro, 1985; Koellner,
2016) for details of Epistemic arithmetic.
3 For clarity, note that it’s possible to add the reflection principle for a formal provability
predicate of a certain formal theory T. What we meant here is that it is impossible to have
a provability predicate that shares the standard conditions put on formal provability and the
reflection schema at the same time. In the first scenario the new predicate enriched by the
reflection schema is no longer a formal provability predicate of the enriched theory.
4I am one of the authors of this paper. The paper is accepted and forthcoming in the
Review of Symbolic logic.
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moves in their proofs can be run in a propositional modal logic. Assume that we
are working in a certain axiomatic theory T extending Peano Arithmetic. The
usual strategy for such proofs is to use the diagonal lemma to generate a sentence
λ provably equivalent to PrT(p¬λq) (for Montague’s theorem and its dual ver-
sion) or PrT(pλq) → ϕ (where PrT is the standard formal provability predicate
of T) for Lo¨b’s theorem. The rest of the proof proceeds on the propositional
level. In order to emulate the application of the diagonal lemma we will add the
propositional counterpart of the formula generated by the diagonal lemma to the
premises, and proceed propositionally from there. The following fact together
with its explanation should clarify the idea.
Fact 72. The following hold for CABAT:
1. B(Bφ→ φ), B(λ ≡ (Bλ→ φ))ZZý| C Bφ.
2. B(Bλ→ λ), B(B¬λ→ ¬λ), B(B(¬λ) ≡ λ)ýC λ ∧ ¬λ.
3. B(λ ≡ ¬Bλ), B(λ→ Bλ), B(¬λ→ B¬λ)ýC λ ∧ ¬λ.
4. IfýC ϕ orýC ¬φ thenýC Bϕ→ ϕ,
5. ϕýC Bϕ and BϕýC ϕ
1 shows that a translation of Lo¨b’s theorem does not hold in CABAT.5 The
first premise is a translation of the antecedent of Lo¨b’s theorem (T ` PrT(pϕq)→
ϕ) and the remaining premise is a translation of the application of the diagonal
lemma to a formula PrT(x)→ ϕ. 2 says that it is not possible to extend CABAT
with a translation of the reflection schema. The first two premises are transla-
tions of the reflection schema and the last one is a translation of the application of
the diagonal lemma. Similarly, the third thing on the list states that one cannot
consistently add all the instances of the provabilitation schema (if something is
true, it is provable). Again, the first two premises are translations of the provabil-
itation schema for λ,¬λ and the last one a translation of the application of the
diagonal lemma. Item 4 shows that the amount of reflection by default available
in CABAT is greater than for the standard provability predicate. The reflec-
tion schema is not only restricted for theorems. The last item on the list shows
that CABAT consequence relation preserves provability both ways (meaning a
stronger version of NEC and CONEC are valid).
In classical first order arithmetic it is not possible to have the standard prov-
ability predicate for which either all the instances of the reflection schema or
all the instances of the provabilitation schema are provable. The moral from
the above theorem is straightforward. In CABAT it is still not possible but the
amount of reflection that is valid for CABAT is greater. Moreover if we translate
paradoxical theorems by implications not by consequence relation, then all the
paradoxes are no longer valid. Unfortunately, the conditional in CABAT is quite
weak so this is not a fully satisfactory solution.
5To be fair if we add to the premise set a formula B¬λ → ¬λ then the consequence does
hold. But we are not interested here in an arbitraty instance of the reflection schema but in
the translation of the standard proof of Lo¨b’s theorem. Thus, in general the reflection schema
is not assumed.
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In the next section of this paper I will introduce some key technical notions.
Then, I will proceed with a presentation of BAT and CABAT. In section 4, I
will further elaborate on some properties of these logics. In section 5 and 6 I will
prove the key negative results about the existence of various types of semantics
sound for either BAT or CABAT.
5.2 Technical preliminaries
Let L be a propositional language (understood as the set of all well-formed for-
mulas) constructed from propositional variables V ar = {p1, p2, . . . }, and connec-
tives. Usually, I will be interested in the language where we have the classical
Boolean connectives: ¬,∧,∨,→,≡. I will use Greek letters φ, ψ, ... as meta-
variables for formulas and by Wl we will mean the set of all formulas. Suppose L
is a language, by LB I will mean an extension of this language with a unary oper-
ator B. In our case, we use B rather than a more common  since we are mostly
interested in interpretations where the operator stands for informal provability.
In order to define BAT and CABAT I will need non-deterministic matrices
developed in (Avron and Lev, 2001, 2005; Avron and Zamanski, 2011).
Definition 73. A matrix for a propositional language L is a tupleM = 〈T,D,O〉,
where T is a non-empty set of truth values, D ⊆ T is the set of designated values.
O is the smallest set that for any n-ary connective ◦n of the language, there is a
corresponding n-ary function ◦n ∈ O such that ◦n : Tn 7→ T .
Definition 74. A valuation in M is a function v : Wl 7→ T such that for any con-
nective ◦n and any sequence of formulas ϕ1, ϕ2 . . . , ϕn, v(◦n(ϕ1, ϕ2, . . . , ϕn)) =
◦n(v(ϕ1), v(ϕ2), . . . , v(ϕn)). For any Γ, ϕ a valuation v:
1. Satisfies ϕ in M in symbols v |=M ϕ iff v(ϕ) ∈ D.
2. Is a model of Γ (v |=M Γ) iff v satisfies every formula in Γ.
We say that ϕ is M -valid iff for any valuation in M , v |=M ϕ. In this case we
often skip the reference to the valuation. By Γ |=M ϕ we mean that for any
valuation v, if v |=M Γ then v |=M ϕ. In this case we say that ϕ follows from Γ.
To have a description of non-deterministic logics in terms of matrices we need
to modify the notion of a matrix and the notion of a valuation.
Definition 75. An n-matrix for a propositional modal language L is a tuple
M = 〈T,D,O〉, where T is a non-empty set of truth values, D ⊆ T is the set of
designated values. O is the smallest set such that for any n-ary connective ◦n of
the language, there is a corresponding n-ary function ◦n, ◦n : Tn 7→ 2T \ {∅} in
O.
This notion is a generalization of the notion of a matrix for a propositional
logic. In the standard deterministic setting, O assigns exactly one value for any
combination of connectives where in an n-matrix it assigns a non-empty subset
of D.
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The role of an evaluation in non-deterministic setting is to specify a single
value ascribed by O. In other words the value of a complex formula doesn’t
depend solely on the values of its arguments.
Definition 76. A valuation in an n-matrix M is a function v : Wl 7→ T such
that for any connective ◦n and any sequence of formulas ϕ1, ϕ2 . . . , ϕn,
v(◦n(ϕ1, ϕ2, . . . , ϕn)) ∈ ◦n(v(ϕ1), v(ϕ2), . . . , v(ϕn)). A valuation v:
1. Satisfies ϕ in M (v |=M ϕ ) iff v(ϕ) ∈ D.
2. Is a model of Γ [v |=M Γ] iff v satisfies every formula in Γ.
We will say that ϕ follows from Γ [Γ |=M ϕ] iff every model of Γ is a model
of ϕ. An n-matrix M is n-valued if |T | = n.
Definition 77. A consequence relation |= is characterized by:
1. A matrix M , iff for any Γ, ϕ it is the case that Γ |= ϕ iff Γ |=M ϕ.
2. An n-matrix M iff Γ |= ϕ iff Γ |=M ϕ for any Γ.
The above definitions are stated in a general format. Mostly through this
paper we will limit our interest to the classical propositional language and its
extension with a provability operator.
5.3 BAT and CABAT
CABAT and BAT were introduced in (Pawlowski and Urbaniak, 2017) as logics
for informal provability. In order to define CABAT we have to start with the
definition of BAT (BAT comes from Being an Absolute Theorem).6
BAT is a three-valued (0, n, 1) non-deterministic logic. The intended inter-
pretation of 0 is informally refutable, 1 stands for informally provable and n for
neither. The idea behind the three-valued semantics relies on the intuition that
in mathematical practice we can distinguish three different sets of mathemati-
cal claims: those which have an informal proof, those which have an informal
refutation, and undecided ones.
Prima facie, we can distinguish two different interpretations of informal prov-
ability. According to the first one, informal provability is time dependent. For
instance, currently a mathematical claim may be informally undecidable, but
later some mathematician can prove it. It will no longer be independent. Thus,
the status of a sentence can change over time.
According to the second interpretation, informal provability is time indepen-
dent: some are simply provable, some are simply refutable, and some are simply
independent. The status of mathematical sentences is fixed and cannot change.
If we stick to the second interpretation then for some undecidable mathe-
matical sentences we may be able to prove that their conjunction is informally
6The etymology of “CABAT” is a bit more complex. The letter C in the name stands for
the closure condition and the letter A, for algebraic conditions that turned out to be redundant.
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refutable.7 For instance, consider the Continuum Hypothesis and its negation.
For some other, their conjunction may remain informally undecidable. For in-
stance, take two sentences: one expressing the consistency of ZFC and the other
expressing the Continuum hypothesis. The reasoning carries over to disjunction.
Some disjunctions of undecided sentence may be undecided and some others in-
formally provable. It seems, informal provability is not truth-functional. This is
the main motivation for using non-deterministic matrices.8
Let M = 〈T,D,O〉 be an n-matrix where T = {0, n, 1}, D = {1} and O is
the set of functions defined by the following tables:
¬ φ
0 1
n n
1 0
∨ 0 n 1
0 0 n 1
n n {n, 1} 1
1 1 1 1
∧ 0 n 1
0 0 0 0
n 0 {0, n} n
1 0 n 1
→ 0 n 1
0 1 1 1
n n {n, 1} 1
1 0 n 1
≡ 0 n 1
0 1 n 0
n n {0, n, 1} n
1 0 n 1
B φ
1 1
{ 0, n} n
0 0
By a BAT-valuation we mean every non-deterministic valuation which re-
spects the above tables. The consequence relation of BAT relation is denoted
by ý and is defined in the usual manner: Γýφ iff for all BAT-valuations, if
v(ψ) = 1 for all ψ ∈ Γ then v(φ) = 1.
We say that a BAT-valuation e respects the closure condition iff
For any LB-formulas φ1, φ2, . . . , φn, ψ such that
φ1, φ2, . . . , φn |= ψ,
where |= is the classical consequence relation for LB, if v(Bφi) = 1 for
any 0 < i ≤ n, then v(Bψ) = 1.
CABAT is the logic resulting from BAT by not considering BAT-valuations
which do not respect the closure condition. The closure condition is quite im-
portant since BAT is a very weak logic, for instance disjunction in BAT is not
symmetric.9
7For the first interpretation, it’s impossible since the status of a mathematical claim may
change. For instance, currently the Goldbach hypothesis is undecidable but it may turn out
later that we will be able to prove or disprove it. Thus, a conjuction and disjuction of two
independent sentences may turn out to be provable, refutable or remain undecided.
8To be fair, it is also a perfectly viable motivation to approach informal provability from su-
pervaluationistic perspective. This approach and the comparison between the two approaches,
however, is beyond the scope of this paper.
9On the other hand it is an interesting system to study since it is a starting point and
system on top of which CABAT is defined.
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We will use ΓýC φ to denote the consequence relation of CABAT. Alterna-
tively, we can characterize CABAT by means of filtration:
Definition 78. Let |= be the classical propositional consequence relation in LB.
We say that a BAT-valuation e belongs to the filtered set of BAT-valuations just
in case the following conditions hold:
1. For any two formulas φ, ψ, if |= φ ≡ ψ then v(φ) = v(ψ),
2. For any tautology φ, v(φ) = 1,
3. For any countertautology φ, v(φ) = 0.
Let Γ |=Lf ϕ mean that for any L-filtrated BAT-valuation v such that v(ψ) =
1 for any ψ ∈ Γ it follows that v(ϕ) = 1. Then the following holds:
Fact 79. For any Γ, ϕ, ΓýC ϕ iff Γ |=Lf ϕ
Proof. See (Pawlowski and Urbaniak, 2017).
One may wonder why we added an additional operator B to the language.
Prima facie it seems that this operator is defined by Bφ := (φ∨¬φ)∧φ since both
formulas have the same matrix. But this does not imply that for every valuation
both formulas have the same values. The semantics is non-deterministic so there
is a valuation e such that v(Bφ) = n and v((φ ∨ ¬φ) ∧ φ) = 0. The general
phenomenon is that if two formulas have the same truth-table it does not mean
that for each valuation the values of these formulas are the same. But if for any
valuation the value of two formulas is the same then they have the same table.
5.4 The lack of finite deterministic characteristic
In this section we show that both BAT consequence relation10 and the set of
CABAT tautologies11 cannot be characterized by a finite deterministic matrix.
We will proceed indirectly. We assume that such a characterization exists. Next,
for each natural number n we will give a general recipe, for constructing a set Γn
and a single formula ψn such that any [potential] deterministic n-valued charac-
terization of BAT validates the reasoning from Γn to ψn, but the inference is not
valid in BAT.
For the latter result we employ a reasoning used by Dugundji (1940) in a
modern formulation that can be found in (Coniglio and Peron, 2014).
The intuition here is that we will use the lack of symmetricity for disjunction
in BAT. Let Γn = {pi ∨ pi | 0 < i < n + 2} ∪ {pi ∨ pj | 0 < i < j < n + 2}.
Formula ψn is defined as
∨j=n+1
i<j [(pi ∨ pj) ∧ (pj ∨ pi)].
Lemma 4. For any n, Γn
Z
Zý| ψn.
10Since BAT does not have any tautologies, we have to stick to its consequence relation.
11From the fact that CABAT understood as the set of tautologies cannot have a finite many-
valued characterization, it follows that CABAT understood as a consequence relation cannot
have deterministic n valued semantics as well.
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Proof. First, since disjunction is not symmetric in BAT, for any i, j, we have
pi∨pjZZý| pj∨pi. It is rather easy to see that for each i, j, pi∨pi, pi∨pjZZý| pj∨pi,
so pi ∨ pi, pi ∨ pjZZý| (pj ∨ pi) ∧ (pi ∨ pj). This straightforwardly generalizes to
any subset of Γ.
Now, we will show that any (potential) n-valued deterministic logic has to
validate the reasoning from Γn to ψn, so it cannot be the case that for all Γ, ϕ,
Γ |=n ϕ iff Γýϕ.
Theorem 80. For each n, Γn |=n ψn.
Proof. Suppose for a contradiction that Γn 6|=n ψn. Let e be a deterministic
valuation such that for any ϕ ∈ Γn, v(ϕ) ∈ D and v(ψn) 6∈ D. Formula ψn
contains n+ 1 different propositional variables. Since the logic is n-valued, there
are i, j such that i 6= j and v(pi) = v(pj).
Since this characteristic is deterministic it follows that v(pi ∨ pi) = v(pi ∨ pj)
and v(pj ∨ pj) = v(pj ∨ pi). But pi ∨ pi, pj ∨ pj ∈ Γn, so v(pi ∨ pi), v(pj ∨ pj) ∈ D.
It follows that v(pi ∨ pj) = v(pj ∨ pi) ∈ D. Since, ψ1, ψ2ýψ1 ∧ ψ2, we have
v((pi ∨ pj) ∧ (pj ∨ pi)) ∈ D on the assumption that the deterministic matrix
under consideration captures BAT consequence. But also, for any two formulas
ϕ1, ϕ2 we have ϕ1ýϕ1 ∨ ϕ2, and so we also have v(ψn) ∈ D, which contradicts
the assumption.
We shall proceed now to showing that CABAT cannot be characterized by
a finite matrix. In the proof we will employ a certain version of Dugundji’s
formula used in (Coniglio and Peron, 2014). By p⇒ q we will mean the formula
B(p → p) → B(q → p). For each natural number n we will construct a so-called
Dugundji formula: DGn =
∨
i 6=j(pi ⇒ pj), where 0 < i, j < n+ 2.
The general strategy for the proof is as follows. For a contradiction we will
assume that there is an n-valued deterministic matrix characterizing CABAT
|=n, meaning that for any ϕ, |=n ϕ iff ýC ϕ. Then we will show that any such
matrix validates Dn. Then we will argue that CABAT does not validate Dn for
any n.
First, we will show that any n-valued characterization of CABAT validates
Dn. Suppose that |=n is such that for any ϕ, |=n ϕ iffýC ϕ.
Lemma 5. For any natural number n, |=n DGn.
Proof. Take any valuation v. Since the matrix is n-valued, and the formula has
n+ 1 variables, by the pigeon-hole principle at least two variables have the same
value. Thus, there are i, j such that v(pi) = v(pj). Since the characterization
is deterministic, it follows that v(pi ⇒ pj) = v(pi ⇒ pi). Note that pi ⇒ pi
is a CABAT tautology. By propositional logic, for any formulas φ, ψ, we have
ýC φ ∨ (pi ⇒ pi) ∨ ψ . From v(pi ⇒ pj) = v(pi ⇒ pi) and the last observation
it follows that the matrix validates DGn.
Fact 81. For any natural number n, 
Z
Zý| C DGn.
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Proof. Consider an evaluation e, under which all propositional variables used in
DGn have value n. It is rather easy to see, that under this evaluation each disjunct
of DGn of the form B(pi → pi)→ B(pj → pi) can have value n, which makes the
whole big disjunction n as well, showing that it is not a CABAT tautology.
5.5 Lack of modal semantics
In this section we will elaborate on modal semantics for CABAT. In particular,
we will show that neither (normal or non-normal) Kripke12 semantics, nor neigh-
borhood semantics can capture CABAT understood as a consequence relation.
First, observe:
Fact 82. 
Z
Zý| C B(ϕ→ ψ)→ (Bϕ→ Bψ).
This means that CABAT cannot have standard Kripke semantics since axiom
K is valid in all possible world models.
One may think that the lack of K in CABAT is problematic. It seems that
axiom K is a correct principle for informal provability. If an implication is in-
formally provable, then if one can prove its antecedent, one has a proof of its
consequent. This is not a problem in CABAT since implication in CABAT says
something more than axiom K does. Observe, ýC B(ϕ → ψ) → (Bϕ → Bψ)
would not only inform us what happens when the antecedent has value 1, but
also what happens when its value is n. For instance, if v(B(ϕ→ ψ)) = n then the
consequent Bϕ→ Bψ couldn’t have value 0. Thus, the initial intuition supporting
the validity of K, “If an implication is informally provable, then if one can prove
its antecedent then one has a proof of its consequent,” should be translated as
B(ϕ → ψ), BϕýC (Bϕ → Bψ), and this inference is valid in CABAT. So, the
intuition behind K is indeed captured in CABAT as well.
It seems that theorem-wise the closure condition of CABAT assures us that
CABAT is closed under (Nec) and (Conec) (if ` ϕ then ` ϕ). However note that
CABAT is slightly stronger than a modal logic closed under (Nec) and (Conec),
as the following fact indicates:
Fact 83. Let |=NC be classical propositional logic in the language with a modal
operator closed under (Nec) and (Conec). Then the following is the case: for all
ϕ, if |=NC ϕ then ýC ϕ and there is a formula λ such that ýC λ but it is not
the case that |=NC λ.
Proof. We will show by induction on the number of applications of (Nec) and
(Conec) that for each line i in the proofýC ϕi.
Suppose n = 0. It means that ϕi is a tautology of classical logic. CABAT
validates modus ponens and all propositional tautologies, which means ϕ is valid
in CABAT. Assume the theorem holds for n applications of (Nec) or (Conec).
We will show that the theorem holds for n+ 1. Let ϕ1 . . . ϕk be an NC proof of
ϕ, so ϕk = ϕ. Let l be the line in a proof obtained by the n+ 1-th application of
(Nec) or (Conec). By the induction hypothesis, any formula at a line occurring
12A non-normal Kripke semantics may contain non-normal worlds, resulting in the weakening
of (Nec) [if ` ϕ then ` ϕ] (Chellas, 1980).
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before line l is valid in CABAT. But CABAT is closed under both (Nec) and
(Conec), so a formula at line l is also valid in CABAT, for it was obtained from
a formula occurring before, which is valid in CABAT, by means of either (Nec)
or (Conec).
For the second part of the theorem consider λ = B(q∧¬q)→ p. Clearly,ýC λ
but it is easy to see that we cannot get this by a simple application of (Nec) and
(Conec).
Recall that a non-normal Kripke frame is obtained from the standard Kripke
frame by distinguishing between two kinds of worlds: normal and non-normal
ones. In non-normal worlds nothing is necessary and everything is possible. Using
this kind of semantics we can model logics where necessitation is not valid. Yet,
every non-normal Kripke frame validates axiom K, so it cannot be an adequate
semantics for CABAT.
One of the most general modal frameworks is the so-called neighborhood se-
mantics. In this semantics, instead of an accessibility relation, we have a neigh-
borhood function. This function fixes which propositions are necessary at which
world.13
Definition 84. Let W be a set of worlds. A function N : W 7→ P (P (W )), where
P (W ) is the power set of W , is called a neighborhood function.
Definition 85. A tuple 〈W,N〉 is called a neighborhood frame iff W is non-
empty and N is a neighborhood function.
Definition 86. A tuple 〈W,N, v〉 is called a neighborhood model iff 〈W,N〉 is a
neighborhood frame, and v : At 7→ P (W ) is a valuation function.
Definition 87. Let M = 〈W,N, v〉 be a neighborhood model. Let w ∈ W .
Satisfaction conditions for formulas are defined in the following way:
1. M,w |= p if w ∈ v(p)
2. M,w |= ¬ϕ if M,w 6|= ϕ
3. M,w |= ϕ ∧ ψ if M,w |= ϕ and M,w |= ψ
4. M,w |= ϕ iff (ϕ)M ∈ N(w)
where (ϕ)M = {w | M,w |= ϕ} is the truth-set of ϕ. The first three conditions
are straightforward. The fourth condition states that a given formula is necessary
in a given world if the set of worlds in which the formula is true belongs to a
family of sets ascribed by the neighborhood function to this particular world.
Let M be a neighborhood model. We say that ϕ is valid in a neighborhood
model M [M |= ϕ] iff for any point w ∈W , M,w |= ϕ. If ϕ is valid in any neigh-
borhood model, then we will say that it is valid in a neighborhood frame. Using
validity in a frame we can define the notion of a local semantical consequence.
13For more information on this semantics see (Chellas, 1980).
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Definition 88. A formula ϕ is a local semantic consequence14 of a set of formulas
Γ iff for all neighborhood models M and all points w ∈ W , if M,w |= Γ then
M,w |= ϕ.
Note that any local semantical consequence validates the following:
Theorem 89. Let |= be a local neighborhood semantical consequence relation.
Then for any two formulas ϕ,ψ, if ϕ |= ψ and ψ |= ϕ then |= ϕ ≡ ψ.
Proof. Suppose that ϕ |= ψ and ψ |= ϕ. Suppose also by a contradiction, that
6|= ϕ ≡ ψ. We have two cases to consider: either there is a model M = 〈W,N, v〉
such that M |= ϕ ∧ ¬ψ or M |= ¬ϕ ∧ ψ. Since both cases are symmetric we
will only show the first one. Since M |= ϕ, by the assumption, we have M |= ψ,
which is a contradiction.
But the above is not true in CABAT:
Fact 90. From ϕýC ψ and ψýC ϕ it does not follow thatýC ϕ ≡ ψ.
Proof. To see that take a valuation on which both ϕ and ψ have value n and
assume that both ϕýC ψ and ψýC ϕ. It is easy to see that under this valuation
the equivalence may have value n.
This consequence shows that its impossible to characterizes CABAT by neigh-
borhood semantics.
14Let F be a family of frames. We say that ϕ is a global semantic consequence of Γ (Γ |= ϕ)
iff for all frames G ∈ F , if G |= Γ then G |= ϕ. For more details about this distinction see
Chapter 1 of (Blackburn, 2001).

Chapter 6
Paradoxes of informal provability
and many-valued
non-deterministic provability
logic1
Abstract
Paradoxes of informal mathematical provability are used to ar-
gue for the inconsistency of the notion of informal provability and
for dialetheism in general. We discuss these paradoxes, their formal
counterparts, and their alleged role in the defense of dialetheism. We
argue that the dialetheist arguments fail, but not for the reasons put
forward so far in the literature. The second part of the paper is more
constructive: we introduce non-classical logics of informal provabil-
ity (BAT and CABAT) and approach the paradoxes wielding this
weapon.
Keywords. Informal provability, many-valued logic, non-deterministic
semantics, Lo¨b’s theorem, paradoxes of provability
6.1 Formal vs Informal provability
Mathematicians justify or prove their claims in an informal way. Their informal
proofs aren’t really stated in a proper formal language, but rather in a mixture of
natural language expanded with mathematical notation, and aren’t as rigorous
as formal proofs. Sometimes, it isn’t even clear what counts as an axiom and
some simple facts are said to be justified merely on the basis of mathematical
insight (or intuition). Yet, the existence of an informal proof of a mathematical
statement is a compelling reason to take the claim to be true (or established).
1This is a joint paper with Rafal Urbaniak as the first author. The paper is currently
submitted.
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Formal proofs, on the other hand, are formulated in a fully formalized axiomatic
theory, and employ very specific formal rules of proof construction.2
The standard view3 on the relation between formal and informal provability
is that any informal proof is at least in principle reducible to a proper proof
in an appropriate axiomatic system (usually, ZFC) (Rav, 1999; Sjo¨gren, 2010;
Antonutti Marfori, 2010). On this view, informal proofs are just sloppy, in-
complete versions of formal proofs. However, some philosophers (Myhill, 1960;
Horsten, 2002; Leitgeb, 2009; Antonutti Marfori, 2010) argue against this view.
The standard view, they insist, does not fully explain why informal proofs are
quite good at convincing mathematicians, whereas formal ones are not. They also
point out that the role of axioms and definitions is quite different in both kinds of
proofs and that there is no clear procedure for converting an informal proof into
a formal one or for associating informal proofs with their formal counterparts
(Tanswell, 2015).
While we do find those aspects of the comparison of these two notions inter-
esting, we won’t get into the issues that are usually brought up in the debate.
Instead, we’d like to focus on general inference principles: are there any inference
principles on which formal and informal provability disagree, that is, which hold
for one, but don’t hold (or shouldn’t hold) for the other (and what is meant by
‘hold’ in this context)?
One example of a principle for which a difference seems to arise is the reflection
schema. Roughly speaking, it says that any provable sentence is also true. On one
hand, reflection is not too compelling for formal provability as such: to think that
claims provable in an axiomatic theory are true, one has to also assume that the
axioms of the theory are true and that the inference rules are truth-preserving.
For instance, it is not the case that for any axiomatic system built over the
standard arithmetical language, whatever is provable in that system is true in
the standard model. For reflection for such a system to be true, it also has to be
the case that the axioms of that system are true in the standard model (and that
provability in the system preserves truth). In contrast, claims proven in informal
mathematics are taken to be true in virtue of having an informal proof — for
this reason, the reflection schema for informal provability (henceforth informal
reflection schema) is quite compelling.
Unfortunately, due to Lo¨b’s theorem, the language of any consistent recur-
sively axiomatizable arithmetical theory T containing Peano Arithmetic can-
not contain a formula for which the standard Hilbert-Bernays conditions on
provability (to be listed soon) and reflection for the full language of T hold.
2The whole discussion on this topic was initiated by Go¨del (1953).
3This view is usually shared by mathematicians; for instance Enderton (1977, 10-11) says:
It is sometimes said that “mathematics can be embedded in set theory.” This
means that mathematical objects (such as numbers and differentiable functions)
can be defined to be certain sets. And the theorems of mathematics (such as the
fundamental theorem of calculus) then can be viewed as statements about sets.
Furthermore, these theorems will be provable from our axioms. Hence our axioms
provide a sufficient collection of assumptions for the development of the whole
of mathematics — a remarkable fact. (In Chapter 5 we will consider further the
procedure for embedding mathematics in set theory.)
Also, for a bit more sophisticated version of the standard view, see (Sjo¨gren, 2010).
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Things are even worse than Lo¨b’s theorem might suggest. Myhill (1960) and
Montague (1963) proved that no formal theory extending Robinson arithmetic
admits a provability predicate for which the reflection schema and Nec (if ` ϕ
then ` P (pϕq)) hold. So, at least prima facie, if we wanted to axiomatize our
intuitions about informal provability over arithmetic, we might have a really hard
time consistently incorporating some rather intuitive principles.
Some attempts at formulating a formal theory of informal provability have
been made. Shapiro (1985) constructed a theory called Epistemic Arithmetic
(EA) where informal provability is formalized as an operator rather than as a
predicate. On this approach informal provability is governed by a modal logic S4.
Shapiro defined a theorem-preserving translation v from the language of arith-
metic based on intuitionistic logic (Heyting arithmetic) to the language of EA.
Goodman (1984) proved that the translation is faithful and his proof was further
simplified by Flagg and Friedman (1986). This theory was further developed into
three directions: by considering additional principles such as Epistemic Church
Thesis (Flagg and Friedman, 1986; Halbach and Horsten, 2000), extending the
language with a truth predicate (Stern, 2015; Koellner, 2016), and a deeper anal-
ysis of the informal provability operator (Horsten, 1994, 1997; Heylen, 2013).
The whole framework was further studied by Rin and Walsh (2016).
The collateral damage here is a serious limitation on expressive power that
results from treating provability as an operator rather than as a predicate.4 It is
no longer possible to quantify over formulas by means of coding. Moreover, the
internal logic of the operator in the theory is quite weak, because of the existence
of the previously mentioned translation from intuitionistic logic.
A different approach to informal provability was proposed by Horsten (1997).
The idea is simple: informal provability remains a predicate, but the set of prin-
ciples holding for it is weakened to a rather small set of very uncontroversial ones.
The set of intuitive inferential principles is split into two, and they’re added to
two arithmetical theories called the basis and the main theory. The main the-
ory is further extended with the principle saying that if something is provable
in the basis, it is informally provable. The main feature of the approach is that
while reflection indeed holds for the main theory, certain other principles, such
as (Nec), can be applied only to the basis.
This approach seems to be more promising but it has its own problems. There
seems to be no principled way of deciding which principles should be weakened
and to what extent. Stern (2015) proved that many similar systems are incon-
sistent. So the approach doesn’t seem as promising as one might initially hope.
Recently, Pawlowski and Urbaniak (2017) proposed an alternative way to
build a theory of informal provability by changing the underlying logic. The
authors developed non-deterministic three-valued logics which can be used for
building a formal theory of informal provability. On this approach the move
to the predicate level seems viable. The translations of paradoxical theorems
blocking the move to the predicate level for theories having classical logic in the
background do not hold. One of the aims of this paper is to investigate how
4This feature is essential: one cannot extrapolate to the predicative level, for at that level
one could employ the Diagonal Lemma to repeat the moves present in the proof of Montague’s
theorem.
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quasi-paradoxical theorems can be translated into this setting and to investigate
how they behave in this context.
Section 6.2 discusses paradoxes related to provability. First, in section 6.2.1
we sketch informal versions of key paradoxical arguments. In section 6.2.2 discuss
their formalizations in order to see what theorems result from approaching them
formally. In section 6.3 we examine Lo¨b’s theorem and its alleged applications
to informal mathematics. Section 6.4 is devoted to paradoxes formulated using
the notion of informal provability. Notably, in section 6.4.1 we take a closer
look at a dialetheist argument for the inconsistency of informal mathematics.
We dissect its problematic premises in sections 6.4.2 and 6.4.3. Then we move
on to the constructive part: the development of a non-classical logic of informal
provability. We start with lying down motivations in subsection 6.5.1 and with a
sketch of the general background strategy in subsection 6.5.2. The main goal of
subsection 6.5.3 is to present our non-deterministic approach where we develop
two logics: BAT and CABAT. These logics are discussed further in subsection
6.5.4 and section 6.6. We conclude, in section 6.7, with an application of these
logics to paradoxical arguments discussed throughout the paper.
6.2 Paradoxes of provability
6.2.1 Informal paradoxes
Here we will take a closer look at some well-known principles involving prov-
ability that have been considered problematic or paradoxical. Let’s begin with
the Informal Provability Go¨del sentence: a sentence which says that it is not
informally provable.
(IPG) is not informally provable. (IPG)
At least prima facie, (IPG) gives rise to a paradox in the vein of (Beall, 1999;
Priest, 2006), where the argument is put forward to the effect that informal math-
ematics is inconsistent. For suppose (IPG) is false. This means it is informally
provable. Then, assuming informal reflection, it is true. The assumption that
(IPG) is false leads to the conclusion that it is true, which itself proves that
(IPG) is true.5 But this piece of reasoning is an informal proof, and so we have
just informally proven (IPG), which means that it is informally provable. This,
however, means that it is false after all. Contradiction.
Let’s call sentences whose negations are informally provable informally refu-
table.6 A close kin of (IPG) is what we’ll call the Informal Provability Liar — a
sentence that says of its own negation that it is informally provable.
(IPL) is informally refutable. (IPL)
Again, it seems that we can use (IPL) to reason to a contradiction. For suppose
(IPL) is true. If that’s the case, things are as it says, and so (IPL) is informally
5That is, we use (¬p→ p)→ p. The argument can be easily run as a reductio.
6Mind your head: proving informal refutability is not the same as proving underivability.
An informally refutable claim is not independent: it’s rejected.
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refutable, and the negation of (IPL) is informally provable. By informal reflection,
the negation of (IPL) is true, and we’ve arrived at a contradiction. So (IPL) is not
true. But this piece of reasoning constitutes an informal refutation of (IPL), and
so (IPL) is informally refutable and we’ve proven it is by giving the argument,
which means that we’ve proven (IPL). By informal reflection, (IPL) is true after
all. Contradiction.
Another interesting example is Informal Provability Curry (IPC) sentence: a
sentence saying of itself that if it’s informally provable, then an arbitrary sentence
ϕ is true (so, one gets different IPC sentences by substituting different sentences
for ϕ):7
If (IPC) is informally provable, then ϕ. (IPC)
Suppose (IPC) is false. Then the antecedent is true and (IPC) is informally
provable, and, by informal reflection, true. So we informally proved (IPC), and
thus have both the antecedent and the implication. Hence ϕ.8
6.2.2 Their formal counterparts and their use
Suppose we are working in a certain axiomatic theory T, extending a sufficiently
strong arithmetic. Relative to a fixed Go¨del coding, by pϕq we mean the code of
a formula ϕ. Proof(x, y) is read as x is a code of a sequence of codes of formulas
which together constitute a T-proof of a formula whose code is y. Proof(x, y) rep-
resents formal provability in T, so that if indeed Proof(m,n), T ` Proof(m¯, n¯),
and if ¬Proof(m,n), T ` ¬Proof(m¯, n¯) for any particular numbers m,n and
their standard numerals m¯, n¯.
By Pr(y) we mean the formula ∃xProof(x, y), We will call it the formal
provability predicate of T. Recall that if Proof(x, y) is constructed in a standard
way,9 this predicate has the following properties, usually referred to as Hilbert-
Bernays derivability conditions:
T ` φ⇒ T ` Pr(pϕq) (HB1)
T ` Pr(pφ→ ψq)→ (Pr(pφq)→ Pr(pψq)) (HB2)
T ` Pr(pφq)→ Pr(pPr(pφq)q) (HB3)
A crucial theorem needed to prove the existence of the formalized counterparts
of the paradoxical sentences is the Diagonal Lemma.
Theorem 91 (Diagonal Lemma). Let N be the standard model of natural num-
bers, then for every formula ϕ(x) there is a sentence λ such that N |= ϕ(pλq) ≡ λ.
7Its construction is, obviously, inspired by the paradoxical Curry sentence which says of
itself that if it is true, then so is an arbitrary sentence ϕ.
8Note that if you prefer a formulation in which we have ‘ϕ is informally provable’ in the
consequent, it follows from (IPC).
9Readers interested in how provability predicates can be defined in the standard and non-
standard ways can turn to (Smith, 2007; Halbach and Visser, 2014).
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Proof. Let Diag(x, y) be a formula representing the diagonal function,10 Take
an arbitrary formula ϕ(x), define ψ(y) := ∀z (Diag(y, z) → ϕ(z)) Let λ be the
diagonalization of ψ, so that λ ≡ ψ(pψq). By the definition of diagonalization,
λ ≡ ∀z (Diag(pψq, z)→ ϕ(z))
follows. But we know that the right-hand side of the equivalence is true iff z (the
code of the diagonalization of ψ) has property ϕ, so λ ≡ ψ(pλq).
Diagonal Lemma can be strengthened to apply the provability in any sufficiently
strong arithmetical theory T, so that λ ≡ ψ(pλq) is not only true in the standard
model, but also provable in T.
In what follows, instead of a standard provability predicate Pr we will often
use a more generic P if we want to emphasize that a claim holds for any predicate
satisfying certain conditions that Pr satisfies.11 Later on, we’ll use B as a specific
provability operator introduced in our non-classical logic. We hope no confusion
will arise in what follows.
Let’s start with obtaining the formal counterparts of the problematic sen-
tences discussed in Subsection 6.2.1. By Diagonal Lemma there are sentences
γ, λ and ζ of the arithmetical language such that:
T ` γ ≡ ¬Pr(pγq) (FPG)
T ` λ ≡ Pr(p¬λq) (FPL)
T ` ζ ≡ (Pr(pζq)→ ϕ) (FPC)
Now, (FPG) and (FPL) (or counterparts thereof for a given candidate for a
provability predicate) can both be used to prove the following theorems that hold
for any sufficiently strong arithmetical theory T. The proofs are well known —
we just go over them because we’ll be making a point about them further on.
Theorem 92 (Montague). T, if consistent, cannot contain (or be consistently
extended to contain) a (possibly complex) predicate for which (HB1) and all in-
stances of the reflection schema hold.
Proof with (FPG). Suppose that there is such a predicate, call it P . Argue inside
T using natural deduction:
1. γ ≡ ¬P (pγq) Diagonal lemma
1.1 ¬γ hypothesis
1.2 P (pγq) equivalence elimination: 1,1.1
1.3 γ Reflection schema: 1.2
2. γ hypothesis discharge: 1.1→ 1.3
3. P (pγq) (HB1): 2
4. ¬P (pγq) equivalence elimination 1, 2
5. contradiction 3, 4
Proof with (FPL).
10It is the function which takes the code of a certain formula and returns the code of its
diagonalization, so that if n = pϕ(z)q, then diag(n) = pϕ(n¯)q.
11So, for instance, when we say that P satisfies (HB1) we mean T ` φ⇒ T ` P (pϕq), etc.
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1. λ ≡ P (p¬λq) Diagonal lemma
1.1 λ hypothesis
1.2 P (p¬λq) equivalence elimination: 1,1.1
1.3 ¬λ Reflection schema: 1.2
2. ¬λ hypothesis discharge 1.1→ 1.3
3. P (p¬λq) (HB1): 2
4. ¬P (p¬λq) 1, 2
5. contradiction 3, 4
Theorem 93 (Dual Montague). T, if consistent, cannot contain (or be consis-
tently extended to contain) a (possibly complex) predicate for which all instances
of ϕ → P (pϕq) (Provabilitation), and the Co-necessitation rule (if T ` P (pϕq),
then T ` ϕ) hold.
Proof with (FPG). Suppose that there is such a predicate, call it P . We use a
natural deduction system. Argue inside T:
1. γ ≡ ¬P (pγq) Diagonal Lemma
1.1 γ assumption
1.2 ¬P (pγq) equivalence elimination: 1, 1.1
1.3 γ → P (pγq) Provabilitation for γ
1.4 ¬γ MTT: 1.3, 1.2
2. ¬γ assumption discharge: 1.1→ 1.4
3. P (pγq) equivalence elimination: 1,2
4. γ Co-necessitation: 3
5. contradiction 2,4
Proof with (FPL).
1. λ ≡ P (p¬λq) Diagonal Lemma
1.1 ¬λ assumption
1.2 ¬P (p¬λq) equivalence elimination: 1,1.1
1.3 P (p¬λq) Provabilitation: 1.1
1.4 ⊥ 1.2, 1.3
2. λ reductio ad absurdum: 1.1→ 1.4
3. P (p¬λq) equivalence elimination: 1, 2
4. ¬λ Co-necessitation: 3
5. contradiction 2, 4
(FPC), the formal counterpart of (IPC), leads to Lo¨b’s Theorem:
Theorem 94 (Lo¨b’s Theorem). Let T be a sufficiently strong arithmetical theory
containing a provability predicate P satisfying (HB1), (HB2) and (HB3). If
T ` P (pϕq)→ ϕ then T ` ϕ.
Proof. Suppose T ` P (pϕq)→ ϕ and argue inside T:
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1. ζ ≡ (P (pζq)→ ϕ) Diagonal Lemma for P (pxq)→ ϕ
2. ζ → (P (pζq)→ ϕ) equiv elimination: 1
3. P (pζ → (P (pζq)→ ϕ)q) (HB3): 2
4. P (pζq)→ P (pP (pζq)→ ϕq) (HB2): 3
5. P (pζq)→ (P (pP (pζq)q)→ P (pϕq)) HB2 to the consequent: 4
6. P (pζq)→ P (pP (pζq)q) (HB3) for P (pζq)
7. P (pζq)→ P (pϕq) logic: 5,6
8. P (pζq)→ ϕ proof assumption, 7
9. ζ equiv elimination: 1, 8
10. P (pζq) (HB1): 9
11. ϕ 8, 10
Notice, however, that these formal results, if one wants to take them as a guide
to our understanding of informal provability, are rather disturbing. Reflection
and (HB1) seem like plausible principles of informal provability, and yet, Theo-
rem 92 suggests they cannot be consistently conjoined. Theorem 93 is not too
scary, because we don’t have strong intuitions supporting provabilitation. Lo¨b’s
theorem, however, is worrying again. After all, we are inclined to think that any
mathematical claim whatsoever is true, if provable, whereas Lo¨b’s theorem (well,
the informal counterpart thereof, to be more precise) seems to suggest that this
can hold only for those claims that are already provable.
6.3 On an informal reading of Lo¨b’s theorem
The philosophical aspects of Lo¨b’s theorem don’t get discussed too often. The
locus classicus is (Boolos, 1993, 54-55), where some reasons to be surprised by the
theorem are discussed. Most of them are bad reasons: but just because Boolos
discusses and criticizes bad reasons to be surprised with the theorem, it doesn’t
mean there aren’t good reasons too. We’ll quote Boolos in extenso, enumerating
his points for further reference, and comment on them.
Lo¨b’s theorem is considered utterly astonishing for at least five rea-
sons:
Reason 1 “In the first place, it is often hard to understand how vast
the mathematical gap is between truth and provability. And to
one who lacks that understanding and does not distinguish be-
tween truth and provability, Pr(pSq)→ S, which the hypothesis
of Lo¨b’s theorem asserts to be provable, might appear to be
trivially true in all cases, whether S is true or false, provable
or unprovable. But if S is false, S had better not be provable.
Thus it would seem that S ought not always to be provable pro-
vided merely that (the possibly trivial-seeming) Pr(pSq)→ S is
provable.”
Reason 2 “Secondly, Pr seems here to be working like negation.
After all, if ¬S → S is provable, then so is S; proving S by
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proving ¬S → S is called reductio ad absurdum [. . . ] Moreover,
inferring S solely on the ground that S → S is demonstrable is
known as begging the question, or reasoning in a circle. To one
who conflates truth and provability, it may then seem that Lo¨b’s
theorem asserts that begging the question is an admissible form
of reasoning in PA.”
Reason 3 “Thirdly, one might have thought that at least on occa-
sion, PA would claim to be sound with regard to an unprovable
sentence S, i.e., claim that if it proves S, then S holds. But
Lo¨b’s theorem tells us that it never does so: PA makes the
clam Pr(pSq)→ S that it is sound with regard to S only when
it obviously must, when the consequent is actually provable. As
Rohit Parikh once put it, “PA couldn’t be more modest about
its own veracity”.”
Reason 4 “Fourthly, one might very naturally suppose that prov-
ability is a kind of necessity, and therefore, just as (p → p)
always expresses a truth if the box is interpreted as “it is nec-
essary that” — for then (p → p) says that it is necessar-
ily true that if a statement is necessarily true, it is true —
Pr(p(Pr(pSq)→ S)q) would also always be true or at least true
in some cases in which S is false and not true only in the rather
exceptional cases in which S is actually provable.”
Reason 5 “Finally, it seems wholly bizarre that the statement that if
S is provable, then S is true is not itself provable in general. For
isn’t it perfectly obvious, for any S, that S is true if provable?
Why are we bothering with PA if its theorems are false? And
how could any such (apparently) obvious truth not be provable?”
In Reason 1 Boolos suggests that reflection might seem trivially true in all
cases to someone who conflates truth and provability. Reason 2 gives us a hint
as to what Boolos had in mind. Apparently, confusing truth with provability
(and thus Pr(pSq) with S) makes one identify the inference legitimated by Lo¨b’s
theorem:
` Pr(pSq)→ S ⇒ ` S
with a fairly obviously incorrect inference pattern:
` S → S ⇒ ` S.
Thus, Boolos’s critic of Lo¨b’s theorem is willing to reject the former in virtue
of rejecting the latter. The fact that the conflation of truth and provability is
represented as intersubstitutability of Pr(pSq) and S suggests that the conflation
meant in Reason 1 consists in thinking that Pr(pSq) → S should hold simply
because S → S does.
But this, we submit, is a straw-man position. No one who seriously de-
fends the universality of reflection (that is, that it holds for all sentences) argues
that Pr(pSq) → S simply because S → S holds. Rather, informal reflection
seems compelling because the proof methods used in informal mathematics are
86 CHAPTER 6. PARADOXES OF INFORMAL PROVABILITY
extremely reliable, so that if a mathematical claim is informally proven, this is
considered sufficient evidence to accept that claim as true.
We don’t have much to say about Reason 3, which we agree with — after
all, it’s a correct claim about formal provability contrasted with an intuition that
we have about informal provability.
The argument considered in Reason 4, however, isn’t too convincing and
seems to be a straw-man argument for reflection. After all, to seriously argue
against Lo¨b’s theorem holding for informal provability by saying that Pr is a kind
of necessity, one would have to explain what it means to be a kind of necessity,
why Pr indeed is one, and how it being a kind of necessity requires the relevant
principle to hold.
In Reason 5 Boolos briefly describes better grounds for accepting the univer-
sality of reflection. Alas, Boolos only brings up this dissonance and leaves it at
that.12 Nowhere in the book does he later come back to the topic to explain how
this intuition about provability is to be squared with the harsh truth unveiled by
Lo¨b’s theorem.
The reasons to be surprised by Lo¨b’s theorem according to Boolos aren’t,
surprisingly, the reasons we’d normally have to accept reflection. Let’s try to
explicate these grounds in more detail. What would happen if reflection was
false? This would mean that some mathematical claim is informally provable
and false. Any sane mathematician would say that this hypothetical situation is
not possible since informal proofs are our only means of establishing the truth
value of a mathematical claim: if an informal proof of a given sentence is correct,
the sentence itself should be considered true.
Another argument for reflection goes as follow. Any (direct) informal proof
can be divided into steps. Each step is either an instance of an axiom or a sentence
that is already accepted as true, or follows from previous steps. The connection
between any two steps in an informal proof is often expressed by phrases such as:
“since ϕ holds, ψ is true” or “from ϕ it follows that ψ”, or “it is easy to see that
since ϕ is true ψ must be true”. Clearly, these expressions say something about
the relation between the truth values of ϕ and ψ, namely that from the fact that
ϕ is true, we infer that so is ψ. It means that truth is preserved between any two
steps in an informal proof. Hence, an informal proof as a whole has to preserve
truth.13
So, in general, while there might be bad reasons to be surprised by Lo¨b’s the-
orem, and Boolos is right in criticizing them, there still seem to be good reasons
to think reflection holds (and therefore, that Lo¨b’s theorem doesn’t apply to in-
formal provability).14 The question now is: won’t our commitment to reflection
lead us into trouble? After all, it seems, when we accept reflection for informal
12Of course, giving a proof of Lo¨b’s theorem (which is what Boolos does) is a way of answering
the question how such an obvious truth could fail to be provable. But such an answer pertains
to formal provability only — the proof of Lo¨b’s theorem sufficiently explains why reflection
fails for formal provability of, say, PA. The proof, however, doesn’t cast much light on why
we’re still convinced that reflection is an obvious universal principle for informal provability,
and how to square these two facts.
13When it comes to indirect proofs, without much effort one can easily translate any indirect
proof into a direct one so the existence of indirect proofs does not cause any problems. A brute
force technique is contraposition, but there are more elegant solutions as well.
14Or, in other words, that the reasoning justifying Lo¨b’s theorem for formal provability can’t
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provability, we end up with a paradox! Let’s take a closer look at the best shot
in this direction, fired by Graham Priest and JC Beall.
6.4 Informal provability meets paradoxes
6.4.1 The dialetheist argument formalized
Priest (2006, 46) and Beall (1999, 324) used (IPG) to argue that informal math-
ematics is inconsistent (and therefore, that a paraconsistent logic is needed).15
This is, essentially, the argument that we’ve already discussed in subsection 6.2.1.
In this section, we’d like to zoom in on the argument and take a closer look
by formalizing it.16 Read  as it is informally provable that and let `I stand
in the metatheory for provability in informal mathematics. The argument starts
with the following rules for informal provability:
`I ϕ→ ϕ (Reflection)
If `I ϕ, then `I ϕ. (Nec)
Note that `I stands in the meta-language for being informally provable, whereas
 expresses informal provability in the object language. As for the first rule,
according to Priest, it is analytic that if something is informally provable, it is
true. Since this claim itself is analytic, it is informally provable. For the second
principle, the intuition is that if something is provable, then its proof constitutes
an informal proof of its provability.
The formalized argument relies also on the presence of self-reference in infor-
mal mathematics, so that it is supposed to be informally provable that (IPG)
is equivalent ¬(IPG) (for brevity, we’ll use γ to stand for (IPG); no unclarity
should arise).17
be extrapolated to analogous correct reasoning about informal provability.
15“Consider the sentence ‘This sentence is not provably true.’ Suppose the sentence is false.
Then it is provably true, and hence true. By reductio it is true. Moreover, we have just proved
this. Hence it is provably true. And since it is true, it is not provably true. Contradiction”
(Priest, 2006, 46).
“Consider the sentence:
γ is (informally) unprovable. (γ)
If γ is false, then it is provably true, and so true. By reductio γ is true. Since we have just
(informally) proved γ, γ is (informally) provable. But since true, γ is (informally) unprovable.
Contradiction” (Beall, 1999, 324).
16The formalization is inspired by the formulation of the argument contained in the new
material in the second edition of In contradiction (Priest, 2006, 238).
17In a similar vein we could run the argument using (IPL), as the second proof of Theorem
92 suggests.
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1. `I γ ≡ ¬γ self-reference
2. `I γ → ¬γ equiv elimination: 1
3. `I γ → ¬γ contraposition: 2
4. `I γ → γ reflection
5. `I ¬γ logic: 3,4
6. `I γ equiv elimination: 1,5
7. `I γ Nec: 6
8. Contradiction 5,7
Thus, it seems, informal mathematics is inconsistent.
Both (Nec) and (Reflection) are plausible inference patterns for informal prov-
ability. The only remaining potentially suspicious move is that in line 1 (we’ll
refer to it as (Premise 1). Notice that the vdash there is essential — if we replace
(Premise 1) with mere truth of γ ≡ ¬γ, we’ll only be able to prove that γ
is independent. So why would it be informally provable that γ is equivalent to
¬γ?
6.4.2 Straightforward arguments for the equivalence fail
One way of arguing that it is, is to say that the availability of self-reference is
an important feature of informal mathematics, and that ‘γ ≡ ¬γ’ is a sentence
formulated in the language of informal mathematics. The strategy is suggested
by the following extremely brief defense:
There seems to be little hope of denying that γ is indeed a sentence
of our informal mathematics. (Beall, 1999, 324)
Of course, ‘being a sentence of. . . ’ is ambiguous. Beall might have simply meant
that γ ≡ ¬γ is informally provable, in which case, it’s not an argument, but a
mere restatement of the premise. On the other hand, he might have meant that
since γ is formulated in the language of informal mathematics, and we somehow
recognize γ ≡ ¬γ to be true, the equivalence, by the same token, is informally
provable.
One way to react is to deny that sentences containing “informally provable”
are sentences of informal mathematics. This strategy has been pursued by
Tanswell (2016), who in his criticism of the dialetheist interpretation of Go¨delian
phenomena, denies the premise and insists that γ is not formulated in the lan-
guage of informal mathematics:
I take the concept of informal proof to be used to talk and reason
about mathematics without it being a part of mathematics. Of course,
I hold that informal proof and provability are very important notions
in talking about mathematics, but it is crucial to emphasize that these
are notions about mathematics. To establish that the paradox will
render mathematics inconsistent, though, we need the extra claim
that it is a part of informal mathematics. (Tanswell, 2016, 163)
His reasons for denying it are that (i) informal provability lacks a precise math-
ematical definition, and that (ii) it doesn’t relate with other mathematical con-
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cepts in the way standard mathematical concepts, such as that of a group or that
of integer, do.
Our impression is that this strategy might be too sweeping. It excludes any
claim involving the concept of informal provability from being informally prov-
able, whereas in our uninspired moments we like to think that, say, claims such
as ‘any mathematical claim either is, or isn’t informally provable’ is as close to
being informally provable as it gets.
We also aren’t too convinced by Tanswell’s reasons for his sweeping rejection.
“Relating with other mathematical concepts the way standard mathematical con-
cepts do” lacks a precise mathematical definition either, and it’s rather unclear
whether being unlike the concept of numbers or algebraic groups excludes a con-
cept from the domain of informal mathematics. Consider computability theory:
it also deals with concepts (algorithm, computation, . . . ) quite unlike that of
algebraic groups or integers: does this mean it’s not part of informal mathemat-
ics? And lacking a precise mathematical definition is also not a necessary feature
of many concepts used in informal mathematics. For centuries, various concepts
were used in mathematics, despite their precise definitions not being available.
If we were to follow Tanswell’s advice, many things we uncontroversially con-
sider mathematical developments wouldn’t deserve that name (think for instance
about the development of the currently standard notions of sets, limits, functions,
and so on).
Perhaps, indeed, we have no good grounds to deny that self-reference is avail-
able in informal mathematics, in the sense that γ ≡ ¬γ indeed is formulated
in the language of informal mathematics. After all, we are (at least prima facie)
free to label sentences as we wish, and free to formulate sentences containing
such labels. But this on its own doesn’t entail that the equivalence is provable
in informal mathematics. There is a more involved sense in which self-reference
is required to be available in informal mathematics for (Premise 1) to hold: the
sense in which such availability would make the equivalence provable. But what
reasons do we have to think that self-reference in this sense indeed is available in
informal mathematics?
The dialetheist cannot leave (Premise 1) undefended, and vague reference to
‘self-reference being available’ is not enough. What more can they do? Let’s see.
One way to argue is that in light of Tanswell’s strategy being too sweeping, there
is no reason to deny that (Premise 1) is formulated in the language of informal
mathematics. Secondly, one could continue, the claim can be proven the way
most informal mathematical claims are proven. It’s simply enough to approach
the blackboard and write appropriate stuff on it! I simply write:
(γ) ¬γ
and you immediately can recognize the equivalence used in (Premise 1) as true.
I introduced γ as (equivalent to) the sentence ¬γ, so by the power of this very
move, γ is equivalent to ¬γ. Q.E.D.!
This, however, is too hasty. Why would such an introduction have the power
to establish a mathematical theorem? Is, perhaps, the claim supposed to be true
by definition? There is no good reason to think that all ways of “introducing”
new symbols automatically translate into informal provability in mathematics
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(think for instance about tonk and plonk etc. (Belnap, 1962)). Quite crucially,
observe that the introduction of (γ) doesn’t yield a proper definition, in the sense
that when a proper definition of a new propositional constant σ is introduced to
extend a language L, it has to be introduced as equivalent to a sentence of L not
containing σ, otherwise the definition would be circular. Once the introduction
fails to have the format of a proper definition,18 it’s far from clear whether
merely being written on a blackboard results in the equivalence being informally
provable.19
Well, perhaps, one could insist that in some domains of informal mathematics
some non-well-founded definitions live peacefully with unicorns and rainbows
without causing any trouble (Aczel, 1988). Maybe. But in such contexts, showing
that such a definition doesn’t pose a threat actually requires some work, and any
argument that would use the definition to obtain inconsistency would rather be
taken as a sign of pathology of the definition, not of the contradiction of informal
mathematics.
So maybe let’s abandon the idea that we should think of the introduction
of (γ) as a definition, and let’s think of it only as a postulation, noticing that
at least certain mathematical postulates can be true without being definitions.
On this reading, even though it perhaps isn’t true that (Premise 1) holds by
definition, it still is supposed to be true because we postulated it to be so! But
again, one needs to be more careful. Not just any postulation on a blackboard
leads to a new informally provable statement. Otherwise, I could just approach
the blackboard, write:
Let x = 0 ∧ x = 1,
and prove the inconsistency of mathematics from this postulate (and, say, Peano
Arithmetic).
One might push further, though, by insisting: but this isn’t just any postu-
lation! I displayed a formula, ¬γ, and introduced an abbreviation for it, γ.
Obviously, any abbreviation of a formula, by the very fact of being introduced, is
equivalent to the formula being abbreviated.
Yes. Mathematicians do use abbreviations in their work. But if you’re seri-
ous about relying on the mathematicians’ practice of using abbreviations, then
perhaps you should also notice that sane working mathematicians don’t use as
abbreviations the sub-formulas of formulas being abbreviated (and in general,
if a symbol is a meaningful part of the expression being abbreviated, it’s not
afterwards used as an abbreviation for the whole expression).
But even if we pretend that the act of introducing (γ) is an act of introducing
an acceptable abbreviation, (Premise 1) still doesn’t follow. Imagine a mathe-
matician correctly introduces an expression, say τ , as an abbreviation for a longer
formula, say ϕ→ ϕ. Now ask them:
18Note also that often even a proper definition has to be accompanied by an existence and
uniqueness proofs; this isn’t too relevant in the case of propositional constants, though. We
mention this only to emphasize that even the introduction of proper definitions isn’t to be take
too lightly in informal mathematics.
19Of course, mathematicians admit methods of introducing concepts which go beyond proper
definitions. For instance, inductive definitions have a somewhat different form. But the relia-
bility of such “definitions” piggybacks on previously proven theorems showing that in principle
they can be replaced by proper ones.
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Have you therefore informally proven that τ ≡ [ϕ→ ϕ]?
The reply would most likely be preceded (or followed) with a deep stare in your
direction, and it would be somewhere close to: no, I haven’t proven anything,
it’s just an abbreviation I introduced for the sake of convenience. So, it seems,
simple strategies of defending (Premise 1), fail. Can the dialethist do better?
6.4.3 Who ya gonna call? Diagonal lemma!
At this point, a persistent dialetheist might conjure the diagonal lemma. One
could first argue that informal mathematics is recursively axiomatizable, because
finite human beings can be taught to do informal mathematical proofs:
The naive notion of proof is a social one. In particular, it is one
which is taught and, correspondingly, learned. Yet the collection of
proofs is (potentially) infinite. Hence the notion cannot be taught by
giving a simple finite list. If proof is not a recursive notion, then the
process whereby it is learned becomes unintelligible. Consider the
following analogy. People are able to produce (potentially) infinitely
many numerals. Moreover, everyone can agree that what is produced
is a numeral. This is perfectly understandable in virtue of the fact
that numerals can be produced by applications of effective rules to a
finite vocabulary. (They are a recursive class.) If this were not the
case, then that agreement is achieved would be a mysterious and even
mystical process. So it is with proof. (Priest, 2006, 41)
The argument continues: since M is a formal theory which satisfies the stan-
dard conditions required for the Diagonal Lemma, we can prove the Diagonal
Lemma for M. Once we do so, the existence of γ satisfying (Premise 1) follows.
The move from the learnability of a concept to its recursive axiomatizability is
somewhat hasty. After all we also seem to understand some notions that aren’t
recursively axiomatizable. For instance, we tend to think that we understand
what it means for a first order arithmetical sentence to be true, even though the
set of first order arithmetical truths isn’t recursively axiomatizable.20
Perhaps there is a stronger sense in which we can learn to do mathematics,
in which we can’t learn the concept of first order mathematical truth, a sense in
which it follows that informal mathematics is recursively axiomatizable? What
would it be? For one thing, saying that for any given claim a mathematically
competent human (or a group thereof) can decide whether it’s informally provable
would be too much. There are many open problems in mathematics where it is
not known if a claim is provable, and it is not even clear whether it will ever be
known.
Well, maybe the difference is that the notion of informally provable claims is
“semi-decidable”, in the sense that if a claim is provable, it would be eventually
recognized as such by means of some general procedure? If informal mathemat-
ics was recursively axiomatizable, such a procedure would exist: simply start
20See (Tanswell, 2016) for criticism from another angle.
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effectively listing all proofs, and if a claim is provable, you’ll run into its proof
eventually.
But even this feat seems out of reach of a mathematically competent human
being or a group thereof: notoriously, some mathematical proofs have eluded
generations of mathematicians, and their invention wasn’t a matter of following
some general recipe. Equally notoriously, we’re as far from inventing a general
procedure for proving any informally provable claim as we were thousands years
ago.
So there seems to be no recipe for deciding whether a claim is informally
provable, and not even a recipe for finding an informal proof of a claim if it is
possible. In what other sense can we connect the “learnability” of mathematics
with recursive axiomatizability? One intuition for the recursive axiomatizability
stems from the observation that informal proofs can be checked for correctness
in a finite amount of time:
Consider the situation which arises if the notion of proof is non-
effective. There is then no certain means by which, when a sequence
of formulas has been put forward as a proof, the auditor may deter-
mine whether it is in fact a proof (Church, 1996, 53).
In the context of formalized theories, the decidability of the set of proofs
entails the semi-decidability of theories: to identify a provable claim as such,
start listing all potential proofs checking them for correctness as you go, and
eventually you’ll find the proof of the theorem that you’re after.
The question is, however, whether the notion of proof that is supposed to be
effective in fact is the notion of informal provability in mathematics in general.
Yes, indeed, at any particular stage of development of mathematics, proofs (and
flawed alleged proofs) given by mathematicians are supposed to be recognizable
as such (even though, sometimes not without effort and not by a single lone
mathematician). This, however, doesn’t mean that at any particular stage of
development of mathematics one could simply sit down and list all admissible
ways of proving mathematical theorems, independently of the development of
mathematics.21 Ask yourself how good a job would Euclid do if asked to list all
means of proving things in mathematics (hint: not an awesome one). Now, why
should we think that we’re now in a better position to predict the development
of mathematics? In other words, even if we can decide whether a given supposed
proof is a proof (and even this is a strong idealization), we can’t start listing all
potential proofs, because there are ways of proving things that we can’t predict,
because they depend on creative developments of the mathematician’s toolbox,
or novel connections between different fields of mathematics etc., and there is no
recipe for listing these a priori.
Informal mathematics evolves: at any stage we have, perhaps, a decent grasp
of what would count as a correct proof; but new domains, new techniques, new
21The phenomenon is quite general: recursive enumerability is not generally closed under
countable unions. For example, consider partial truth predicates for restricted formula complex-
ity, each of which is definable in the arithmetical language, while the union of their extensions
isn’t. For another example, consider the fact that Peano arithmetic proves the consistency
of each of its finite sub-theories, but it does not prove the consistency of their union. For a
thorough study of related phenomena see (Franze´n, 2004).
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methods, new axioms, new definitions, new re-conceptualizations etc. can always
be introduced in a fashion that doesn’t seem to be algorithmic.22 Such develop-
ments are mirrored by an appropriate extension or modification of the notion of
a proof, and it’s at least far from obvious that such developments can be at any
particular stage captured by a recursive axiomatization.
Perhaps, the claim is simply obvious? Presumably, it would go along the
following lines:
For any (mathematical) property there is a mathematical sentence
which is provably (in informal mathematics) equivalent to the claim
that it has the property.
Does this sound plausible? Not really — buying into supposedly intuitive claims
involving quantification over all properties has been passe´ for at least a century,
and the fashion doesn’t seem to be coming back anytime soon.
One might insist that the above reading is too rough. After all, the original
lemma is about codes of formulas and about arithmetical properties. So perhaps
the official informal counterpart of the Diagonal Lemma, instead of mentioning
properties and attributing them to claims, should rather talk of codes of mathe-
matical formulas and their arithmetical properties. In this setting, we no longer
have to worry about the notion of property being suspiciously wide, and about
mathematical properties being attributable to sentences. Also, the proof of the
Diagonal Lemma isn’t too complicated, and, one could argue, once we think
about informal mathematics in terms of codings, we should be able to repeat its
steps, mutatis mutandis, for informal provability as well.
But would we? The original proof relies heavily on the availability of coding
of the language and inferential steps of a formal mathematical theory. Can
we effectively code the language and all potential inferential moves of informal
mathematics? Not really: the language and methods of informal mathematics
are indefinitely extensible and we can’t predict what devices and expressions it
will comprise in, say, two centuries, just as Euclid couldn’t have predicted the
development of category theory or computer-assisted proofs.
But wait! We suggested that at least, currently used methods of proof might
be claimed to be recursively axiomatizable in virtue of us, finite beings, being
(supposedly) able to evaluate any mathematical proof formulated using currently
available methods that life can throw at us.23 Can’t the dialetheist run with that
assumption?
Well, not really. Say you read  and `I as expressing informal provability
by means of currently used mathematical methods. How would you go about
defending (Premise 1)? The straightforward strategies discussed in section 6.4.2
still fail for exactly the same reasons.
But what about the Diagonal Lemma? Even if we admit that the strategies
used in the proof of the Diagonal Lemma for a formal system of arithmetic
22Well, we can’t prove the class of all such methods really isn’t algorithmic, because we’d
have to pin their set down first, and it’s exactly our point that there is no known way of going
about this.
23However, for an explanation why such a formalization is not forthcoming anytime soon,
and why there wouldn’t be a unique one anyway, see (Tanswell, 2016).
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belong to the current mathematical toolbox, it still doesn’t follow that we can
run an analogous proof for the whole of today’s mathematics and still end up
with something that’s provable by means of today’s mathematics. The problem
is, running such an analogous proof properly would first require actually writing
down the axiomatic system capturing the whole of today’s mathematics — and
doing that certainly isn’t a standard proving technique of today’s mathematics.
If you buy into this variant of the dialetheist argument, you might equally well
embrace dialetheism because of Richard’s paradox.
So, we conclude, the strategy of defending (Premise 1) by conjuring some
variant of the Diagonal Lemma that would apply to informal mathematics, fails,
because informal mathematics is too lively a beast to be tamed.
Where does this leave us? The dialetheist argument for the inconsistency
of informal mathematics fails. The formalizations of the supposedly paradox-
ical claims, however, yield serious and interesting limitative results concerning
formalized theories. We don’t have a sufficient reason to think that we can cap-
ture all of (future, past and present) informal mathematics by means of a formal
axiomatic system. Are we done?
Not quite. While we might be unable to axiomatize informal mathematics,
we still might ask what inferential principles hold for informal provability and
try to formulate a formal axiomatized theory capturing those principles. This is
the task that we’ll turn to now.
6.5 A non-deterministic logic of provability
6.5.1 Motivations
Perhaps we convinced the reader that the notion of informal provability isn’t
as paradox-ridden as the dialetheist would like it to be. Still, however, both
the discussion in Section 6.4 and the results of Section 6.2 might suggest severe
pessimism regarding any possibility of a formal grasp of the properties of informal
provability.
We should not despair (or at least not too much), though. The discussion of
Section 6.4 indicates only that we shouldn’t hope for a recursive axiomatization
of all informally provable mathematical sentences. This doesn’t preclude the pos-
sibility of developing a logic that captures formal properties and valid inference
principles of the informal provability operator. We’ve already seen, for instance,
that reflection is a principle that seems plausible in this context.
Historically, the first candidate for a provability logic, has already been sug-
gested as such by Go¨del. It was the modal logic S4, which contains as axioms all
the substitutions of classical tautologies in the language with , all substitutions
of the schemata:
(K) (ϕ→ ψ)→ (ϕ→ ψ)
(M) ϕ→ ϕ
(4) ϕ→ ϕ
and is closed under two rules of inference: modus ponens (from ` ϕ and ` ϕ→ ψ
infer ` ψ), and necessitation (Nec): if ` ϕ, then ` ϕ.
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The principles of S4 seem sensible when ϕ is read as ‘it is provable that
ϕ’: if an implication and its antecedent are provable, then so is its consequent,
whatever is provable should be true, and if something is provable, we can prove
that it is by simply displaying the proof. The system was used in 1933 by
Go¨del to interpret intuitionistic propositional calculus (which is closely related
to reasoning about provability).
Prima facie S4 is a viable candidate for the logic of informal provability.
All its principles are intuitive as principles of informal provability.24 Yet, S4
falls pray to Montague’s theorem. This means that we cannot consistently have
a provability predicate for which all the properties captured by the S4 axioms
hold, as long as we have sufficiently rich arithmetic in the background.
On the other hand, avoiding the difficulty by staying at the level of informal
provability sentential operator, as long as the strategy can’t be extrapolated to
the first order level, seriously limits expressive power of our theory of informal
provability.
The question now is: does this mean that the enterprise of developing a logic
of informal provability which wouldn’t, so to speak, get aggressive when put in
one cage with an arithmetical theory, is doomed? Moreover: can we develop
such a logic motivated not only by the negative desire to avoid contradiction,
but also by positive and sensible independent intuitions? The answer, we think,
is positive.
6.5.2 The strategy
Philosophers faced a similar problem when constructing a formal theory of truth.
There is an intuitive schema governing the truth-predicate: the T-schema
T (pϕq)⇔ ϕ,
where T is a truth-predicate. It is well-known, by Tarski’s undefinability theo-
rem, that not all instances of this schema can be consistently added to Peano
arithmetic.
One of the most common solutions to this problem is to weaken the back-
ground logic to a non-classical one. By choosing an interesting logic, it’s possible
to circumvent the problem and to have a decent formal theory incorporating an
interesting class of instances of the T-schema. If only we supplement this picture
with a convincing and independently motivated philosophical story explaining
why this particular non-classical logic should be used, our job as philosophical
logicians is done. We will follow a similar route. Most notably, our goal is to ex-
plore the option of treating mathematical provability as a partial notion, just as
some prominent theories of truth treat the truth predicate as a partial one. After
all, there is an intuitive division of mathematical claims into provable, refutable
and undecidable.
In the standard Kripke construction for truth one relies on the Strong Kleene
logic to deal with the partial truth predicate. Alas, Strong Kleene Logic is
24Whether S4 is a complete system of informal provability is still an open problem; see
(Leitgeb, 2009) for a more elaborate discussion.
96 CHAPTER 6. PARADOXES OF INFORMAL PROVABILITY
not appropriate for modeling informal provability, for it seems that informal
provability is not truth-functional. For instance, it is sometimes, but not always
the case that a disjunction of two sentences independent of a given theory is
independent of that theory. For this reason, it seems that no deterministic many-
valued logic could do the job. We have to do something else then.
Let L be a propositional language (understood as the set of all well-formed for-
mulas) constructed from propositional variables V ar = {p1, p2, . . . } and Boolean
connectives (¬,∧,∨,→,≡) in the standard manner. We will use Greek letters
ϕ,ψ, ... as meta-variables for formulas. The language that results from extending
the set of Boolean connectives with one unary operator B will be denoted LB.
We will use B to express provability within the object language.
By an assignment we mean any function v : V ar 7→ V al, where V al is a set of
values. By an evaluation ev built over an assignment v we will mean a function
assigning values to all well-formed formulas (ev : LB 7→ V al) agreeing with
v on V ar (propositional variables), and satisfying some additional constraints
determined by a given logic.
In the case of standard classical propositional logic, evaluations are unam-
biguously determined by assignments. For each assignment there is exactly one
evaluation extending it.
It is possible to construct sensible logics for which this uniqueness fails.
One nice example is the propositional variant of paraconsistent logic CLuN
(Batens and De Clercq, 2004).25 The standard semantics of CLuN is similar
to the semantics of classical propositional logic with one difference: the truth
conditions for negation are different.
Both for classical logic and for CLuN we have V al = {0, 1}. In classical
propositional logic ev(¬ϕ) = 1 iff ev(ϕ) = 0. In CLuN this equivalence is weak-
ened to an implication: if ev(ϕ) = 0, then ev(¬ϕ) = 1. (Clauses for the rest
of connectives are the same as in classical propositional logic.) In other words,
CLuN allows for gluts for negation: both ϕ and ¬ϕ can be true in one and the
same evaluation.
The standard semantics of CLuN has another interesting feature. It is non-
deterministic: assignments of values to propositional variables do not uniquely
determine evaluations of all formulas. One and the same assignment might be
extended in different ways to different evaluations, as long as they obey classical
clauses for connectives other than negation and the implication above for nega-
tion. For instance, if v(p) = 1, there is one evaluation e1v such that e
1
v(¬p) = 0
and there is another one e2v such that e
2
v(¬p) = 1.
6.5.3 Non-deterministic semantics
We apply a similar trick to develop a non-deterministic semantics for a logic which
would help us model the notion of informal provability. The logic will be three-
valued: we take the set of values V al = {0, n, 1}. The intended interpretation of
the values is as follows. 1 stands for (informally) provable, 0 represents (informal)
25A general framework for non-deterministic logics can be found in (Avron and Zamanski,
2011). Particular systems discussed there have, however, quite different motivation from ours,
and quite different matrices.
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refutability and n stands for being neither (informally) provable, nor (informally)
refutable.
Here’s the semantics for connectives of LB by means of non-deterministic
matrices. Let’s start with negation. A given formula is informally provable iff
its negation is informally refutable. A given formula is informally refutable iff its
negation is informally provable. A formula is undetermined iff its negation is.
For disjunction we introduce non-deterministic clauses. The equivalence:
ev(ϕ ∨ ψ) = 1 iff ev(ϕ) = 1 or ev(ψ) = 1
is weakened to one direction only:
If ev(ϕ) = 1 or ev(ψ) = 1 then ev(ϕ ∨ ψ) = 1.
The intention behind the introduction of non-determinism is this. We want to
allow for the possibility of there being informally (absolutely) undecidable math-
ematical sentences (without saying that there are any). Yet, even for such sen-
tences (if there are any), some disjunctions built from them might be informally
undecidable, while some others will be informally provable. Say ϕ and ψ are
informally undecidable (and therefore, so is ¬ϕ). Then, while we might think
that ϕ ∨ ψ is informally undecidable, we might be inclined to think that ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ
is informally provable despite ϕ not being decidable.
For instance, you might be inclined to think that the Continuum Hypothesis
(CH) is informally undecidable, while CH ∨ ¬CH is still informally provable,
being a logical truth. This however, clearly doesn’t mean that CH ∨ CH is
provable, and so not every disjunction of undecidable sentences is decided.
Once we gave semantics for negation and disjunction, matrices for other
Boolean connectives follow. Conjunction ϕ∧ψ is taken to have the same matrix
as ¬(¬ϕ ∨ ¬ψ).
The motivation for the non-deterministic case for conjunction is this. For
some informally undecidable sentences we may be able to prove that they are
mutually contradictory, which makes their conjunction informally refutable. For
some others it may be impossible, and so their conjunction remains informally
undecidable.26 Implication is taken to have the same matrix as (¬ϕ ∨ ψ), and
equivalence has the same matrix as ((ϕ→ ψ) ∧ (ψ → ϕ)).
The intended reading of Bϕ is ‘ϕ is informally provable.’ The matrix for B is
non-deterministic. The intuition behind this move is the following. If a formula
is informally provable (ev(ϕ) = 1), then giving its own proof is also a proof of its
provability (ev(Bϕ) = 1), and the other way around. If a formula is informally
refutable ev(ϕ) = 0, then giving its own refutation is also a refutation of its
provability (ev(Bϕ) = 0). If a formula is informally undecidable (ev(ϕ) = n), then
one of two things may happen. First, it may be the case that the undecidability
of that formula is informally provable, and so its informal provability is refutable
(ev(Bϕ) = 0). Second, it may be the case that its absolute informal undecidability
26Notice that just because ϕ ∧ ψ has the same truth table as ¬(¬ϕ ∨ ¬ψ), it doesn’t follow
that the substitution of expressions of this form preserves the value under an interpretation.
This will fail due to indeterminacy. (The substitutability will be regained once we move from
BAT logic to CABAT logic.)
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is not informally provable, and so its absolute informal provability is informally
undecidable (ev(Bϕ) = n).
All these conditions are captured by the following tables:
¬ ϕ
0 1
n n
1 0
∨ 0 n 1
0 0 n 1
n n n/1 1
1 1 1 1
∧ 0 n 1
0 0 0 0
n 0 0/n n
1 0 n 1
→ 0 n 1
0 1 1 1
n n n/1 1
1 0 n 1
≡ 0 n 1
0 1 n 0
n n 0/n/1 n
1 0 n 1
B ϕ
1 1
n/0 n
0 0
Because we interpret value 1 as Being an Absolute Theorem (BAT), we call
the logic thus obtained BAT-logic and we’ll use the bat symbolý to denote its
consequence relation, which we define as follows.
A BAT-assignment v is a function from propositional variables W to {0, n, 1}.
A BAT-evaluation over an assignment v is a function which assigns values to all
formulas of L, agrees with v on W and obeys the constraints we gave for the
connectives. Notice that due to non-deterministic clauses, one and the same
assignment might underlie multiple evaluation functions.
By Γýϕ, where Γ is a set of formulas, we will mean that any BAT-evaluation
which assigns 1 to all formulas in Γ assigns 1 to formula ϕ. We say that ϕ is a
BAT-tautology iff ∅ýϕ. We say that ϕ is a BAT-countertautology iff ∅ý¬ϕ.
Observe that disjunction is neither commutative nor associative. Take the
assignment v where all propositional variables have value n and consider two
formulas: ϕ = p ∨ q and ψ = q ∨ p. As far as ϕ and ψ are concerned, there are
four possible ways to extend this assignment:
e1v(ϕ) = n = e
1
v(ψ)
e2v(ϕ) = 1, e
2
v(ψ) = n
e3v(ϕ) = n, e
3
v(ψ) = 1
e4v(ϕ) = 1 = e
4
v(ψ).
BAT logic is too weak to eliminate extensions (e1v, e
2
v, e
3
v), in which ϕ and ψ obtain
different values, and which show that neither ϕýψ, nor ψýϕ. Thus, it needs
to be strengthened.
6.5.4 Strengthening BAT
Usually, to obtain a stronger logic from a logic with non-deterministic semantics
we have to limit the range of available possible extensions of given assignments.27
In our case, it will be particularly useful to enrich one logic (the non-deterministic
one) by another one (classical logic), which will be used to “filter out” certain
assignments.
27The most common way to strengthen a non-deterministic logic is to use the level-evaluation
method (Coniglio et al., 2015) Due to simplicity, we prefer our method.
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Definition 95. Let L be a logic. We say that a BAT-evaluation e belongs to
the L-filtered set of BAT-evaluations just in case the following conditions hold:
1. For any two formulas ϕ,ψ, if |=L ϕ ≡ ψ then e(ϕ) = e(ψ),
2. For any L-tautology ϕ, e(ϕ) = 1,
3. For any L-countertautology ϕ, e(ϕ) = 0.
We will focus on the case where L is classical logic (L=CL), and we simply
use |= to denote the classical consequence relation. By ΓýCL ϕ we will mean
that for any evaluation e in the CL-filtered set of BAT-evaluations if e(ψ) = 1
for all ψ ∈ Γ then e(ϕ) = 1. The resulting logic is called CLBAT.
We may also be inclined to strengthen BAT-logic in a different manner. A
quite intuitive way to go is to close BAT-logic under classical consequence. It
can be done by the following condition:
Definition 96 (Closure condition). An extension of BAT (in LB) satisfies the
closure condition just in case for all LB-formulas ϕ1, ϕ2, · · · , ϕk, ψ such that
ϕ1, ϕ2, · · · , ϕk |= ψ,
where |= is the classical consequence relation for LB, for any BAT-evaluation ev,
if ev(Bϕi) = 1 for any 0 < i ≤ k, then ev(Bψ) = 1.
The result of closing BAT-logic under the closure condition will be called
CABAT logic and its consequence relation will be denoted byýC . It turns out
that the above conditions are equivalent, and so are the resulting logics:
Theorem 97. ΓýC ϕ iff ΓýCL ϕ.
6.6 Basic Properties of CABAT
Quite trivially, CABAT logic is strictly stronger than BAT logic. The first inter-
esting thing to see is that Deduction Theorem is not generally valid in CABAT:
Theorem 98. If ýC ϕ → ψ then ϕýC ψ but the implication in the opposite
direction doesn’t hold in general.
In CABAT implications are stronger than the corresponding consequence re-
lation, simply because the consequence relation informs us only about those eval-
uations in which all the premises have value 1. For instance, the consequence
relation ϕýC ψ does not determine the value of implication ϕ → ψ when both
ψ and ϕ have value n. On the other hand, ýC ϕ → ψ uniquely determines the
value of the implication under the previous assignment.
Lack of the deduction theorem makes a difference when we look at inference
patterns with provability operator. Usually, principles for provability are valid in
CABAT as consequence relations whereas their implicational formulations may
be invalid. We are not terribly worried about that, since given our reading
ϕýC ψ means that if ϕ is informally provable then ϕ is and this is the phrase
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we intended to formalize. On the other hand,ýC ϕ→ ψ says: if ϕ is informally
provable, then so is ψ and if the antecedent is undecidable then the consequent is
either provable or independent, which is a stronger claim than ϕýC ψ. So, keep
in mind that implication no longer expresses the natural language conditional (as
if it ever did), or the implication that we’d like to formalize in the system.
Let’s take a look at some schemata involving the provability predicate and
we will indicate whether they are sound for informal provability. The table
below summarizes which inference patterns are valid in CABAT and whether
the principle, according to us, is intuitive or not (we add question mark in cases
where one might be, at least prima facie, worried):
Principle Valid? Intuitive?
(Bϕ ∧ Bψ)ýC B(ϕ ∧ ψ) Yes Yes
B(ϕ ∧ ψ)ýC (Bϕ ∧ Bψ) Yes Yes
B(ϕ ∨ ψ)ýC (Bϕ ∨ Bψ) No No
(Bϕ ∨ Bψ)ýC B(ϕ ∨ ψ) No ?
ϕýC Bϕ Yes Yes
BϕýC ϕ Yes Yes
BϕýC ¬B¬ϕ Yes Yes
BϕýC BBϕ Yes Yes
BBϕýC Bϕ Yes Yes
B(ϕ→ ψ)ýC (Bϕ→ Bψ) No ?
B(ϕ→ ψ), BϕýC Bψ Yes Yes
B(ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ)ýC B(ψ) Yes Yes
Bϕ ∨ B¬ϕ No No
Bϕ ∨ ¬Bϕ Yes Yes
¬BϕýC B(¬ϕ) No No
B(¬Bϕ)ýC B(¬ϕ) No No
B(¬B¬ϕ)ýC ¬B(¬Bϕ) No No
One thing that might seem worrying is that
(Bϕ ∨ Bψ)ZZý| C B(ϕ ∨ ψ)
After all, if ϕ is informally provable, shouldn’t ϕ∨ψ also be informally provable?
This worry, however, stems from the fact that the provability of a disjunction
in CABAT says something weaker than that one of its disjuncts is provable —
after all, ϕ∨¬ϕ is going to be informally provable without either ϕ or ¬ϕ being
informally provable. So, we submit, the intuition should be rather captured by
requiring that the following should hold:
BϕýC B(ϕ ∨ ψ)
BψýC B(ϕ ∨ ψ)
and indeed, they do.
Another worry might be that the following asymmetry between at least prima
facie close cousins can be observed:
B(ϕ→ ψ)ZZý| C (Bϕ→ Bψ) (Fake K)
6.7. CABAT AND PROVABILITY PARADOXES 101
B(ϕ→ ψ), BϕýC Bψ (Real K)
The answer is, however, that putting Bϕ → Bψ on the right-hand side of
ýC doesn’t adequately capture the intuition that if ϕ is informally provable,
then so is ψ. For Bϕ → Bψ actually contains more information than that. If
ϕ is informally provable, then so is ψ tells us only what happens when ϕ (and
so, Bϕ) is informally provable, while the provability of Bϕ → Bψ puts further
constraints on what happens if ϕ is not informally provable (for instance, that if
it is undecidable, ψ cannot be refutable). It’s (Real K) and not (Fake K) that
properly captures the underlying intuition.
Given our discussion of implication and the failure of the deduction theorem,
one key observation is that we have:
BϕýC ϕ (Cref)
which is a certain version of the reflection schema.
6.7 CABAT and provability paradoxes
Now, let’s see one important difference between usingýC and its provability op-
erator on the one hand, and using Peano Arithmetic and its standard provability
predicate (or the modal logic of provability GL and its provability operator, for
that matter) on the other.
Quite crucially, we may want to see which principles that hold for standard
formal provability predicates hold for the operator B as well. In the arithmetical
setting we get Lo¨b’s theorem as a side-effect of Diagonal Lemma. It is not
something that we would like to postulate as an interesting and independently
motivated principle. Rather, it is an unwanted surprising consequence. It is
also one of the reasons why we cannot consistently put all the instances of the
reflection schema together with HB conditions in the classical setting.
In CABAT we have certain versions of HB conditions:
ϕýC Bϕ (HB1′)
B(ϕ→ ψ), BϕýC Bψ (HB2′)
BϕýC BBϕ (HB3′)
The first condition in CABAT is a bit stronger than (HB1), since it is not
restricted only to theorems. The condition starts to be intuitive as soon as you
recall the interpretation of ϕýC ψ, which says that if ϕ is informally provable
then so is ψ. Some may be worried that the above formulation of HB1, in some
sense, allows to go from premises which are true (and may not be theorems)
to premises which are theorems. But as we explained, according to our reading
formulas on the left hand side of ýC are not true but informally provable. So
the principle allows only to go from informally provable premises to informally
provable premises having informal provability expressed in the object language.
CABAT doesn’t validate reflection as implication in its whole generality.
Given that implication has a rather strong meaning, as already discussed, we
don’t consider it a flaw. Our intended formulation of reflection is (Cref), which
we do have. Nevertheless, we have the following theorem.
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Theorem 99 (CABAT reflection as implication). Suppose eitherýC ϕ orýC ¬ϕ.
It follows thatýC Bϕ→ ϕ.
Proof. Take any evaluation e, it is clear that since e(ϕ) = 1 or e(ϕ) = 0, we have
e(¬Bϕ ∨ ϕ) = 1, which shows that e(Bϕ→ ϕ) = 1.
Given that (Nec) is admissible in CABAT, having full reflection as implication
would lead to inconsistency as it did for the formal provability predicate.
Observe an interesting corollary of Theorem 99: CABAT is not comparable
to the logic of formal provability GL (see: (Boolos, 1993)). On the one hand,
CABAT proves reflection for countertautologies (GL doesn’t) and on the other
hand GL ` B(ϕ→ ψ)→ (Bϕ→ Bψ) which is not a valid schema in CABAT.
An interesting question is whether the inferential apparatus of CABAT is suf-
ficient to prove Lo¨b’s theorem. The key observation is that in the standard proof,
once the premises, including the one produced by an application of the diagonal
lemma, are listed, the theorem follows by classical propositional logic. So the
issue can be judged at the propositional level, once all the relevant assumptions
are in.
The natural way to go about the translation is this. We translate both Pr
and ` as B. It is a standard practice to translate them using a single symbol
(see Boolos, 1993). Slightly more challenging is the question how to translate
implications from the language of PA. The straightforward approach is to trans-
late them as material implications in LB. But we think it will not do justice to
the original theorem. The deduction theorem does not hold for CABAT. Im-
plications are stronger claims than consequence claims and are much harder to
prove. Thus, whenever possible, we will translate ϕ → ψ in the conclusions as
ϕýC ψ. We leave implications in the premises, especially within the scope of B.
But this is not a cheap way for us to avoid an undesired consequence: by leaving
material implications in the premises we make them as strong as we can. As for
sentences produced by the application of Diagonal Lemma we will build them to
the assumptions.
Fact 100 (Lo¨b’s theorem failure).
B(Bϕ→ ϕ), B(λ→ (Bλ→ ϕ)), B((Bλ→ ϕ)→ λ)ZZý| C Bϕ.
Proof. Just take an assignment v(ϕ) = v(λ) = n and extend it to an evaluation
where for each implication if it is possible to choose n, it should be chosen. It
is easily verifiable that all the premises have value 1, and yet the conclusion has
value n, while all the constraints on valuations remain satisfied.28
Why doesn’t the standard argument work? Suppose ev gives value 1 to all
the premises. Since ev(B(λ → (Bλ → ϕ))) = 1, it follows that ev(Bλ → (BBλ →
Bϕ)) = 1. Now, in the standard proof we use the fact that ev(Bϕ→ BBϕ) = 1, but
we cannot do that here, since in general the previous formula is not a CABAT-
tautology.
28Note that here we are translating the assumptions of Lo¨b’s theorem not adding reflection.
As soon as we add instance of reflection for ¬λ the unwanted consequence holds.
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In other words, it is not the case that only those instances of the reflection
schema are provable for which ϕ is already a theorem. The lack of Lo¨b’s theorem
is rather promising, since it isn’t too intuitive for informal provability. In fact,
we’ve seen that reflection as implication is provable also for refutable claims, and
reflection as consequence is in for all formulas.
We will take a quick look at two other theorems related to provability and
the reflection schema. Montague theorem suggested that it is impossible to add
all instances of the schema and at the same time have all the Hilbert-Bernays
conditions. The moral from Montague (and dual Montague) theorems is that
the price for all Hilbert-Bernays conditions together with all instances of the
reflection schema on the one hand, or all instances of provabilitation one the
other (assuming co-necessitation) is too high in the classical setting. But what
happens when we switch to CABAT?
First, note that every occurrence of B on the left-hand side of ýC can be
omitted. Also, for the clarity we split equivalences into implications. The rel-
evant inferences, when evaluated from the perspective of CABAT, result in the
following.
Fact 101 (Truth-teller). λ→ Bλ, Bλ→ λZZý| C λ.
Proof. Take any evaluation e which ascribes to all the premises value 1. It is
possible that e gives value n to both λ, Bλ. Under this evaluation the conclusion
doesn’t have value 1.
Fact 102 (Curry). λ→ (λ→ ϕ), (λ→ ϕ)→ λýC ϕ.
Proof. The reasoning is classically valid, so it is also valid in CABAT.
Fact 103 (Montague with IPL).
λ→ B¬λ, B¬λ→ λ, Bλ→ λ, B¬λ→ ¬λýC λ ∧ ¬λ.
Proof. Take an evaluation e such that all the premises have value 1. Clearly,
since e(λ → B¬λ) = 1 = e(B¬λ → ¬λ), it follows that e(λ) = 0. On the other
hand e(B¬λ → λ) = 1 so e(¬B¬λ) = 1, which means e(B¬λ) = 0, which implies
e(λ) = 1.
The moral is quite straightforward. We blocked Lo¨b’s theorem but not at a
very high price: other counterparts of formal results that hold in the classical
context still work. Just for the sake of completeness we will take a glance at the
behavior of CABAT-counterparts of other theorems.
Fact 104 (Dual Montague with IPL). λ → B¬λ, B¬λ → λ, λ → Bλ,¬λ →
B¬λýC λ ∧ λ.
Proof. Take any evaluation e which gives value 1 to all the premises. Clearly,
since e(¬λ → B¬λ) = 1 = e(λ → B¬λ) it follows that e(B¬λ) = 1 so e(λ) = 0.
On the other hand e(B¬λ → λ) = 1 so e(B¬λ) = 1, thus e(λ) 6= 0, which is a
contradiction.
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What is also interesting is the fact that the dual paradox in which we add
provabilitation instead of reflection still works.
Fact 105 (Montague with IPG). The following consequence still holds:
λ→ ¬Bλ,¬Bλ→ λ, Bλ→ λ, B¬λ→ ¬λýC λ ∧ ¬λ.
Proof. Take any evaluation e which gives value 1 to all the premises. Clearly,
since e(λ → ¬Bλ) = 1 = e(¬Bλ → ¬λ), it follows e(λ → ¬λ) = 1, so e(¬λ) = 1.
On the other hand e(¬Bλ→ λ) = 1, which implies that e(Bλ) = 1 so e(λ) = 1 a
contradiction.
Fact 106 (Dual Montague with IPG). The following consequence still holds:
λ→ ¬Bλ,¬Bλ→ λ, λ→ Bλ,¬λ→ B¬λýC λ ∧ ¬λ.
Proof. Take any evaluation e which gives value 1 to all the premises. Clearly,
since e(¬λ → B¬λ) = 1 = e(¬Bλ → λ), it follows that e(λ) = 1. On the other
hand, e(λ→ ¬Bλ) = 1, so e(¬Bλ) = 1 which means e(λ) 6= 1.
Given these results, we submit, CABAT, despite the lack of reflection for-
mulated by means of implication, incorporates reflection nevertheless, and is an
independently motivated and interesting candidate to be further developed into a
first order version. It incorporates very basic intuitions about informal provabil-
ity as used in mathematical practice and preserves quite a few intuitive inferential
patterns of informal provability at a not too high cost.
Chapter 7
Future work and conclusions
First, let’s say a few words about possible dimensions in which the framework
can be further extended. We start with a first order version of BAT.
7.1 First order BAT
In order to construct a first order version of BAT, we need to start with a couple of
definitional and notational conventions. First, let L be a first order language un-
derstood as a set of formulas built in the standard way. We use V ar = x1, x2, . . .
to denote the set of variables, Con for constants, Term for the set of terms.
Sometimes we will be interested in the language L+ defined as L extended with
constants for all elements of the quantification domain. Usually, to define a
three-valued first order logic the notion of a three-valued structure is used. This
notion is pretty standard (Halbach, 2011). In our case, we use a slight variation
of this notion, since the resulting logic is not deterministic. It’s quite clear how
to rephrase the results in the paper in terms of the standard three-valued setting.
A three-valued structure is a tuple 〈M, i〉, such that:
• M 6= ∅ is the domain of quantification (sometimes called the universe of the
structure).
• i is an interpretation:
– To every n-ary predicate P , i ascribes a triple 〈E(P ), A(P ), F (P )〉
such that:
E(P ), A(P ), F (P ) ⊆ Mn
E(P ) ∩A(P ) = E(P ) ∩ F (P ) = A(P ) ∩ F (P ) = ∅
E(P ) ∪ F (P ) ∪A(P ) = Mn
E(P ) is called the extension of a predicate P , A(P ) stands for the
anti-extension of P and F (P ) is called the fringe of P . Intuitively,
E(P ) corresponds to the things that are P , A(P ) to the things that
are not P and the fringe correspond to those elements of the domain to
which a predicate is not applicable. In the classical context we always
assume that the fringe is empty.
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– i(c) ∈ M for every constant c.
– For any n-ary function symbol ◦, i(◦) : Mn 7→ M.
– Identity is classical: i(=) is 〈E(=), A(=), F (=)〉 such that E(=) is
{〈x, x〉 | x ∈ M}, A(=) is M2 \ E(=) and F (=) is empty.
Now, a three-valued modelM is a triple 〈M, i, v〉, where 〈M, i〉 is a three-valued
structure and v : V ar 7→ M is a valuation function. Relative to a valuation we
can define the interpretation of terms:
• tM(τ) = i(τ) if τ is a constant,
• tM(x) = v(x) if x ∈ V ar,
• tM(◦(τ1, . . . τn)) = (i(◦))(tM(τ1), . . . , tM(τn)).
For a moment let’s focus on atomic formulas. In the classical context each
atomic formula P (a) is either true if i(a) ∈ E(P ) or it’s false, if i(a) ∈ A(P ).
The interpretation uniquely determines the values of all formulas defining at the
same time the satisfaction relation. In our case, since we have three values,
it’s impossible to use the classical satisfaction relation. Instead, we use a triple
〈ý , ý, ý 〉 of relations between a given structure M and the set of well-formed
formulas partially determined by:
• MýP (τ1, . . . τn) iff 〈i(τ1), . . . , i(τn)〉 ∈ E(P )
• M ýP (τ1, . . . , τn) iff 〈i(τ1), . . . , i(τn)〉 ∈ A(P )
• M ý P (τ1, . . . , τn) iff 〈i(τ1), . . . , i(τn)〉 ∈ F (P )
These satisfaction triples are used to define the notion of evaluation which
is responsible for generating the satisfaction clauses for the full language. An
evaluation is a total function eM : L 7→ {0, n, 1} such that for atomic formulas
ϕ we have:
• eM(ϕ) = 1 iff Mýϕ,
• eM(ϕ) = n iff M
ý
ϕ,
• eM(ϕ) = 0 iff M ýϕ.
Again, in classical two or three-valued settings evaluations are uniquely de-
termined by a model and truth-tables for connectives and satisfaction clauses of
quantifiers. Since, our aim is to generalize BAT to the first order, we need to
restrict our attention to those evaluations which satisfy conditions put on con-
nectives by BAT. In order to cope with quantifiers, we treat them as “infinite”
conjunction and infinite disjunction.
Definition 107 (BAT evaluation). Let M be a three-valued model. We say
that an evaluation eM is a BAT evaluation iff for all formulas ϕ,ψ:
• eM(¬ϕ) = 1 iff eM(ϕ) = 0,
7.1. FIRST ORDER BAT 107
• eM(¬ϕ) = n iff eM(ϕ) = n,
• eM(¬ϕ) = 0 iff eM(ϕ) = 1,
• If eM(ϕ) = 1 or eM(ψ) = 1, then eM(ϕ ∨ ψ) = 1,
• eM(ϕ ∨ ψ) = 0 iff eM(ϕ) = 0 and eM(ψ) = 0,
• If eM(ϕ) = 0 and eM(ψ) = n, then eM(ϕ ∨ ψ) = n,
• If eM(ϕ) = n and eM(ψ) = 0, then eM(ϕ ∨ ψ) = n,
• If eM(ϕ) = n and eM(ψ) = n, then eM(ϕ ∨ ψ) = n or eM(ϕ ∨ ψ) = 1,
• If eM(ϕ) = 0 or eM(ψ) = 0, then eM(ϕ ∧ ψ) = 0,
• eM(ϕ ∧ ψ) = 1 iff eM(ϕ) = 1 and eM(ψ) = 1,
• If eM(ϕ) = 1 and eM(ψ) = n, then eM(ϕ ∧ ψ) = n,
• If eM(ϕ) = n and eM(ψ) = 1, then eM(ϕ ∧ ψ) = n,
• If eM(ϕ) = n and eM(ψ) = n, then eM(ϕ ∧ ψ) = n or eM(ϕ ∧ ψ) = 0,
• eM(ϕ→ ψ) = 0 iff eM(ψ) = 1, then eM(ϕ ∧ ψ) = 0,
• If eM(ϕ) = 0 then eM(ϕ→ ψ) = 1,
• If eM(ϕ) = n and eM(ψ) = n, then eM(ϕ→ ψ) = n or eM(ϕ→ ψ) = 1,
• If eM(ϕ) = n and eM(ψ) = 0, then eM(ϕ→ ψ) = n,
• If eM(ϕ) = 1 and eM(ψ) = n, then eM(ϕ→ ψ) = n,
• If eM(ϕ) = 1 and eM(ψ) = 1, then eM(ϕ→ ψ) = 1,
• If eM(ϕ) = n and eM(ψ) = 1, then eM(ϕ→ ψ) = 1,
• The clauses for equivalence are exactly as those of (ϕ→ ψ) ∧ (ψ → ϕ),
• eM(∀xϕ(x)) = 1 iff for any constant c ∈ L+, we have eM(ϕ(c)) = 1,
• eM(∀xϕ(x)) = 0 iff there is a constant c ∈ L+ such that eM(ϕ(c)) = 0,
• eM(∀xϕ(x)) = 0 or eM(∀xϕ(x)) = n otherwise,
• eM(∃xϕ(x)) = 0 iff for all constants c ∈ L+ such that eM(ϕ(c)) = 0,
• eM(∃xϕ(x)) = 1 iff there is a constant c ∈ L+ such that eM(ϕ(c)) = 1,
• eM(∃xϕ(x)) = n or eM(∃xϕ(x)) = 1 otherwise.
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The above clauses limit the set of all possible evaluations to BAT-evaluations.
The intuition here is quite simple: we try to mimic the clauses from the proposi-
tional level. Quantifiers are treated as a generalizations of BAT conjunction and
disjunction. In a sense quantifiers are “infinitary” versions of them. Each such a
BAT-evaluation determines a BAT triple 〈ýB , ýB ,
ý
B
〉 which is an extension
of a satisfaction triple to the full language. Based on that, we can define the
following notions:
Definition 108 (BAT-triple based on M). Let M be a model. We say that
〈ý , ý, ý 〉 is based on M iff 〈ý , ý, ý 〉 is a BAT-triple defined over the same
model. The set of all BAT-triples based on M is denoted as StrM. We say
that a model M decides formula ϕ iff all BAT-evaluations agree on ϕ, so all
BAT-evaluations ascribe the same value to ϕ.
Every model decides all Boolean combinations of atoms which are already
decided by it, but it is quite easy to see that in general M does not decide the
logical values of all complex formulas. For instance, for disjunctions of atoms
which are undecided by the model there are many underlying BAT-triples.
We managed to lift the framework to fully-fledged first order. Unfortunately,
the whole framework is quite complex and some philosophically motivated tech-
nical issues remain unsettled. For instance, given a three-valued structure it is
not clear what is the structure of BAT-evaluations based on it. Our hypothesis
is that they form a lattice with maximal and minimal elements, where the order
between BAT-evaluations is introduced by looking at the formulas whose values
are 1. The next issue is to find a procedure for selecting the BAT-evaluations
that are “admissible” to parallel the propositional move from BAT to CABAT.
Note that if we consider the set of all evaluations based on a given structure, then
we have a similar problem as in the propositional case: disjunction is not sym-
metric. Thus, there is a need for an additional closure or a filtration condition
which would allow one to eliminate the unwanted BAT evaluations. The third
issue is to actually use the framework over arithmetic and see what happens.
7.2 Conclusions
The non-deterministic approach to informal provability is far from complete. It
is rather clear, from the thesis, that the paradigm is quite promising and it is
a source of interesting technical results. We showed that CABAT is a viable
candidate as the logic of informal provability. With CABAT in the background
we have more reflection: it is no longer limited only to theorems.
Not only the study of non-deterministic semantics is interesting but also the
relation between well-known many-valued logics and the non-deterministic se-
mantics is far from clear. Non-deterministic semantics is difficult to work with.
One of the problems with it, seems to stem from its generality. This makes the
investigations about alternative semantics for the logic of informal provability
attractive.
Philosophically, I showed that the non-deterministic interpretation is far from
insane. It is well-motivated and influenced by a reading of informal provability
quite close to mathematical practice. To be fair, the cost of a non-deterministic
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solution is the technical complexity and the lack of natural semantics for CABAT.
As I showed, CABAT cannot be pinned down by most of known semantics that
are usually used to characterize propositional modal logics. Yet, it seems that
the principles of informal provability incorporated in CABAT are sufficient to
obtain a strong theory which somehow is not susceptible to most of the well-
known paradoxes. Note that the relation between formal and formal provability
is quite complex. On the one hand, it seems that inferential patterns governing
these two notions are different. But is it enough to infer that the extensions
of these concepts are different? I think, there is still room for an interesting
philosophical debate. On the technical side, it may be interesting to develop a
system containing two provability predicates both formal and informal to see now
how they interact in the first order arithmetical setting.
I also discussed Lo¨b’s theorem and its lack of applicability to the informal
concept of a proof. It is one of the reasons blocking the straightforward strategy
for adding the reflection schema together with others intuitive principles of in-
formal provability. Philosophically, it does not constitute a convincing principle,
since it’s not compatible with the reflection schema. In CABAT Lo¨b’s theorem is
not provable, and so the amount of the reflection that CABAT admits is greater
than for the formal provability.
Finally, I was able to study the most common types of the arguments to the
effect that informal mathematics, taken as a whole, cannot be consistent. The
construction of CABAT, and philosophical discussion of thereof shows that it
is possible to have an interesting formalization of informal provability on top of
which one can argue against the inconsistency of informal mathematics.
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Summary
Mathematicians prove theorems in a semi-formal setting, providing what we’ll
call informal proofs. There are various philosophical reasons not to reduce in-
formal provability to formal provability within some appropriate axiomatic the-
ory, but the main worry is that we seem committed to all instances of the so-
called reflection schema: B(ϕ) → ϕ (where B stands for the informal provability
predicate). Yet, adding all its instances to any theory for which Lo¨b’s theorem
(B(Bϕ→ ϕ)→ B(ϕ)) and some other very intuitive conditions for B hold leads to
inconsistency.
We propose a new way out by treating informal provability as a partial notion.
This means that some mathematical sentences are informally provable, some are
informally refutable and some are neither. In order to model this formally, we
develop the three-valued non-deterministic logics BAT and CABAT. The reason
for the lack of truth-functionality stems from the observation that disjunctions
and conjunctions of sentences which are neither informally provable nor refutable
may have a different status depending on the relations between these sentences.
Most of the dissertation is devoted to an extensive study of these logics. In
particular, we search for a less complex semantics, showing that many natural
candidates (finite deterministic semantics, Kripke semantics, non-normal Kripke
semantics and neighbourhood semantics) are not up for the job. We also con-
struct a complete proof system and generalize it to any non-deterministic con-
sequence relation. We also study some of the paradoxes of informal provability,
investigating what happens with them if we change the underlying logic from
classical logic to CABAT.
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Samenvatting
Wiskundigen bewijzen stellingen in een semi-formeel kader en komen op die
manier tot wat “informele bewijzen” worden genoemd. Er zijn verschillende
filosofische redenen om informele bewijsbaarheid niet te reduceren tot formele
bewijsbaarheid binnen een axiomatische theorie. De voornaamste is dat het niet
te verantwoorden lijkt om niet alle instanties van het zogenaamde reflectieschema
(Bϕ → ϕ) toe te voegen (waarbij B staat voor het informele bewijsbaarheid-
spredikaat). Er kan echter worden aangetoond dat het toevoegen van alle in-
stanties van het reflectieschema aan een theorie, waarin zowel de stelling van Lo¨b
(B(Bϕ → ϕ) → B(ϕ)) geldt als een aantal andere intu¨ıtieve eigenschappen voor
B, onvermijdelijk tot inconsistenties leidt.
In dit proefschrift stellen we een nieuwe manier voor om hiermee om te gaan,
namelijk door informele bewijsbaarheid als een partie¨le notie te beschouwen. Dit
komt erop neer dat we sommige beweringen als informeel bewijsbaar beschouwen,
sommige als informeel weerlegbaar en sommige als geen van beide. Om dit
formeel vorm te geven, hebben we de driewaardige niet-deterministische log-
ica’s BAT en CABAT ontworpen. Dat deze logica’s niet waarheidsfunctioneel
zijn, hangt samen met de vaststelling dat disjuncties en conjuncties van zinnen
die noch informeel bewijsbaar noch informeel weerlegbaar zijn een verschillende
status kunnen hebben, afhankelijk van de relaties tussen de zinnen in kwestie.
Het grootste deel van dit proefschrift is gewijd aan een grondige studie van
deze logica’s. In het bijzonder formuleren we een semantiek die zo eenvoudig mo-
gelijk is en tonen daarbij aan dat heel wat mogelijke semantieken (eindige deter-
ministische semantieken, Kripke semantieken, niet-normale Kripke semantieken
en “neighbourhood” semantieken) niet geschikt zijn. We formuleren ook een
volledige bewijstheorie en veralgemenen deze tot elke niet-deterministische gevol-
grelatie. We bestuderen tenslotte de meest voorkomende paradoxen in verband
met informele bewijsbaarheid en gaan na wat er gebeurt als we de onderliggende
logica veranderen van klassieke logica naar CABAT.
